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Whose Knowledge? Whose Influence? 
Changing Dynamics of China’s 
Development Cooperation Policy and 
Practice*
Jing Gu,1 Xiaoyun Li2 and Chuanhong Zhang3
Abstract This article aims to investigate the recent evolution of 
China’s development policy and practice. More precisely, how 
do China’s policymakers and practitioners understand and 
debate China’s role in international development, specifically in 
the context of the global Covid-19 pandemic? China’s growing 
development activities overseas, particularly in the African 
continent, have spurred intense debate over its role as a rising 
power in international development. China is viewed in the 
West both as a threat and as a valuable potential partner in 
development cooperation. However, differences between Western 
and Chinese conceptions of development have complicated 
cooperation and understanding of China’s development policy. 
Further understanding of these differences is needed, in order 
to evaluate their implications for low-income countries, and for 
potential trilateral cooperation.
Keywords development cooperation, knowledge, governance, 
practice, development policy, China.
1 Introduction
China’s growing role as a provider of development assistance, 
and the broader impact of its economic engagement overseas, 
has been the subject of considerable interest both within and 
outside China in recent years. There has been intense debate 
about the nature of Chinese foreign aid, especially in Africa 
and Asia. In particular, the question of what role China plays 
in global development has fascinated the world. There is a 
rich body of literature, ranging from studies on China’s aid 
modalities to research specifically focusing on aid data, and 
case studies on different projects or sectors. Conclusions and 
opinions appear divided: there are positive analyses that echo 
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the ‘win–win’ perspective of stakeholders from both China and 
partner countries through to scepticism from those who argue 
that China’s primary interest is in accessing raw materials and 
exporting its labour and goods.
However, communication and collaboration between Chinese 
and international policy researchers and practitioners have been 
limited, creating a knowledge gap and understandable deficit 
between different stakeholders. Similar to ‘traditional’ Western 
donors trying to re-establish global development aid architecture, 
China is also pursuing a bigger international role for itself through 
new multilateral platforms, including the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), and the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
In this context, this IDS Bulletin brings together studies of the 
primary institutions and policies that guide China’s activities 
in development cooperation. It also explores a range of 
cross-cutting topics including: the new Asian development 
finance and the potential impact of China on development 
thinking and policies; and China’s development practice and the 
effectiveness of South–South cooperation (SSC) and triangular 
cooperation. In an era where the ‘traditional’ aid discourses 
and the practices of new ‘emerging powers’ in development 
cooperation are simultaneously reacting and evolving – and 
given China’s growing prominence as a source of development 
finance and as an institutional player, and the potential that it 
offers for poverty reduction and growth in low-income countries – 
there is a real need for greater mutual understanding to promote 
effective cooperation and healthy competition in development 
cooperation.
2 Evolution of China’s development cooperation
Aid, or development assistance in the traditional sense, forms 
a small element of China’s development cooperation, which 
entails a much broader model of economic engagement that 
includes significant trade, loans, and capital investments. 
Official definitions and statistics around China’s foreign aid 
remain vague and are often classified, and the practical and 
experimental nature of Chinese development assistance means 
there is little articulation of a model for China’s development 
cooperation. The 2021 White Paper (SCIO 2021) lists technical 
cooperation, debt relief, and projects as major forms of aid. 
Of these foreign assistance projects, a majority is spent on 
economic infrastructure, followed by industry, energy and resource 
development, and agriculture. Grants, concessionary loans, and 
assistance for joint ventures are the primary forms of financing, 
which are used in concert with its investment and trade policies in 
order to leverage greater investment from the commercial sector.
China is often categorised as an emerging economy, but China 
is not an emerging donor. China started to provide development 
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assistance to other developing countries in the 1950s. Over the 
past 70 years, the concepts and policies of China’s development 
cooperation have been constantly adjusted, showing multi-level, 
multi-stakeholder, and multifaceted characteristics. China’s 
development cooperation policy has evolved in three main 
stages, resonating with China’s domestic policy transformation. 
Each stage features its own priorities and shows different 
characteristics.
The first stage of China’s foreign aid is more ideologically focused. 
In the early days of the founding of the People’s Republic of 
China, revolution was the main theme of the world at that 
time. The Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the breakdown of 
Sino-Soviet relations put China in an isolated situation. As a 
newly established regime, gaining the recognition of its national 
sovereignty by the international community was the top priority. 
Also, as a large country, to restore its status as a permanent 
member of the United Nations was the most urgent task. To win 
support from developing countries was a feasible approach 
to achieving these objectives. Therefore, during this period, 
political objectives dominated China’s international development 
cooperation policies. Most resources from China went to 
supporting the proletarian revolution and anti-imperialism of 
developing countries. Foreign aid became the main source for 
China to fulfil its international responsibilities and to build its 
national prestige.
China’s international cooperation during this period was mainly 
in the form of assistance in material, cash, and complete projects 
(similar to Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) projects) and was 
designed within the centrally planned economic system. From 
1953 to 1963, China’s foreign aid accounted for 1 per cent of its 
fiscal expenses. It has been increasing continuously since 1963, 
and by the fourth Five-Year Plan period (1968–73), China’s foreign 
assistance had reached 6.3 per cent of its fiscal expense and 
2.06 per cent of its gross domestic product (GDP), while at the 
same time, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) members only contributed 0.3 per cent of their gross 
national income (GNI). During this period, three quarters of China’s 
foreign aid went to North Korea, Vietnam, Albania, Laos, and 
Cambodia. During 1959–75, China provided more than US$838m 
to just one country, Albania, which is 8.9 times more than the West 
provided to this country (Backer 1982).
The ‘Eight Principles’ put forward by Premier Zhou Enlai during 
his talks with the Ghanaian president, Kwame Nkrumah, in 
19644 became the guiding principles of China’s international 
cooperation, and the concept of equality, cooperation, and 
mutual benefit (Li 2007) was strongly resonated by developing 
countries. Although mutual benefit was mentioned as one 
of the key principles, political solidarity carried more weight 
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in China’s development cooperation in practice during this 
period, which also brought benefit to the partner countries. The 
Tanzania–Zambia Railway built by China in the 1970s not only 
played a significant role for Southern African countries gaining 
independence, but was also a first try for China to promote its 
own development experiences (Hall and Peyman 1976). It certainly 
won the hearts and minds of African people, which made the 
huge economic sacrifice of China worthwhile. China successfully 
resumed its status as one of the five permanent members of the 
UN Security Council in 1971 with the support of African countries. 
But cooperation forged with aid from China for other countries 
did not turn out to be so fruitful. For example, China’s relationship 
with Vietnam broke down in the late 1970s, even though China 
had provided it with huge support.
The second stage starts from the reform and opening policy 
in 1978. China’s then top leader Deng Xiaoping made the 
‘scientific judgement’ that ‘peace and development’ would 
be the main theme of this new era. In a series of speeches 
on international cooperation, Deng Xiaoping stressed that 
China’s international cooperation cause needed to ‘act 
according to its capacity’, and added the principle of ‘seeking 
truth from facts’ to the principles of international cooperation. 
In December 1982, the then Premier Zhao Ziyang proposed new 
four principles of China’s foreign aid when he visited Africa, 
i.e. ‘equality and mutual benefit, emphasis on practical results, 
diverse forms, and common development’ (Jinghuashibao 2014). 
China still adhered to the spirit of proletarian internationalism, 
but at the operational level, foreign aid should also serve China’s 
reform and opening policy.
The principles of equality and mutual benefit became guiding 
principles of China’s foreign aid. It has also become the 
guiding principle for promoting economic and trade relations with 
other countries. The definition of development cooperation has 
gone beyond foreign aid as trade and investment have become 
indispensable components for development. Under the guidance 
of the core principles, China’s foreign aid policy has undergone 
several reforms, gradually shifting from the ideologically focused 
to promoting mutually beneficial cooperation between China 
and partner countries. This new concept of equal partnership has 
been widely accepted by foreign countries as it is seen as being 
able to diminish the inherent inequality in the ‘donor–recipient 
paradigm’ (Moyo 2009).
There are two salient features of China’s development cooperation 
during this period. First, the volume of China’s foreign aid has 
increased significantly since the mid-1990s after decreasing in 
the 1980s. According to the first White Paper on China’s foreign 
aid (SCIO 2011), during 2004–09, the annual growth rate of 
China’s foreign aid reached 29.4 per cent, surpassing that of most 
developed countries during the same period. Second, economic 
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development for both China and partner countries was prioritised 
over other factors. The complete projects (BOT) supported by 
concessional loans have become the most important form of 
China’s development cooperation. According to the 2014 White 
Paper on China’s foreign aid, in just three years (2010–12), China 
built 580 complete projects in 80 countries, concentrating on 
infrastructure and agriculture sectors (SCIO 2014).
In terms of the administrative system, in the context of the 
institutional reform of the ‘separation of government functions 
from enterprise management’ in 1995, China began to expand 
the scale of aid funds in the form of government concessional 
and preferential loans (Li 2007). The introduction of the market 
mechanism changed direct state control over the economy, and 
enterprises became the subjects of market. Different government 
departments participating in China’s development cooperation 
could mobilise professional resources to implement foreign aid 
projects.
The administration of development cooperation became quite 
fragmented as the original administrative system gradually 
disintegrated, and the functions of the government began to 
change. With the addition of market factors, some aid projects 
gained economic benefit for the Chinese companies. The 
combination of aid with investment and trade contributed to 
the transnational flow of capital and human resources between 
China and other developing countries. Marketisation reforms such 
as ‘equity participation’ and ‘debt-to-equity swap’, revived some 
old projects that had not run well. Chinese and local enterprises 
were encouraged to implement China’s international cooperation 
projects in the form of joint ventures. Through the injection of 
market funds, more resources were mobilised.
The third stage began in 2013, when China’s development 
cooperation entered into a new era. The phenomenal growth 
of China’s economy not only changed China’s status in the 
world, but also increased the global expectation that China 
should shoulder more international responsibility. In 2013, 
when President Xi Jinping visited Africa, he proposed the new 
development cooperation principle between China and African 
countries, the ideology on ‘righteousness over benefit’ (‘弘义让利 
honghongyirangli’ in Chinese). Specifically, it means that China 
will conduct development cooperation with Africa based more on 
‘righteousness rather than mere benefit’. China needs to prioritise 
‘righteousness’ over ‘benefit’, to ‘give more and take less’, or ‘give 
first, take later’. In some cases, only giving, no taking (Xi 2013).
To refute the accusation of ‘neo-colonialism’ and ‘debt trap’ on 
China–Africa cooperation, President Xi reiterated the ‘five no’ 
policies at the Beijing Forum on China–Africa Cooperation 
summit in 2018: do not interfere with African countries in exploring 
development paths that suit their national conditions, do not 
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interfere in the internal affairs of Africa, do not impose China’s will 
on partner countries, do not attach any political conditions to 
aid to Africa, and do not seek private political gains in investment 
and financing in Africa. These policies adhere to the five principles 
of peaceful coexistence in China’s foreign policies formulated 
in 1954, which fundamentally convinced African countries that 
China’s main objective was to help develop their economy and 
eradicate poverty.
During this period, more development aid went to the least 
developed countries (LDCs). President Xi promised to provide 
US$12bn to LDCs by 2030 at the UN Sustainable Development 
Summit in 2015. Rather than emphasising the political or economic 
gains, China’s development cooperation has expanded into 
broader areas such as environmental sustainability, peace and 
security, and people-to-people exchange (Gu and Kitano 2018). 
The volume and geographical coverage of China’s foreign aid 
has increased steadily. From 2013 to 2018, China provided more 
than RMB27bn to other developing countries. Since the global 
outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, China has provided different 
types of health aid to 53 African countries and the African Union, 
including personal protective equipment, respirators, vaccines, 
and medical teams (SCIO 2021).
At the same time, China has become an active supporter of 
multilateralism (Carty and Gu 2021). China responded actively 
to the call of the G20 on the Debt Service Suspension Initiative 
(DSSI). China has reached consensus or signed contracts on DSSI 
with 19 African countries and cancelled the interest-free loans of 
15 African countries that needed to be paid by the end of 2020. 
The BRI has become the most important platform for China’s 
development cooperation and new multilateral banks such as the 
AIIB and the NDB have also become important facilitators of new 
development cooperation (Gu and Carey 2019). All these indicate 
that while adhering to the principle of mutual benefit, altruistic 
elements are becoming more important in China’s development 
cooperation, showing China’s willingness to shoulder more global 
responsibility to promote sustainable development.
From the above analysis, we can see clearly that China’s 
development policy reform has been closely related to its 
domestic development strategy. ‘Mutual benefit’ is a core 
principle in China’s aid and foreign policy, through which it 
helps build up the partner country’s capacity for independent 
‘self-development’. From the practice perspective, China’s 
development cooperation has transformed from concentration 
on a few countries with clear political goals to the demand-
driven nature of partner countries. In most recent years, focusing 
on sustainable as well as inclusive development has become the 
new direction for China’s development cooperation. By doing this, 
China’s development cooperation has been moving to ‘building a 
global community for a shared future’ (Xi 2015).
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3 China’s new approaches to international development
Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) in November 2012, the central committee of the 
CPC identified the overall goal of deepening comprehensive 
reform of China and to promote the modernisation of the 
national governance system and governance capacity. In March 
2018, China established the China International Development 
Cooperation Agency (CIDCA), an independent ministerial-level 
agency, to be responsible for policymaking relating to China’s 
foreign aid while the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s 
Republic of China (MOFCOM) would still be responsible for 
the implementation of development cooperation projects. 
The fragmentation of the institutional setting has changed 
to some extent. The 2021 White Paper officially extended 
the concept of foreign aid to development cooperation, 
incorporating cooperation under the BRI with China’s foreign 
aid, and re-emphasising that China will conduct development 
cooperation under the framework of SSC.
While current Western development aid focuses strongly on 
notions of poverty reduction, social welfare, and political and 
institutional reform, Chinese development cooperation forms a 
much broader remit that emphasises economic relationships. 
China’s approach to international development has been 
shaped by two important policy frameworks on development, 
the first formulated through the Chinese state, the second 
through the CPC. Firstly, the 14th Five-Year Plan, adopted by the 
Fourth Session of the 13th National People’s Congress in March 
2021,5 defined a concept of high-quality growth with innovative, 
coordinated, and green development. These central principles 
underpinning China’s approach to implementation coalesce 
with those of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
(2030 Agenda).
In dominant Chinese perspectives, sustainable development 
emphasises the need for a holistic, integrated approach to 
policy and practice (Gu et al. 2016; Gu, Corbett and Leach 2019). 
Broadly, it embraces the idea of ecological civilisation as the final 
goal of change within a given society, involving a synthesis of 
economic, educational, political, agricultural, and other societal 
reforms towards sustainability (Zhu 2016). Peaceful development, 
win–win cooperation, integration and coordination, inclusiveness 
and openness, sovereignty and voluntary action, as well as 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, should be followed in 
building a new type of international relations featuring win–win 
cooperation, establishing all-round partnership, and achieving 
economic, social, and environmental development in a balanced 
manner (UN 2016: 2).
In 2021, the Chinese government published China’s second 
Position Paper on the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development (MFA 2021). This sets out the principles, 
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priorities, and policies and sought to explain the progress made 
in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. The paper set out a 
number of specific elements to be pursued as priority aims:
 l Promote high-quality development. As China enters a new 
development stage, the goal is to achieve sustained and 
healthy economic development through improved quality and 
efficiency, guided by the new development philosophy.
 l Accelerate innovation and digitalisation. Promote the deep 
integration of digital technology with the real economy, use 
digital technology to promote innovation in public services, and 
improve the efficiency of government.
 l Improve people’s wellbeing and all-round development. China 
will develop a high-quality education system, advance the 
Healthy China Programme across the board, and implement 
the national strategy for population ageing.
 l Boost green development. China will accelerate the green 
transformation, and increase the efficiency of energy, water, 
land, and mineral resources. As an active response to climate 
change, China will strive to peak carbon emissions before 2030 
and realise carbon neutrality before 2060.
China further emphasises the need for global partnership and 
collective action in implementing the 2030 Agenda, stating that 
China will work with the global community to provide sound 
support in five principal ways: 
 l Upholding multilateralism for equity and justice;
 l Fostering an open world economy for a sound international 
development environment;
 l Deepening South–South cooperation and global partnerships;
 l Supporting international post-Covid-19 recovery;
 l Advancing global green and low-carbon transformation and 
enhancing the global climate response.
The second key policy framework is China’s ‘new development 
philosophy’ initiated and explained by Xi Jinping in his Secretary-
General’s Report to the CPC Congress in October 2017. China’s 
development of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics for a 
new era’ under President Xi has at its core a ‘people-centered 
philosophy of development’ (Xi 2017: 1, 16); a philosophy reflecting 
and reinforcing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 
2030 Agenda commitment to ‘leave no one behind’. 
China’s business sector has become increasingly involved in 
development projects, fuelled in part by its ‘going global’ strategy 
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initiated in 2000. This policy used state incentives, including 
preferential trade regulations, low-interest loans, and Export–
Import Bank of China (China Exim Bank) support, in order to 
promote the outward investment and global expansion of China’s 
leading firms and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). China’s SOEs 
have been involved in both labour-intensive manufacturing and 
infrastructure construction in developing countries, often through 
joint ventures with local private enterprises and SOEs, and have 
become highly influential in developing countries. However, 
beyond multinational SOEs, a growing wave of Chinese private 
firms and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are moving 
abroad. These SMEs are driven by growing domestic competition 
to seek new market opportunities overseas, but they do so with 
little coordination and direction from the state, and are often 
underprepared when operating in foreign and new environments.
The increasing role of market-driven businesses and SOEs in 
Chinese aid project implementation indicates an important 
transition away from state-dominated foreign aid. The growing 
diversity and multitude of Chinese firms now operating in Africa 
presents a challenge for state coordination, and in mediating 
China’s sometimes controversial public image abroad. Though 
incentivised by the state, business actors also act autonomously 
from state directives, and this must be recognised when liaising 
with Chinese business or state actors. Conflicts between state 
aims and business goals may be an emerging tension as China’s 
development activities evolve, leading to a potential gap 
between policy and practice.
China’s approach to aid significantly differs from that of Western 
donors and is still evolving, and awareness of differences in 
ideologies behind aid and development remains key to future 
successful aid cooperation. China does not wish to be regarded 
as a donor; its conceptions of its development cooperation and 
rejection of a donor identity must be respected when building 
engagement and cooperation bilaterally or in global forums. 
Though non-interference is a central principle of China’s foreign 
aid policies, its growing involvement and investments in high-risk 
parts of the world mean that this may be increasingly difficult 
to sustain. Increased political engagement and investment in 
security may be a necessary spillover in China’s engagement in 
fragile states.
The institutional context of China’s development cooperation 
is complex, and Western donors and external partners must 
take these differentiated political roles into consideration in 
order to effectively pursue trilateral development cooperation. 
The Chinese state and CIDCA in particular still has very limited 
capacity in coordinating between the multitude of actors 
operating in this environment. As China’s development assistance 
commitments grow, the institutional capacity and responsibility of 
this nascent agency will also need to be developed. Prospects for 
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trilateral cooperation remain viable, particularly in forums like the 
G20, which has adopted shared growth and development as a 
part of its core agenda. As discussed in Section 2, China has also 
taken steps towards avenues for cooperation, and the creation 
of CIDCA shows it is willing to learn from, and be amenable to 
cooperation with, traditional donors. However, recipient countries 
must be central in leading and participating in discussions 
around trilateral cooperation with Western countries and China.
4 Contributions to this issue
The articles in this IDS Bulletin provide a rich diversity of further 
contributions to this important and ongoing debate. They supply 
much needed detail of what is happening in practice on the 
ground, adding to existing evidence and further illuminating 
the issues being debated internationally about China’s role 
in international development. Though wide-ranging in their 
coverage, these articles are aligned around the central theme 
of this IDS Bulletin; namely, China’s development policy and 
practices. Taking this central theme, the respective articles 
focus on the question of what China contributes to international 
development and the implications for global development 
cooperation.
The articles focus, thematically, on just what this overarching 
ambition means in practice. In the first, Jiantuo Yu and Evan 
Due (this IDS Bulletin) look at some of the characteristics of 
China’s foreign aid system and its development over the years. 
The article discusses China’s foreign aid based on China’s 
own development experiences and its view of SSC. As China’s 
international aid continues to grow and become more prominent, 
particularly in the context of the BRI, the article calls for a deeper 
understanding of China’s aid institutions and the need for greater 
cooperation and capacity building.
In the second article, by Karin Costa Vazquez and Yu Zheng 
(this IDS Bulletin), the analysis centres on the recent challenges 
posed for multilateralism, and the emergence of a sustainable 
development regime which has pushed countries to engage 
in more flexible, fluid, and issue-based development finance 
initiatives and institutions. These changes have had a profound 
impact on how China conceives and delivers its development 
finance. The authors argue that it is critical to understand 
that China’s development finance has been increasingly 
market oriented, concerned with financial and environmental 
sustainability, and delivered through hybrid bilateral-multilateral 
channels, particularly since the launch of the BRI.
Shaped by the changes that China experienced at both 
international and domestic levels, particularly the consolidation 
of its aid governance structure, these new features signal the 
rise of a ‘new Asian development finance’. This is refocusing the 
global debate to the importance of combining aid, trade, and 
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investment under financially and environmentally sustainable 
frameworks, and channelling development finance through 
multilateral channels to catalyse structural transformation.
Against the background and context provided by the present 
introduction and the two initial articles, the following six articles 
provide theme-focused studies. Jiajun Xu and Richard Carey 
(this IDS Bulletin) examine the impacts, actual and potential, of 
China’s development experiences upon development thinking 
and policies elsewhere. They argue that the New Structural 
Economics provides a framework in which three agendas stand 
out – structural transformation as a policy priority; the return of 
industrial policy; and the use of Special Economic Zones. They 
integrate related drivers of growth in China – rapid urbanisation 
pulling in massive rural migration in an economic transformation 
process; the financing of provincial and city governments by 
improvised local government financing vehicles based on rising 
urban land values; and competition and accountability processes 
in China’s subnational governance system. While China’s 
experiences cannot be directly replicated elsewhere, they argue 
that lessons on why and how to achieve structural transformation 
are relevant for other developing countries, especially in fast 
urbanising and integrating Africa.
In their article on China’s non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
partnerships in a new era of development cooperation, Anthea 
Mulakala, Robin Bush, and Hongbo Ji (this IDS Bulletin), argue 
that NGO engagement in international development activities 
would improve their effectiveness. However, challenges exist that 
constrain optimal engagement, especially access to funding and 
a weak enabling environment and policy framework. This article 
addresses these challenges, drawing from the literature on ‘going 
out’ among Chinese NGOs and social organisations, along with 
interviews with key players in the Chinese NGO ecosystem. The 
authors recommend, among other things, that the government 
clarify and improve its policy framework for NGOs/social 
organisations in support of China’s international development 
collaboration, especially regarding funding flows, personnel 
regulations, and material and capital outflows.
In their article, Chuanhong Zhang, Xiaoyun Li, and Dawit Alemu 
(this IDS Bulletin) examine the effectiveness of SSC through a 
study of China’s agricultural aid projects in Africa. They argue 
that ‘ownership’ matters for the effectiveness of SSC. Their 
analysis centres on the representation of ownership in SSC and 
how it affects the process and impact of SSC projects using 
case studies of three uniformly designed Chinese agricultural 
aid projects in Mozambique, Tanzania, and Ethiopia. Based on 
long-term participatory observation and in-depth interviews, 
they argue that ownership in SSC is represented differently from 
project design to implementation. Divergence and ambiguity 
exist among different stakeholders in the operation of ownership. 
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Co-ownership of the two partners at the local level contributes 
to the effectiveness of SSC projects, while de-ownership and 
forced ownership have a negative impact on the survival and 
sustainable development of an SSC project. It is concomitant 
upon partners to make strong efforts, including in consultation 
and community engagement, to ensure that the challenges are 
overcome and opportunities are realised in practice.
The next article, by Xiuli Xu, Lídia Cabral, and Yingdan Cao (this 
IDS Bulletin), explores the formation of China’s modern agricultural 
science capability and its approach towards learning. The authors 
argue that while China was previously regarded and treated as 
a recipient of international scientific expertise, it is now a more 
equal partner and contributor, with capacity to provide funds, 
support exchange programmes for scientists, and collaborate 
in building laboratories and joint research programmes. Some 
of these are now extending beyond the CGIAR (formerly the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research) system 
and creating new Southern platforms for scientific collaboration 
and knowledge production. By offering an illustration of China’s 
‘selective learning’ approach, emphasising self-reliance and 
pragmatism in its engagement with the CGIAR, this article 
feeds into broader debates on how China contributes to global 
development knowledge and learning.
The article on Chinese foundations in international cooperation 
by Lindan Tan and Huib Huyse (this IDS Bulletin) argues that 
China’s international cooperation strategies are gradually 
changing due to evolving views about the limits of its 
internationalisation approach, which has traditionally mainly 
focused on building governmental and business relationships. 
Intensified interactions with developing countries in the context 
of the BRI are perceived to benefit from an increased role for 
its domestic NGOs. This article explores China’s initial steps 
in enabling its quickly evolving domestic NGO landscape 
to internationalise by looking at this development from an 
organisational capacity perspective. By assessing five key 
organisational characteristics of 36 Chinese foundations that 
engage in international cooperation over the period 2014–19, 
the authors find that the average organisational capacity for 
international cooperation is still limited but is showing gradual 
improvement. While they all comply with government regulations 
in governance and several foundations have large budgets and 
capacity for their domestic operations, the authors suggest that 
only a few currently mobilise substantial human and financial 
resources for their international activities.
The final article, by Sebastian Prantz and Xiaomin Zhang (this 
IDS Bulletin), broadens the perspective once again to consider 
the triangular aid cooperation conducted by China and Germany 
in Laos, Ethiopia, and Zambia. The article critically reviews the rise 
of the triangular cooperation modality to promote development 
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effectiveness in recent years. The authors argue that the aim of 
triangular cooperation is to utilise the comparative advantages 
of development cooperation approaches by a pivotal partner 
(usually an emerging donor) and a facilitating partner (usually a 
traditional donor) to effectively generate development impacts 
together with a beneficiary in its country, while at the same time 
strengthening the partnership of all actors involved. Recent 
years have seen an uptake in Chinese institutions actively 
engaging with international development partners in triangular 
cooperation. China and Germany have jointly founded the 
Sino-German Center for Sustainable Development to conduct 
triangular cooperation projects. This article explores the fields, 
frameworks, mechanism, and effects of triangular cooperation 
projects launched by China and Germany by examining case 
studies of projects initiated in Laos, Ethiopia, and Zambia.
5 Development cooperation in the pandemic era – China and 
the West
Global development is at a turning point. The common global 
challenges of climate change and the Covid-19 pandemic 
threaten all countries and demand unprecedented global 
cooperation. We need to recognise the differences and 
competition between regions and countries while still promoting 
development cooperation. Global challenges require global 
responses and local solutions. In an international environment of 
increasing tension and rivalry in the struggle for natural resources, 
in an ideological conflict over models of governance – and 
over increasing security anxieties generated by possibilities of 
technological surveillance – the need for policy-oriented research 
networking across borders could not be more essential.
The past two years have highlighted the ways in which prospects 
for global development cooperation have continued to be 
shaped by geopolitics, global health, and the global economy. 
The years 2020 and 2021 saw the unexpected global health crisis 
caused by Covid-19 and the global economic downturn. Further, 
China’s position in global trade and climate change negotiations 
emphasised the changing balance of economic and political 
power in the global economy.
China’s impressive economic growth and increasing development 
activities overseas, particularly in the African continent, have 
spurred intense debate over its role as a rising power in international 
development (Gu and Carey 2019; Renwick and Gu 2020). China’s 
global engagement with the developing world is changing 
rapidly and fundamentally. These fast-growing activities present 
both internal and external challenges for China and the world. 
How these challenges and knowledge gaps are addressed will 
not only determine China’s internal governance on development 
issues, but also its external activities and behaviours that are now 
having a profound global impact.
14 | Gu et al. Whose Knowledge? Whose Influence? Changing Dynamics of China’s Development Cooperation Policy and Practice
IDS Bulletin Vol. 52 No. 2 November 2021 ‘China and International Development: Knowledge, Governance, and Practice’
China is viewed in some Western perspectives as both a threat 
and as a valuable potential partner in development cooperation. 
However, differences between Western and Chinese conceptions 
of governance and development have complicated cooperation 
and understanding of China’s development policy and practices. 
The Covid-19 global health crisis became an invisible contesting 
ground beyond the immediate challenges being played out in 
response to the unfolding pandemic. On the one hand, China 
hoped to present the best possible image of its country to 
the world as it rolled out its most intensive and largest-scale 
emergency humanitarian assistance mission in recent years 
(Kurtzer and Gonzales 2020). On the other hand, the West hoped 
the pressure from the international development community 
could help to change China, recasting its image to align more 
closely to Western norms of governance and democracy. Further 
and deeper knowledge of these differences is needed, in order 
to evaluate their implications for low-income countries, and for 
potential trilateral cooperation.
6 How can the West cooperate while competing with China?
It has become customary, on the Western side, to categorise 
West–China relations as based on three types of relationship: 
partnership – where specific interests can be balanced and  
win–win is possible; competition – where market forces are 
accepted as valid determiners of outcomes; and strategic rivalry 
– where each side tries to outdo the other, displacing the other 
in the international sphere with its own model of governance, and 
bringing with that triumph a zero-sum relationship in a broad 
range of areas. Where does a global striving for sustainable 
development find its place in the face of these three types of 
relationship?
The answer is to leave behind all of these conventional ways of 
thinking and to recognise that development concerns overcome 
group/national egotism – through a common dedication to 
the ideal of furthering the welfare of those nations and regions 
which are in danger of being left behind in global development. 
Even partnership to balance interests is not enough. It is not 
a matter of individual aid providers gaining equal benefits for 
their interests by helping needy countries to progress. Instead, 
it is by focusing themselves jointly on the third parties they wish 
to assist, in dialogue with the latter, that there is a real hope of 
fruitful outcomes, where all grow and are enhanced from enjoying 
progress together, in a triangular relationship: the West, China, 
and the global South.
The history of China shows that real change comes from within, 
not without. China’s developmental success has been driven by 
the country’s own changing system, not from without, though 
the country has drawn on external knowledge and development 
assistance. China’s remarkable development trajectory has been 
acknowledged by the international community. As the largest 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 52 No. 2 November 2021 ‘China and International Development: Knowledge, Governance, and Practice’ 1–18 | 15
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
SSC provider and the second largest economy in the world, 
China’s new initiatives and practices in development cooperation, 
with distinct features from that provided by traditional donors, 
will reshape the landscape of global development, leading to 
the generation of new development knowledge and global 
development cooperation governance architecture.
With the AIIB and NDB being the first major multilateral 
development banks created once climate change had 
finally been acknowledged as a major issue to be addressed 
internationally, China has an opportunity to pioneer the design 
and funding of positive strategies that support sustainable and 
inclusive development; for example, around renewable energy 
or labour-intensive technologies/sectors. China’s role grew 
from one that was just focused on development financing to 
becoming a knowledge power that produced theory and policy 
applications for global development (Gu 2015). Increasingly, 
scholars are focused on the implications of what its ‘peaceful rise’ 
means for the international competitiveness of other countries’ 
manufactures; for financial and exchange rate stability; for 
military security; for global public goods; and for international 
development knowledge mobilisation and cooperation.
There is a pressing need for countries to build up the capacity to 
better understand and better participate in global and national 
development. Initiatives that help to foster mutual learning and 
long-term relationships are vital. In a changed, and still rapidly 
changing, global landscape there is much debate on the future of 
development cooperation. Further dialogue is needed to explore 
new approaches to international development cooperation and 
healthy competition over the coming decades. How to build an 
essential foundation and rule-based international order to share 
responsibilities and build mutual trust and understanding will be 
the critical challenge in a post-pandemic era.
Notes
*  This IDS Bulletin was produced as part of the UK Anchor 
Institution for the China International Development 
Research Network, funded by the Foreign, Commonwealth 
& Development Office (FCDO). The opinions expressed are 
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or 
policies of IDS or the UK government.
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Mutual Learning in Development 
Cooperation: China and the West*
Jiantuo Yu1 and Evan Due2
Abstract This article looks at some of the characteristics of 
China’s foreign aid system and its development over the years. 
It discusses China’s foreign aid based on its own development 
experiences and its view of South–South development 
cooperation. Both the modalities and narratives of China’s 
international development cooperation need to be considered 
in order to better understand the complexities, strengths, 
and weaknesses of its aid system. As China’s international aid 
continues to grow and become more prominent, particularly in 
the context of the Belt and Road Initiative, the article calls for a 
deeper understanding of China’s aid institutions and the need for 
greater cooperation and capacity building.
Keywords South–South cooperation, China’s foreign aid; Belt and 
Road Initiative, international development cooperation.
1 Introduction
China’s foreign aid practices have attracted much global 
attention over the past decade. But China’s foreign aid is not a 
recent phenomenon, as implied by the term ‘emerging donor’. As 
widely cited, China has been extending international assistance 
as far back as the 1950s. However, only recently have the 
magnitude and character (both institutional and policy make-up) 
of China’s foreign aid and international development cooperation 
dramatically changed.
The presence of foreign aid from China alongside the Western aid 
system led by the international financial institutions and the club 
of bilateral donors represented in the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) has become a topic of much discussion 
outside of China (Woods 2008; Brautigam 2011; Gu et al. 2014; 
Dreher and Fuchs 2016; Nowak 2015; Brazys and Vadlamannati 
2018; Regilme and Hartmann 2018). Indeed, surprisingly few 
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studies have actually come from within China, suggesting 
that this has not been a subject of much internal debate. As 
China is now an influential player in international development 
cooperation, inadequate dialogue, misunderstanding, and a 
prevailing lack of trust between China and the Western donor 
communities make cooperation between the two sides difficult 
and exacerbate uncertainties of the current global order.
This article tries to address the recognition gaps between 
China and Western societies by reviewing China’s involvement 
in international development assistance. It seeks to highlight 
aspects of China’s evolving foreign aid system, alongside its 
efforts to engage as a global partner in promoting global 
development and working towards the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs). Section 2 provides a short overview of China’s 
foreign aid, and Section 3 describes the evolution of China’s aid 
practices with some observations on current trends. Section 4 
discusses what China, as a developing country and a donor-
recipient, can contribute to global development based on the 
conceptual framework of modernisation for the majority. This 
is followed by a critical analysis in Section 5 on the weakness 
of China’s current aid architecture and discusses what China 
can learn from previous lessons and experiences of Western 
counterparts. Section 6 concludes the article.
2 China’s foreign aid: an overview
China became an aid donor, in the modern sense,3 in 1950, soon 
after the founding of the People’s Republic of China. However, 
unlike other donors responding to the reconstruction needs 
of the post-Second World War era at the time, China was a 
poor developing country coming out of revolutionary conflict, 
and aid cooperation was seen as a political imperative for 
relations with its neighbours. Fast forward to today, and China 
is now a significant bilateral donor and a major contributor of 
development financing to the multilateral aid system (Kitano and 
Harada 2014). It is a major provider of humanitarian aid (alongside 
its growing commitments to United Nations (UN) human security), 
and a significant contributor to global public goods – notably in 
combating climate change and in addressing health needs as 
a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. It also is a core partner and 
financier of multilateral institutions.
2.1 A cursory glance
According to the official White Papers published by the State 
Council of the People’s Republic of China (SCIO 2011, 2014, 2021; 
Zhang 2021), China has allocated cumulatively CNY 615.83bn 
(around US$130.8bn) for foreign aid projects estimated from the 
1950s to the present, of which CNY 270.2bn (around US$42bn) was 
disbursed during 2013–18. The components of Chinese aid are 
classified into three broad areas: grants, interest-free loans, and 
concessional loans.4
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Although the aggregate amount of foreign aid has been relatively 
large over the past decade, China’s annual appropriation for 
development assistance is actually quite modest compared 
to Western counterparts (Li 2019). According to estimations 
conducted by Kitano and Miyabayashi (2020), China’s net official 
development assistance (ODA) increased by more than eight 
times, from US$0.7bn to US$6.8bn during 2001–19. However, even 
with this significant increase, the ratio of China’s net ODA to that 
of the United States was only one fifth (Figure 1).5
The composition of China’s foreign aid experienced a 
fundamental shift after 2010. Figure 2 shows the proportions of 
the three categories of foreign assistance: grants accounted 
for the largest proportion of China’s foreign assistance during 
1950–2009, and interest-free loans and concessional loans almost 
had equal shares. However, concessional lending overtook grants 
as the largest part of foreign assistance during 2010–18, though 
the latter’s share was up slightly, and the share of interest-free 
loans decreased significantly during the same period (see 
Figure 3). This also marked the period when overseas Chinese 
foreign direct investment into developing countries expanded 
greatly, encouraging concessional lending to be linked with 
investment projects.
2.2 Categories and allocation of aid
Focusing only on expenditure underestimates China’s overall 
foreign assistance contributions. According to China’s official 
classification, China offers aid in terms of eight categories 
or forms, some of which are not recorded in expenditure 
terms. These include what are defined in China’s system as: 
Source Authors’ own, based on Kitano and Miyabayashi (2020) and OECD 
data set (OECD n.d.).
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complete projects; goods and materials; technical cooperation; 
human resource development cooperation; medical teams sent 
abroad; emergency humanitarian aid; volunteer programmes 
in foreign countries; and debt relief. A wide variety of types of 
aid fit in the above categories. Although imprecise in terms 
of development accounting or reporting as done by Western 
donors, these categories do indicate the types of assistance 
and policies that China pursues in its development cooperation. 
This has implications for how aid is accounted for and managed, 
and presents some challenges for statistical recording and 
comparisons.
Table 1 shows the change in complete projects. Providing 
complete projects is a very popular aid type adopted by China. 





Figure 3 China’s foreign aid structure, 2010–18






Figure 2 China’s foreign aid structure, 1950–2009
Source Authors’ own, based on SCIO (2011, 2014, 2021).
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with public facilities accounting for the largest part in terms of 
the quantity of completed projects (44.12 per cent), followed by 
industry projects and economic infrastructure projects. However, 
the share of industry projects has declined dramatically since the 
mid-1980s as many recipient countries have accelerated their 
pace of privatisation in the industrial sector (Li 2019). The share 
of public facility projects increased significantly, accounting for 
around three quarters of the total during 2013–18, with education 
and health projects comprising the majority type of aid. It is not 
clear as to the distribution of financial resource inputs in these 
projects. Yet according to SCIO (2014), economic infrastructure 
projects – mainly including roads, electricity, telecommunications, 
Table 1 Change in complete projects in 1950–2018
1950–2018 1950–2009 2010–12 2013–18
Type of complete 
projects
Quantity Share in 
total (%)
Quantity Share in 
total (%)
Quantity Share in 
total (%)
Quantity Share in 
total (%)
Public facilities 1,336 44.12 670 33.09 360 62.07 306 72.34
Economic 
infrastructure
626 20.67 390 19.26 156 26.90 80 18.91
Agriculture 283 9.35 215 10.62 49 8.45 19 4.49
Industry 655 21.63 635 31.36 15 2.59 5 1.18
Others 128 4.23 115 5.68 0.00 13 3.07
Total 3,028 100.0 2,025 100.0 580 100.00 423 100.00
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from SCIO (2011, 2014, 2021).




Figure 4 Chinese aid allocation by region, 1950–2012
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and broadcasting – comprised the largest share in 2010–12, 
accounting for 44.8 per cent of the total financial resources input.
According to data released by SCIO (2011, 2014), Africa has been 
given more priority in Chinese aid. In terms of magnitude of financial 
resources allocated by region, Africa accounted for 47.28 per cent 
of the total, followed by Asia (32.21 per cent) and Latin America and 
the Caribbean (11.59 per cent) respectively (Figure 4).
3 Evolution of China’s foreign aid practices since 1978
China’s foreign aid practices have evolved over the years in 
accordance with international and domestic circumstances. 
During the formative years (1950–78), China’s foreign assistance 
was largely motivated to strengthen the solidarity of the socialist 
camp and to support its global campaign of anti-imperialism 
and anti-colonialism. In this stage, China had developed core 
thinking about development assistance in terms of technical 
cooperation and ‘South–South cooperation’, a concept borne 
out of the Bandung Asian-African Conference in 1955 and which 
remains a defining feature of China’s conceptualisation of aid.
Embodied in the ‘Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical 
Assistance to Other Countries’ (Yu 1992: 610), this forms the 
ideological basis for China’s engagement with other developing 
countries, and the primacy of recipient-led development which 
today colours much of aid discourse. There have been dramatic 
changes to China’s aid system in terms of motives, methods, 
and policy considerations since the adoption of the reform 
and opening up policy in 1978, though China’s commitment to 
developing countries and some key principles have been followed.
3.1 Transformation
In late 1978, China adopted its reform and opening up policy. 
As argued by Deng Xiaoping, ‘peace and development are the 
main themes of our era’ (Deng 1994: 105); such a prediction on 
the status quo and trends of the global environment laid a solid 
foundation for China’s domestic market-led economic reforms. 
These far-reaching economic reforms, which continue with 
modification, unlocked unprecedented growth averaging over 
9 per cent and set in motion an extended period of economic 
development, poverty reduction, and institutional and social 
change. On the international front, Deng Xiaoping suggested 
that China ‘keep a low profile’ and should ‘never be the leader of 
any (ideological) camp’ (ibid.: 363), though the former has often 
been translated, perhaps wrongly, as to ‘conceal one’s abilities 
and bide one’s time’. Although the reform period was entirely 
domestic in nature, the expansion of industrial capacity and 
trade set the stage for a fundamental shift in foreign policy from 
passive to active engagement (Deng 1994).
As China’s economic policies mobilised resources for rapid 
economic expansion at home – complemented by aid from Japan 
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and Western nations – China also expanded its international 
investment and foreign aid. Deng Xiaoping underscored the 
concept of ‘mutual development’ and ‘mutual benefit’, situating 
foreign aid as a tool in its foreign policy (Johnston and Rudyak 
2017). In accordance with the shift from a centralised planned 
economy to a socialist market economy, economic rationality, 
fiscal affordability, and long-term impacts on recipient countries 
began to guide the provision of development assistance.
China attached considerable importance to capacity building 
in recipient countries and focused on technical training in its 
aid regime. By the mid-1990s, however, China began to diversify 
into development projects in the form of economic infrastructure 
financing. The Export-Import Bank of China and the China 
Development Bank were established during this period and 
started to play an important role in development financing. 
Foreign aid became more compartmentalised in terms of 
technical cooperation on the one hand, and the provision of loans 
for investment projects on the other, where lending from the policy 
banks fell to the authority of various state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) according to their areas of competence of mutual interest.
3.2 Going global
China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 
brought about further changes to China’s domestic economic 
development and the landscape of global economic power. 
By the end of the 1990s, China’s stock of accumulated foreign 
direct investment accounted for around a third of all foreign 
direct investment to developing countries, enabling Chinese 
firms to become major investors abroad. Accession induced 
more domestic reforms and economic liberalisation, laying the 
framework for deeper integration into the global economy. 
Throughout this period, the ‘going out’ strategy to promote 
Chinese investment abroad incentivised more and more Chinese 
enterprises supported with concessional financing, similar to the 
tied aid that benefited Japanese firms.
The strategy was made clear in the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-10) 
which both encouraged Chinese enterprises to actively 
participate in international and regional cooperation mechanisms 
and overseas investment projects, and to increase Chinese aid 
to other developing countries and further strengthen economic 
and technical cooperation (SCIO 2006). Foreign aid was seen as 
integral to China’s ‘going out’ policy and of opening up to the 
outside world through participation in international economic 
and technical cooperation. This explicitly embedded international 
development assistance within the narrative to:
actively participate in the international regional economic 
cooperation mechanism, strengthen dialogue and consultation 
and develop bilateral and multilateral economic and trade 
cooperation with all countries. Actively participate in the 
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formulation of multilateral trade and investment rules and push 
the establishment of the new international economic order… 
and to increase Chinese aid to other developing countries.6
Throughout this period, China had begun to utilise both grant aid 
and concessional financing, along with technical assistance, in a 
much more integrative fashion with SOEs and private firms. This 
was driven less by external demand than by a supply-side push, 
due to the high accumulation of foreign reserves and savings, and 
the less than favourable returns from external holdings, such as 
US treasury bills. By the time of the 2008 financial crisis, domestic 
concerns over large foreign exchange reserve holdings, and 
excessive supply capacity in manufacturing and industry, drove 
more aggressive spending abroad, including utilising foreign aid 
as a means to crowd in pent-up commercial investments.
In tandem with its proactive international trade and investment 
strategy, China initiated aid consultations with developing 
countries through multilateral forums and regional groupings. 
These included increasing aid commitments in forums such 
as the UN High-Level Meeting on Financing for Development, and 
the UN High-Level Meeting on the Millennium Development Goals, 
as well as regional arrangements including the Forum on China–
Africa Cooperation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
the China–Caribbean Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum, 
the China–Pacific Island Countries Economic Development 
and Cooperation Forum, the Forum on Economic and Trade 
Cooperation between China and Portuguese-Speaking 
Countries, and the China–ASEAN (Association of South East Asian 
Nations) forum. These served as venues to deepen development 
cooperation in a range of fields (agriculture, infrastructure, 
education, health care, human resources, and clean energy). 
South–South cooperation became the basic modality for the 
implementation of foreign aid (Zhang 2012).
It was also realised and made clear in policy formulations that 
China’s own national development and modernisation depended 
on a peaceful international environment and collaborative 
relations with other countries (Xia and Jiang 2004). Thus, from 
the perspective of idealism, peace and development should be 
pursued because they are common human values and China 
as a responsible developing country should get involved in this 
process (SCIO 2011, 2014, 2021). From the perspective of realism, 
however, based on China’s own experience, development itself 
was seen as the most effective means to cope with crime, 
inequality, and social and economic instability. Thus, providing aid 
to developing countries would help China benefit from a peaceful 
and cooperative international environment (Zhou 2008; Zhang 
2008; Yang and Chen 2010).
China’s segmented, uncoordinated, and less organised foreign 
aid system was nevertheless also not clearly aligned with its 
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investment policies, and this led to both a haphazard approach 
to the provision of aid alongside economic investments, as well 
as a misunderstanding more broadly as to the use of aid as a 
foreign policy instrument (Zhou 2010, 2012; Xue 2014; Li et al. 2014; 
Li 2019).
3.3 Strategic upgrade and the Belt and Road Initiative
China’s economic and social development began to trend 
towards rebalancing and deepening reform with the 12th and 13th 
Five-Year Plans, and correspondingly, moves towards increasing 
China’s presence on the international stage. This also served 
to accelerate the provision of foreign aid. Following the 18th 
Plenary Meeting of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), many 
new initiatives were launched expanding the use of foreign aid 
alongside economic investment agreements with developing 
countries around the world. In late 2012, China proposed the 
establishment of ‘the community with shared future’, so as to 
cope with the common challenges faced by the world in the 
twenty-first century. The policy direction was not only a response 
to global challenges such as climate change, global security, 
and health pandemics, but also a signal to the US and Western 
powers of China’s increasing involvement in global affairs and 
governance with respect to global public goods.
In 2013, President Xi Jinping’s announcement of the Silk Road 
Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road, known later as the 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), set an important milestone for 
China’s international development cooperation and foreign aid. 
In addition to having established new development agencies and 
financial entities – such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank, the New Development Bank, and the Silk Road Fund – the 
BRI was articulated as an inclusive framework for international 
development cooperation with regional parameters, promoting 
commercial cooperation and Chinese foreign assistance for 
infrastructure development, connectivity, and poverty reduction. 
By the end of 2020, China had signed 203 cooperation 
documents with 138 countries and 31 international organisations 
to jointly promote the Belt and Road Cooperation, exceeding the 
framework of the previous South–South cooperation modality 
and opening up a new international paradigm for development 
cooperation.
The 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–20) is perhaps the most explicit 
strategic document setting out the policy framework for 
international investment and development cooperation. This 
included moving forward with improving bilateral and multilateral 
mechanisms of the BRI, strengthening multilateralism, and helping 
to reform international economic governance. Foreign aid played 
an important role in this context, not only through increased 
finances for expanding cooperation, but also in improving China’s 
aid implementation system so as to be an active partner in the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
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The establishment of the China International Development 
Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) in 2018 is a significant step in 
this direction. It is part of an overall effort in constructing a 
more modern architecture of foreign aid and development 
cooperation, seeking to formulate strategic guidelines, plans, and 
policies for foreign aid, and to coordinate and offer advice on 
major foreign aid issues. CIDCA is mandated to advance China’s 
reforms in matters involving foreign aid, and to identify major 
programmes and supervise and evaluate their implementation. 
As it currently stands, the institution is at an early stage of 
building its own capacity, and this requires assistance and 
cooperation from other agencies and departments within China, 
as well as engagement internationally with other bilateral and 
multilateral agencies responsible for administering and managing 
development assistance. Although there is much that needs to 
be improved, the contour of the modernised architecture of the 
development cooperation system has started to take shape.
4 Modernisation for the majority: China’s possible contribution to 
global development cooperation
4.1 Rethinking foreign aid from the perspective of modernisation 
for the majority
‘Modernisation for the majority’ (多数人的现代化) (Deng 1987, 2012) 
is a conceptual framework first introduced by the late Chinese 
economist Deng Yingtao. As reflected in his books and articles, 
Deng argued that, for about two centuries, only a minor group 
of people, mainly concentrated in developed societies, could 
lead a modern life under the Western model, which he called 
modernisation for the minority (少数人的现代化). However, if the 
majority of the world’s population want to lead modern lives, 
or modernisation for the majority, the ways of industrialisation, 
urbanisation, and resource use should be fundamentally 
changed (ibid.).
Chinese policy analyst and advocator Lu Mai further developed 
this framework by arguing that, when China, together with other 
emerging economies such as India, Brazil, and Russia, achieve 
modernisation, the majority of the world’s population will then 
be able to lead modern lives, and it will be easier for these 
newly modernised countries to work with the developed world 
to help other developing countries. Lu Mai argues that China’s 
aid to developing countries will help to promote the process of 
modernisation for the majority (Lu Mai 2014, 2017).
This conceptual framework could be used to understand 
the increasing role of China in foreign aid and international 
development cooperation. From China’s perspective, its foreign 
aid is embedded within a South–South cooperation framework, 
where the norms, standards, and accounting procedures that 
govern aid practices among the DAC group of donors do not 
apply. Nonetheless, China now sees itself as a major actor in the 
foreign aid arena with increased obligations in the governance 
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of international development finance. China’s role as a donor 
should therefore be considered not solely from the platform of the 
DAC club of donors, but also from the perspective of Southern 
partners and within a South–South cooperation narrative, in 
concert with wider multilateral forums such as the G20. Reform 
of the international aid architecture that emphasises inclusivity 
could be part of the unfolding agenda of what is termed in China 
as ‘modernisation for the majority’.
However, modernisation for the majority will not be achieved 
automatically and without challenges. There are various 
obstacles hindering the modernisation of developing countries, 
and two kinds of gaps that are particularly challenging among 
them. One is the financing gap. To date, there is a huge gap 
between the official aid provided by OECD countries and the 
demand of developing countries. As reported in OECD (2020), 
on average, DAC members provide about 0.3 per cent of gross 
national income (GNI) to official aid, while the suggested level by 
the UN is 0.7 per cent. It is estimated that the financing gap is 
US$2.5tn per year to achieve the SDGs (United Nations 2019).
The other is the knowledge gap. Development knowledge, to 
a large extent and for a long time, had been centralised in 
Western-style thinking and narratives. More importantly, as 
argued by the Korean development economist Ha-Joon Chang, 
the West has always tried to teach developing countries things 
they have never done (Chang 2011). On the other hand, voices 
and experiences from the developing world have not been given 
enough attention (Li 2019).
4.2 What can China contribute?
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, and 
particularly since the launch of its reform and opening up policy, 
China has made significant progress in modernisation, economic 
growth, and poverty alleviation. Today, China sees that its fiscal 
capacity and experience drawn from its own development can 
be used to help the international community mitigate the two 
gaps mentioned in Section 4.1.
4.2.1 Mobilising financial resources and providing alternate 
innovative forms of development financing
The influence of China’s foreign aid remains modest in terms of 
its share in global aid. However, financial resources mobilised by 
China have been steadily increasing over the years and is set 
to expand further, whereas aid from the DAC donors has been 
declining in both real and nominal terms. Moreover, China has 
been introducing new innovative mechanisms of development 
financing through the BRI and its financial institutions. These 
mechanisms are providing developing countries with alternate 
sources of financing, including addressing associated issues 
of debt management through new modalities of repayment, 
coupled with stress measures and ‘lines of forgiveness’. China’s 
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development financing approach to projects, while following 
market principles, allows for alternative forms of scheduling, 
payments, and project management which are carefully worked 
out with recipients in accordance with their practices, capacity, 
and sets of interests. This flexibility allows for negotiations that 
have proven to be attractive for recipient countries, including 
accelerated project appraisals and approval mechanisms.
4.2.2 Mobilising resources for economic infrastructure investment
The global shortage in investment funds for infrastructure 
development is huge. However, China’s own development 
experience through infrastructure investment has provided it 
the capacity and technical know-how to fill some of the gaps 
in infrastructure financing and project implementation (Yu 2018). 
Whereas multilateral and bilateral aid agencies have over the 
years reduced their commitments to hard infrastructure financing, 
China has excelled in this direction by providing developing 
countries new alternatives and modalities. China has been looked 
to by other developing countries as offering a development 
partnership model for infrastructure development that is both 
efficient and integrated. What is needed at this stage is greater 
cooperation, particularly from countries that have long experience 
in this sector such as Japan, as well as multilateral institutions 
such as the World Bank and regional development banks.
4.2.3 Promoting development knowledge sharing
Sharing knowledge and promoting capacity building is a key 
pillar of China’s foreign assistance, based on its experiences as 
a developing country and recipient of aid. China has developed 
over the recent past a significant number of training and 
capacity-building programmes that have benefited a large 
number of officials, professionals, and students from developing 
countries. It has also established specialised institutes, such as 
the Institute of South–South Cooperation and Development, for 
the purpose of promoting knowledge sharing between China 
and other developing countries (SCIO 2021). Efforts are underway 
to greatly expand these initiatives to support skill development 
and strengthening capabilities in a range of fields catered to 
the needs of developing countries, but China is also looking for 
increased institutional collaboration with other Southern donor 
partners, such as India, Brazil, and South Africa.
4.2.4 Promoting the governance of international development 
cooperation
It is imperative that the international community enhances its 
coordination efforts in international development cooperation, so 
as to respond to global challenges such as climate change and 
the health pandemic, and to achieve the SDGs and modernisation 
for the majority in the longer term. As China is now taking a 
leading role in South–South cooperation, it could further promote 
the cooperation and coordination of development assistance 
practices between traditional and emerging donors. China has 
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always emphasised the importance of respecting recipient 
countries’ right to independently select their own path and model 
of development and believes that every country should explore a 
development path suitable to its actual conditions.
China’s aid approach is to shift the accountability framework 
to the aid recipient, with consideration of their socioeconomic 
circumstances and historical background, and to promote 
a South–South model absent of political conditions. China’s 
approach emphasises inclusivity, but from the position of 
a recipient. What this offers is a different model whereby 
cooperation can provide space for multiple actors, including 
non-governmental and private sector interests and where 
accountability is not to the donor but to the recipient.
5 What can China learn from Western donors?
5.1 Integrating the international development cooperation system
Foreign aid and international development cooperation covers 
numerous areas and requires the engagement and coordination 
of various governmental departments, civil society organisations, 
and the private sector. China is currently at a critical juncture in its 
development of foreign aid as a policy tool. For a long time, there 
have been approximately 30 governmental departments involved 
in aid affairs but no systematic and efficient coordination among 
these departments and other entities. Hence, the system has 
become highly fragmented. While there is a clear policy direction 
as articulated by the Chinese Communist Party and through the 
State Council, the implementation and provision of assistance 
through various agencies and institutional arrangements 
has made coordination and alignment with the international 
development cooperation system cumbersome and difficult.
The founding of the CIDCA is an important step to integrate the 
current development cooperation system. However, the role of 
CIDCA is mainly in back-stage management and coordination, 
focusing more on providing guidance, planning, offering advice, 
and supervising. CIDCA itself lacks the capacity to manage 
or implement aid projects and to effectively allocate specific 
assignments to different departments. Institutional strengthening 
of CIDCA, and greater alignment under the supervision of 
the State Council, is a process that will require both internal 
cooperation and adjustments, as well as learning, cooperation, 
and partnership with the international aid community and 
recipient countries.
5.2 Building capacity in international development cooperation
China seriously lacks expertise and personnel in international 
development cooperation. Very few universities in China have 
majors related to international development, and there are 
even fewer research establishments devoted to the study of 
international development, global governance, and public policy. 
In addition, training programmes in international development are 
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in short supply. This situation is particularly dire for CIDCA where 
there are few staff and even fewer with the kinds of experience 
needed for the broad and important mandate of the institution. 
Having institutional linkages with other bilateral and multilateral 
donors would be an important step in building institutional 
capacity as well as human capabilities. This could be in terms of 
training and experiential learning offered by other aid agencies, 
but also include efforts to build understanding through staff 
exchanges, joint activities, and institutional linkages.
5.3 Developing necessary infrastructure
Project information on aid and other international development 
affairs has been scattered among different government 
departments, policy banks, and SOEs. Regular statistical systems, 
standards, and frameworks on international development have not 
yet been established. This makes planning, supervision, evaluation, 
and research of international development cooperation very 
difficult, and leads to unnecessary misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation of Chinese aid and development cooperation 
programmes. Working with the OECD-DAC and other bilateral 
donors to develop and modernise China’s statistical framework, 
databanks, and other development infrastructure is necessary.
5.4 Improving communication with the existing community of 
international development cooperation
It is important and necessary for each country to develop its 
own language and narratives on international development 
based on its practices. However, it is also necessary to be able to 
communicate effectively such narratives to a variety of audiences, 
locally and internationally, in order to build understanding and 
acceptance by stakeholders and the general public. Efforts to 
improve elements of strategic communication, media platforms, 
international engagement, and other aspects are necessary 
to not only improve transparency, but also to generate public 
support and acceptance.
5.5 Involving the private sector and civil society organisations in 
international development cooperation
China’s SOEs have been playing a very important role in 
implementing aid projects throughout China’s history because 
many of them, particularly those in areas of engineering 
procurement construction, are pioneers in doing business 
abroad, even much earlier than the adoption of the reform and 
opening up policy. However, with more and more private Chinese 
enterprises engaged in international business, it is necessary 
for China to get them involved in international development 
cooperation projects. Encouraging more non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) to participate in international development 
is also a common practice. It is also promising to share knowledge 
and work together with foreign partners, including multinationals, 
global NGOs, and multilateral organisations, to provide 
foreign assistance.
IDS Bulletin Vol. 52 No. 2 November 2021 ‘China and International Development: Knowledge, Governance, and Practice’ 19–36 | 33
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
6 Concluding remarks
The increasing involvement of emerging donors such as China 
is not an isolated phenomenon. In this article, we have argued 
that the modalities of China’s efforts in foreign assistance are 
necessary and inevitable from the perspective of modernisation 
for the majority. With the rise of Southern countries, there will be 
more opportunities to mitigate financing and knowledge gaps 
and accelerate the pace of modernisation for those countries left 
behind for centuries.
Specifically, there are critical areas where China can contribute 
to global development cooperation, including mobilising 
more development finance resources, investing in economic 
infrastructure, sharing development knowledge, and promoting 
governance of the global development cooperation system. 
However, there is still much room for China to further improve 
its development cooperation system and to learn from its 
Western counterparts, including strengthening integration of 
the system, modernising its statistical framework, and improving 
communication with the international development community.
Notes
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The New Asian Development Finance*
Karin Costa Vazquez1 and Yu Zheng2
Abstract The recent challenges posed for multilateralism and 
the emergence of a sustainable development regime have 
pushed countries to engage in more flexible, issue-based 
development finance initiatives and institutions. These changes 
have profoundly impacted how China conceives and delivers 
its development finance. How is China’s development finance 
being shaped by other countries’ experiences? How has China 
been shaping development finance globally? This article 
argues that China’s development finance has been increasingly 
market-oriented, concerned about financial and environmental 
sustainability, and delivered through hybrid bilateral–multilateral 
channels, particularly since the launch of the Belt and Road 
Initiative. Shaped by the changes that China experienced at 
both international and domestic levels, these new features signal 
the rise of a ‘new Asian development finance’ that is refocusing 
the global debate on the importance of combining aid, trade, 
and investment under financially and environmentally sustainable 
frameworks, and channelling development finance through 
multilateral channels to catalyse structural transformation.
Keywords development finance, the Asian model, multilateralism, 
sustainable development.
1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, the global economic landscape has 
been shifting with the rise of emerging economies and developing 
countries, on the one side, and the relative decline of developed 
countries’ share in world output, on the other. These changing 
dynamics in the global economy have also had a profound effect 
on international development as emerging economies become 
even more important sources of development finance on both 
bilateral and multilateral fronts. More recently, the challenges 
posed for multilateralism have pushed countries worldwide to 
prefer more flexible, fluid, and issue-based development finance 
initiatives and institutions over models of global economic 
governance that prioritise negotiations within standing, formal, 
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treaty-based bodies with universal membership (Patrick 2015, 2019; 
Ikenberry 2018; Vazquez 2021).
The emergence of international commitments to sustainable 
development, signalled by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development (the 2030 Agenda), the Paris Agreement on climate 
change, and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda for financing 
sustainable development, has further pushed countries to 
align their own development goals more closely with notions of 
sustainability. The creation of the New Development Bank (NDB) 
and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015 reflects 
these changes, with both institutions born out of two innovative 
platforms for multilateralism: South–South cooperation and a 
mandate anchored on sustainability (Vazquez, Roychoudhury and 
Borges 2017; Vazquez and Chin 2019; Vazquez 2021).
With four decades of remarkable economic performance, China 
has also become more confident in sharing its development 
experiences with other emerging and developing countries. 
This can be seen in the expansion of the transformation of 
development finance. Three new features have emerged as 
China’s development finance has transformed itself over the last 
decade under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) umbrella. First, it 
has adopted a more market-oriented strategy through an explicit 
combination of aid, trade, and investments. Second, it is more 
concerned about financial and environmental sustainability in 
response to the rising concern of debt distress and environmental 
impact. Third, it has become hybrid in nature as it is increasingly 
being delivered through earmarked United Nations (UN) 
programmes and the new multilateral development banks. These 
new features, we argue, have been prompted by institutional 
changes in China’s aid coordination system and slowly shaped 
by China’s economic rebalancing and the changing global 
landscape, particularly after the 2008 global financial crisis.
Other Asian economies also share similar features in conceiving 
and delivering their development finance, signalling the rise of 
a new development finance model that has China and, more 
broadly, Asia at its epicentre. This new Asian development finance 
has been refocusing the global debate on the importance 
of state-led (blended) finance to support infrastructure and 
sustainable development, both as a driver to endogenous 
structural transformation and economic growth as well as a tool 
to advance countries’ economic, policy, and strategic goals. More 
than a convergence between traditional donors and emerging 
economies, the new Asian development finance could signal the 
emergence of alternative narratives in international cooperation 
for development.
2 The new features of China’s development finance
Over the last decade, China has extensively increased its 
development finance, becoming one of the leading capital 
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providers in developing countries. Three new features of China’s 
development finance have emerged during the time, as 
summarised in Table 1.
2.1 Increasing market orientation
The first feature of China’s new development finance is its 
increasing market orientation, as evidenced by the more explicit 
combination of official development assistance (ODA)-like aid 
and commercial forms of economic engagement. Today, China’s 
development finance is less about the narrow construct of ‘aid’ 
or ODA, as defined by the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) in terms of grants, interest-free loans, 
and concessional loans, and more about export buyers’ credits, 
non-concessional loans, strategic lines of credit, and other 
resource flows such as remittances (Lakatos et al. 2016; Mawdsley 
2021; Mulakala 2021; SCIO 2021).
Even though Chinese development finance has long had a 
commercial nature, the percentage of aid has been declining 
over the past decade while the commercial part of the finance 
continues to increase, especially after the launch of the BRI. From 
2003 to 2019, Chinese development finance to Africa increased 
from US$20bn to US$340bn, but China’s global foreign aid only 
increased from US$0.6bn to US$3.1bn.3 Foreign aid expenditure 
even dropped sharply after 2015 before it rebounded to a new 
high in 2019. This trend can also be observed in the 2015 and 2018 
editions of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) 
when the country pledged a total of US$120bn in financing 
for Africa, of which only a small proportion came in the form of 
grants, interest-free loans, or concessional loans.4 Indeed, after 
the creation of two policy banks – the Export–Import Bank of 
China (China Exim Bank) and the China Development Bank (CDB) 
– the proportion of concessional loans (issued by the Exim Bank) 
Table 1 The new features of China’s development finance
Development finance Features Evidence
Types Increasing market orientation Declining share of aid in development 
finance
Criteria Emphasis on financial and environmental 
sustainability
Debt sustainability framework, green 
investment and financing regulations, 
new multilateral development banks’ 
commitment to sustainability, more 
renewable energy projects
Channels Hybrid multilateral–bilateral channels More earmarked multilateral funds, and 
new multilateral development banks, credit 
programmes, and special funds 
Source Authors’ own.
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and non-concessional loans (mainly issued by the CDB) rose, 
while the proportion of interest-free loans dropped sharply 
(Morgan and Zheng 2019; Chen 2020).
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, commercial 
financial institutions have also become important sources of 
development finance. The number of Chinese creditors in the 
overseas market expanded from two public lenders (Exim Bank 
and the CDB) in 2000 to over 30 lenders, including commercial 
banks and other private creditors in 2019 (Acker and Brautigam 
2021). The increase in the number of private creditors in China’s 
development finance signals a new trend whereby public–
private partnerships are being used to supplement state-led aid 
programmes as they help alleviate political and financial risks 
associated with China’s aid programmes on the one side, and 
expand sources of development finance, on the other.
2.2 Emphasis on financial and environmental sustainability
China’s new development finance has also emphasised 
financial and environmental sustainability. Over the last decade, 
China has become the leading official creditor to low-income 
developing countries, many of which are former highly indebted 
poor countries and where Chinese capital is particularly 
important for the financing of large-scale energy and mining 
projects (Horn, Reinhart and Trebesch 2019). Given the growing 
concern regarding high debt burdens, China has begun to 
look more closely into the financial sustainability of its overseas 
development finance. In 2018, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
released a debt sustainability framework for the BRI low-income 
countries similar to that of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (MOF 2019). Under this framework, Chinese lenders 
are encouraged to direct development finance to countries that 
have not previously asked for debt relief while countries with weak 
records of debt management are likely to receive less capital 
(Gallagher and Ray 2020; Acker and Brautigam 2021).
Regarding environmental sustainability, since 2012, China’s financial 
regulators have issued a number of regulations in pursuit of green 
investment and financing. In 2021 alone, China launched the 
world’s largest carbon market, released guidelines to align Chinese 
international cooperation and foreign investment with green 
development principles, and published a roadmap towards the 
decarbonisation of its economy by 2060. China has become the 
second largest green bond issuer in the world, accounting for a 
quarter of newly issued global green bonds in 2018 (CDB and UNDP 
2019). The major development finance platforms and institutions like 
the two new multilateral development banks have included notions 
of environmental sustainability in their mandate (Vazquez and 
Chin 2019; Vazquez 2021). This growing concern with environmental 
sustainability can also be seen in the high profile of renewable 
energy in China’s development finance, which has reached 57 per 
cent of total overseas investments in 2020 (Nedopil 2021).
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2.3 Delivery through hybrid bilateral–multilateral channels
China’s new development finance is also characterised by the 
use of both bilateral and multilateral channels, also labelled as 
‘new multilateralism’. This new multilateralism has two dimensions. 
The first is the growing use of earmarked contributions to the 
UN Development System (UNDS). In the past, China was reluctant 
to move to multilateral lending due to a lack of understanding 
of how it works and how traditional multilateral channels implied 
lesser control of how resources are spent, and how outcomes are 
defined and achieved.
While China’s foreign aid remains largely bilateral, the country 
has also been promoting efforts to support and participate in 
aid programmes initiated by international organisations such 
as the UN. Over the last decade, China’s overall contribution to 
the UNDS has quadrupled, with Chinese funding growing at an 
annual average rate of 33.8 per cent between 2013 and 2017 
alone. China’s shares of core funding and assessed contribution in 
its total UNDS funding grew more than that of traditional donors, 
while the share of non-core funding in China’s total contribution 
jumped from 23 per cent in 2008 to 50 per cent in 2017 (Mao 2020).
In the second dimension of the new multilateralism, China has 
also made use of its foreign reserves to create new development 
finance institutions, credit programmes, and special funds 
with both a portfolio diversification and development finance 
objectives. This is the case of the China-LAC Cooperation Fund 
(CLAC), the China-LAC Industrial Cooperation Investment Fund 
(CLAI), the Fund for Cooperation and Development between 
China and Portuguese-Speaking Countries, and the Silk Road 
Fund. One could also add the China Investment Corporation (CIC) 
and many regional-oriented initiatives as vehicles for investment 
based on Chinese sovereign reserves. These initiatives culminated 
in the creation of the AIIB and the NDB, headquartered in China 
but with a global reach and membership.
3 Causes of the transformation of China’s development finance
China’s development finance was shaped by the changes that 
the country experienced at both international and domestic levels, 
particularly the consolidation of its aid governance structure.
3.1 Consolidation of aid governance structure
Traditionally, China’s aid governance structure involved more 
than 20 central line ministries, commissions, and agencies as 
well as their provincial counterparts (Zhou and Xiong 2017). 
The decision-making power of China’s aid lies with the central 
government, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP). Three central government agencies – the Ministry 
of Commerce (MOFCOM), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 
and MOF – are authorised by the State Council to implement 
aid projects; ensure that the aid agenda is aligned with broader 
foreign policy goals; and oversee China’s financial contributions 
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to multilateral development organisations (Vazquez, Mao and 
Yao 2016).
In addition to the three major players, the National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MOST), the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), the Ministry 
of Education (MOE), the National Health and Family Planning 
Commission (NHFPC), and other line ministries also take part in 
China’s foreign aid according to their sectorial expertise and 
by the request of MOFCOM or their counterpart agencies in the 
partner country. MOFCOM also works closely with the China Exim 
Bank on concessional loan policies and their implementation. The 
Chinese embassies abroad coordinate and manage foreign aid 
projects in the field.
It has long been debated how to make better use of China’s 
growing foreign aid budget and justify its benefits to the 
domestic public. Over the past decade, mid- and long-term 
foreign aid plans, country strategies, and evaluations have been 
developed though they remain unpublicised (ibid.). While Western 
perceptions often assume deliberate secrecy (Brautigam 2009), 
Chinese scholars have attributed this to system complexity and 
fragmentation (Hu and Huang 2012; Huang and Hu 2020). Within 
a highly decentralised aid architecture, the diverging interests of 
the bureaucratic and corporate actors can be seen. These actors 
either regard foreign aid as an instrument for exercising diplomatic 
influence on the international stage and deepening cooperation 
with selected countries or as a way of assisting domestic 
businesses to expand exports and investments (Morgan 2019).
This has called for enhanced efforts to speak with a unified 
voice and facilitate concerted action in formulating policies and 
identifying projects (Zheng 2016; Vazquez, Mao and Yao 2016). To 
strengthen coordination, MOFCOM, MFA, and MOF led 24 central 
ministries, commissions, and units to establish China’s foreign 
aid interagency liaison mechanism in 2008. In 2011, this liaison 
mechanism was upgraded into an interagency coordination 
mechanism (Zhou and Xiong 2017) and in 2018, the China 
International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) was 
created to provide central coordination and to better integrate 
China’s foreign aid governance. Since 2013, the BRI has served as 
the primary platform for institutionalising China’s development 
finance. The establishment of CIDCA has placed the BRI at the 
core of Chinese aid, helping to articulate China’s foreign and 
economic policy priorities down to the projects supported by 
the country.
Despite the lingering coordination challenges, this transformation 
has favoured the development of a strategy that articulates 
the three new features of China’s development finance 
down to project level. CIDCA has unveiled the new directions 
of China’s development finance in the 2021 White Paper 
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China’s International Development Cooperation in a New Era 
(SCIO 2021). This White Paper distinguishes from the 2011 and 
2014 versions in three ways. First, the scope and objective of 
China’s foreign aid are no longer limited to traditional bilateral 
‘aid’ or ODA, but a broader discussion about China’s South–
South development, trade, and investment with both bilateral 
and multilateral actors. Second, China’s foreign aid is, for the 
first time, partially framed in a non-Chinese framework with the 
2030 Agenda presenting an important vision guiding China’s 
contribution to partner countries. Third, the categorisation of 
what constitutes foreign aid has evolved by including the  
South–South Cooperation Assistance Fund (SSCAF) as an 
emerging financing modality in addition to grants, interest-free 
loans, and concessional loans.
3.2 An evolving international setting
At the international level, the transforming global political and 
economic landscape, especially after the 2008 financial crisis 
and the decline in aid supplied by traditional donors, laid the 
conditions for China and other emerging economies to play an 
even more substantial role in development finance (Manning 
2006; Walz and Ramachandran 2011; Hernandez 2017; Gu and 
Carey 2019; Acker and Brautigam 2021). In the case of China, this 
includes the use of foreign aid, trade, and investment not only 
to respond to the growing demand from other emerging and 
developing economies, but also to create a more favourable 
international environment for China’s own development (Fuchs 
and Rudyak 2019).
China’s rapidly expanding development finance has led to 
concerns on its supposedly adverse economic and environmental 
impact in the developing world (Acker and Brautigam 2021). For 
some authors, China’s foreign aid sets agendas (Jakóbowski 2018) 
and imposes conditionalities (Hirst 2008), making it difficult for 
countries to pay their debts. For other authors, China’s foreign 
aid fails to comply with local and international environmental 
standards, keeps local business out of the market, and relies 
excessively on Chinese workers, thus not creating enough local 
jobs (Dussel and Armony 2015; Gallagher 2016).
The adoption of the 2030 Agenda, the Paris Agreement, and the 
Addis Ababa Action Agenda has created additional pressure on 
China, not only to avoid, mitigate, and compensate any adverse 
impacts of its foreign aid, but also to align its development 
finance and institutions with the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) and other internationally agreed commitments 
on climate and development. At the domestic level, China’s 
economic rebalancing and commitment to carbon neutrality 
by 2060 has started a transition towards a new growth pattern 
in which domestic consumption, services and high technology, 
and sustainability are to rise relative to investments and exports, 
manufacturing, and resource-intensive production.
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The greater public scrutiny and the international commitments 
on climate and development, coupled with China’s economic 
rebalancing and growing awareness of the risks associated with 
its foreign aid, have motivated the country to emphasise the 
financial and environmental sustainability of its development 
finance. This can be seen in the reduction of CDB and Exim 
Bank loans from US$75bn in 2016 to US$4bn in 2019, signalling a 
possible rebalancing of China’s overseas development finance 
over concerns around borrowing countries’ indebtedness and loan 
sustainability (Gallagher and Ray 2020; Acker and Brautigam 2021).
The increasing hybrid bilateral–multilateral nature of China’s 
development finance is intended to minimise these credibility, 
reputational, and operational risks on the one side, while 
increasing cost efficiency, directing the country’s capacity to 
changing domestic priorities, and seeking greater influence 
globally, on the other. The growing use of earmarked multilateral 
funds, for instance, reduces concerns over how resources are 
spent, and how outcomes are defined and achieved. This thinking 
is similar in the case of the new multilateral development banks 
as China figures among their top shareholders – an evolution 
from the role China and other emerging and developing countries 
have historically played as borrowers from traditional multilateral 
development banks (MDBs).
4 Beyond China: Asian development finance
China’s new development finance has developed alongside 
the rise of Asia and other emerging countries, as one of the 
many shifts and disruptors that shape twenty-first-century 
multilateralism (Kharas and Rogerson 2017; Ikenberry 2018). Over 
the last two decades, Asia has become the pivot of a structural 
shift in the centre of the world’s economic gravity (Ikenberry 
2018; Mulakala 2021). China and India are at the heart of this 
transformation, accounting for at least one quarter of global 
output and a significant proportion of the world’s middle class. 
The two countries have also had sustained growth rates and are 
projected to be the first and second largest economies in the 
world by 2050.
The rise of China, Asia, and other emerging countries, as part 
of the so-called ‘global South’, has created new and diversified 
forms of development finance, including the very understanding 
of foreign aid beyond the OECD-DAC traditional definition of 
ODA, and the establishment of new international institutions 
such as the NDB and the AIIB (Bhattacharya and Llanos 2017; 
Fejerskov, Lundsgaarde and Cold-Ravnkilde 2017; Gray and Gills 
2018). While these shifts have contributed to an increasingly 
fragmented landscape of institutions, norms, and standards 
(Chaturvedi et al. 2021), they have also allowed development 
models and experiences, other than those of traditional donors, 
to shape these very institutions, norms, and standards. For 
example, NDB and AIIB focus on infrastructure lending as a 
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leverage to economic growth, in contrast to that of traditional 
MDBs, which have marginalised infrastructure investment to 
prioritise institutional reforms in borrowing countries (Vazquez, 
Roychoudhury and Borges 2017).
4.1 Asian versus Western approaches
These emerging approaches to development finance are based 
on domestic development experiences that are substantially 
different from those in the West. Similarly to China, other Asian 
countries have emphasised infrastructure, industrialisation, and 
foreign direct investment as essential drivers of growth with the 
potential to trickle down into poverty reduction (Stallings and Kim 
2017; Gabor and Brooks 2017; Mawdsley 2021). These countries 
would also have contributed to the emphasis on state–private 
capital hybrid formations and state-supported development 
financing (Mawdsley 2015, 2018). This is noticeably different 
from the Western model, which emphasises immediate poverty 
alleviation and conditionality to promote democracy, human 
rights, and ‘good’ governance in the poorest countries, especially 
in sub-Saharan Africa.
Asian development finance also tends to come as a package, 
with a mixture of aid, loans, export credit, and investment (Zheng 
2020; Mulakala 2021) to secure natural resources or expand the 
overseas market for their domestic firms. This occurs alongside 
the promotion of the economic development of their poorer 
neighbours through exports and integration into regional 
production networks (Stallings and Kim 2017). China’s official 
financing, for example, is less concessional than World Bank 
financing in comparable settings, in addition to systematically 
offering higher interest rates, shorter maturity lengths, and less 
generous grace periods (Morris, Parks and Gardner 2020). This 
would demonstrate the novelty of the commercial nature of 
Chinese development finance as part of a package of aid and 
commercial loans vis-à-vis Western models.
The combination of aid, trade, and investment has, in fact, 
historical precedents in many parts of the world, but lost 
momentum as newly independent countries realised its costs 
(Kaplinsky and Morris 2009). More recently, traditional donors 
have been attempting to reform the ODA system thus: ‘increasing 
alignment of aid with partner countries’ priorities, systems and 
procedures and helping to strengthen their capacities’ (OECD 
2008: 3), and to use aid to leverage private investment to help 
promote economic growth (UN 2002). The Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness and the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for 
Development set two different, if not opposing goals for foreign 
aid: aid effectiveness is important for development, but aid is only 
part of the solution to development. Ideally, donors can delink aid 
and commercially oriented capital or trade flows and connect 
aid with investment. In reality, this dual goal creates a dilemma for 
the donor community as untying aid requires donors to focus on 
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the public interests of the recipient countries whereas leveraging 
private investment requires attention to the business prospects of 
aid programmes.
In the post-Covid-19 era, the sizeable financial and political risk 
underpinning China’s global infrastructure boom, particularly 
in the BRI economies, leaves China’s development finance 
open to the possibilities of huge default losses. It is therefore in 
China’s interest to eventually pay more attention to the domestic 
issues of partner countries, which may lead to a more flexible 
application of the ‘no-strings-attached’ principle. This could be 
done, for instance, through the joint design of projects to better 
understand the local reality and to manage any political and 
economic risks that could harm project viability and long-term 
sustainability. In the meantime, traditional donors have revised 
their definition of ODA to add a new international standard – 
Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD) – to 
monitor a broader range of funding, including private resources 
mobilised through official means, that help countries reach 
the SDGs. This convergence between the traditional donors 
and emerging economies on aid conditionality may lead 
them towards an alternative model that is more inclusive and 
development oriented.
There is also a global trend towards hybrid forms of bilateral–
multilateral development finance. While multilateral development 
organisations remain the major source of development finance, 
there is a growing tendency of donors to earmark funds and 
use ad hoc initiatives to exert greater bilateral influence on 
international organisations, raising a debate that the system is 
evolving towards ‘à la carte’ multilateralism (Vazquez 2021; OECD 
2020). This is evident in the substantial increase in non-core 
funding in the UN system, designated by donors for specific 
purposes in accordance with their bilateral interests.
Though this hybrid is mainly shaped by traditional donors, such 
as the US and the UK, who remain the major shareholders and 
funders of the multilateral development system, it is convenient 
to China and other Asian and emerging economies as they step 
up contribution to the multilateral system. According to the OECD 
(2020), growing contributions from the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, and South Africa) to the UN system, coupled with their 
establishment of new multilateral organisations of which they 
are main shareholders, attest to their rise in influence. Their share 
of total multilateral contributions to the UN system, while still 
relatively low at around 4 per cent in 2018, has increased steadily 
over the past decade.
4.2 New versus past Asian approaches
While Asian countries share features of development finance 
that are noticeably different from Western donors, there are also 
marked differences between how Asian development finance is 
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conceived and practised today and its earlier versions. China 
and India have, for instance, added ‘twenty-first century pivots’ 
(Mulakala 2021: 522) to the East Asian post-war development 
finance. This has been done by: 
 l Emphasising investment in big-ticket connectivity schemes 
such as the BRI and the Asia–Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) 
to stimulate growth and reduce poverty. This is an evolution 
of the East Asian post-war model as it integrates individual 
infrastructure projects under a broader development 
framework that combines Asian growth-led models with 
Western notions of poverty alleviation.
 l Increasing multilateral cooperation through the new 
development banks – in which China and India figure among 
the top shareholders. This could mean a new economic and 
political geography of international development cooperation 
substantially different from that of previous Asian approaches 
and even the Bretton Woods system (Carey and Li 2016). 
This new geography could also point to new narratives 
based on Asian development experiences and the global 
transformations that will have Asia at its epicentre.
There is also diversity among the current Asian approaches 
and between Asian and non-Western, non-Asian countries. 
For example, despite sharing the commercial and multilateral 
features of East Asian development finance, India has not yet 
placed the same emphasis on environmental sustainability. 
Likewise, the commercial and multilateral features of the Asian 
development finance are generally not shared by non-Western 
countries outside Asia, especially in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. The new development banks have been combining 
aid, trade, and investment under the same institutional mandate 
while emphasising environmental sustainability, and could 
become the locus for convergence among these different 
approaches in the future.
5 Conclusion
In the past decade, a new development finance model has been 
on the rise. This new model was shaped by the transforming 
global political and economic landscape as well as China’s 
evolving aid governance structure and long-term development 
goals. Drawing from development experiences in China and other 
Asian countries, this new development finance model is refocusing 
the global debate on the importance of combining aid, trade, 
and investment under financially and environmentally sustainable 
frameworks, and channelling development finance through 
multilateral arrangements to catalyse structural transformation.
This new Asian development finance adds ‘twenty-first 
century pivots’ (Mulakala 2021: 522) to the East Asian post-war 
development finance by refocusing infrastructure investment from 
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individual projects towards big-ticket connectivity schemes that 
stimulate growth and reduce poverty. It also elevates China and 
India to top shareholders in new multilateral development finance 
institutions and relies on partnerships with the private sector to 
complement state capacity. Despite being markedly different 
from Western experiences by emphasising principles such as 
equality, horizontality, non-conditionality, and mutual benefit, 
this new Asian development finance increasingly converges 
with traditional donors on the use of earmarked multilateral 
funding, the conditionality of development cooperation to ensure 
economic and environmental sustainability, and the lack of 
coherent strategies for integrating aid, trade, and investment.
The Covid-19 pandemic has triggered a surge in demand for 
development financing in all developing countries, particularly 
low-income countries. It has also pointed to the need to think 
towards new models for post-pandemic recovery, beyond 
emergency relief. In this new context, the new Asian development 
finance could signal new narratives to address countries’ short-, 
medium-, and long-term development needs. Future research 
could look at how Western notions of development sustainability 
have emphasised countries’ financial ability to repay debts and 
the use of safeguards to avoid, mitigate, or compensate any 
negative impacts of investments. These notions seem to oppose 
the more development-oriented notion of sustainability, as 
understood by China and other Asian and emerging economies: 
that privileges the catalytic role investments can play in 
generating additional positive impact.
Notes
*  This IDS Bulletin was produced as part of the UK Anchor 
Institution for the China International Development 
Research Network, funded by the Foreign, Commonwealth 
& Development Office (FCDO). The opinions expressed are 
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or 
policies of IDS or the UK government.
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Exploring China’s Impacts on 
Development Thinking and Policies*
Jiajun Xu1 and Richard Carey2
Abstract In this article, we explore the impacts, actual and 
potential, of China’s development experiences upon development 
thinking and policies elsewhere. New Structural Economics, a 
theoretical innovation by Professor Justin Yifu Lin drawing on a 
longer tradition of pragmatic ‘learning by doing’ development 
strategies, provides a framework in which three agendas stand 
out: structural transformation as a policy priority; the return of 
industrial policy; and the use of Special Economic Zones. We 
integrate related drivers of growth in China: rapid urbanisation 
pulling in massive rural migration in an economic transformation 
process; the financing of provincial and city governments by 
improvised local government financing vehicles based on rising 
urban land values; and competition and accountability processes 
in China’s subnational governance system. While China’s 
experiences cannot be directly replicated elsewhere, we argue 
that lessons on why and how to achieve structural transformation 
are relevant for other developing countries, especially in fast 
urbanising and integrating Africa.
Keywords New Structural Economics, development thinking, 
international development, industrial policy, Special Economic 
Zones, structural transformation, effective markets, facilitating 
government.
1 Introduction
Over the past four decades, China has achieved unprecedented 
economic development and poverty alleviation. Its example 
has made a deep impression, raising the question of what the 
lessons are for development thinking and practice. Once the 
richest country in the world (Maddison 2001), China had become 
entrapped in poverty for several centuries. Its gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita was US$156 in 1978, less than one third 
of the average of US$490 in sub-Saharan African countries. But 
since the transition from planned to market economy in the late 
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1970s, China has eradicated extreme poverty and overtaken 
the United States as the world’s largest economy measured in 
purchasing power parity (PPP) in 2014.3
‘Economic miracles’ such as those in China and other Asian 
countries have been explained by Robert Lucas as the 
combination of rapid urbanisation with fast human capital 
development, including notably learning by doing via trade (Lucas 
1988, 1993; Glaeser and Lu 2018). China’s reform programme did not 
involve disruptive ‘shock therapy’. Chinese economists debated but 
then avoided the mainstream neoliberal programme of privatising 
its state-owned enterprises, liberalising its trade and capital 
accounts, and deregulating its economy in a sweeping manner.
Instead, China adopted a pragmatic dual-track approach to 
the liberalisation of markets. Starting with the rural economy, 
the government first improved incentives and productivity by 
replicating across the country the household responsibility 
contracting system. This allowed workers in collective farms and 
state-owned firms to be residual claimants, setting their own 
selling prices at the market after delivering quota obligations 
to the state at fixed prices. At the same time, the government 
continued to provide support to non-viable firms in priority 
sectors to avoid the collapse of social cohesion and human 
capital (Lin 1992).
From this beginning, China progressively moved to a market 
system using the dual-track price system approach which 
quickly generated a flourishing rural economy with town 
and village enterprises while retaining priority sectors in 
state hands (Weber 2021). At the same time, there was major 
decentralisation to provinces and cities, counties and townships, 
where meritocratically selected governors and mayors became 
responsible for economic performance and social stability, and 
were accountable to the central authorities on both fronts, in a 
form of ‘franchise’ from central to subnational levels.
This system helped to spread talent and initiative around the 
entire large and varied territory of China, even if coastal regions 
grew faster than inland areas and the west of China (Xu 2011). 
The dynamics of this ‘matrix’ governance system remain driving 
factors in China’s performance today. This explains how, with 
its many levels of initiative, development could proceed so 
rapidly, and villages become large modern cities (Xiao et al. 
2015). According to Ang (2016), the development of governance 
and markets is not sequential but ‘co-evolutionary’. The process 
operates as follows: weak institutions are used to generate 
markets, emerging markets stimulate strong institutions, and 
then strong institutions preserve markets. Such co-evolutionary 
processes can be observed elsewhere, historically and 
geographically, and are thus an inherently generic pathway from 
low development capacities to strong development capacities.
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The generic elements of China’s experience can thus offer an 
alternative to mainstream prescriptions for institutional and 
market development. We look at three such generic lessons 
from Chinese development history of the last four decades. 
First, structural transformation matters for large-scale poverty 
alleviation. Second, a facilitating government can aid market 
development. Last, but not least, to kick start structural 
transformation, Special Economic Zones (SEZs) can be used 
to overcome the challenge of poor institutional capacities 
nationwide by improving the business environment in demarcated 
areas to achieve quick wins.
In this article, we aim to explore the extent to which China offers 
alternative development thinking and policies in the field of 
international development. Specifically, we examine the central 
research question of what China’s impacts, potential and actual, 
upon development thinking and policies are. The reason why 
we focus on potential impacts as well is that it often takes time 
for development thinking and policies to change. Hence, we 
aim to capture initial signs of changes, if any. Such changes 
may be attributed to either conscious influence by China, or 
responsive changes by other actors owing to China’s behaviours. 
As China’s impact upon development thinking and policies is 
an unfolding process, our inquiry is preliminary. And our study is 
empirical in nature, capturing and analysing why and how China’s 
development experiences and practices may deviate from 
mainstream approaches.
To tackle the above research question, we need an analytical 
angle that helps explain how China has achieved economic 
structural transformation. We will also consider what alternative 
thinking it may bring to the debates on fundamental questions of 
how best to achieve development, both as a growth phenomenon 
and a human development phenomenon. As formulated by 
Professor Justin Yifu Lin, drawing on China’s development 
experiences, New Structural Economics (NSE) provides such a 
framework for rethinking development policy. Compared with 
mainstream development thinking, NSE is new in at least two 
aspects. First, for developing countries to overcome poverty 
and low- or middle-income traps, it is important to move 
labour and other productive resources from low-productivity 
to high-productivity economic activities in line with latent 
comparative advantage. Second, NSE promotes the market system 
and private entrepreneurship, but proposes that the government 
needs to play a facilitating role in mitigating the constraints on the 
path to economic structural transformation (Lin 2012).
The rest of this article proceeds as follows. Section 2 explores 
China’s impacts in three dimensions: the development thinking 
that sets policy agendas; the role of the state in economic 
development; and the strategic use of SEZs to foster economic 
transformation. Section 3 concludes with key findings.
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2 Detecting China’s impacts upon development thinking and 
policy agendas
2.1 Agenda-setting: structural transformation matters
Economic transformation is the key driving force behind 
sustainable large-scale poverty reduction. China is home to 
nearly one fifth of the world’s population and has lifted 800 million 
people out of poverty in the past four decades. It achieved the 
complete eradication of extreme poverty – the first target of 
the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
– in 2021, ten years ahead of schedule.4 China’s development 
experience shows that economic structural transformation was 
the underlying driving force for large-scale poverty reduction. As 
China’s White Paper on poverty alleviation states, ‘As the largest 
developing country, China has achieved rapid development 
in step with large-scale poverty alleviation, and economic 
transformation in step with the elimination of extreme poverty’ 
(SCIO 2021b).
The prevailing Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)-based 
poverty reduction approach was a reaction to economic 
structural adjustments in the 1980s where economic reforms were 
undertaken to the detriment of investment in human capital 
and the wellbeing of ordinary people. They were thus also an 
issue of sustainable development. But the pendulum had swung 
back too far, shying away from the fundamental challenges 
of improving productivity, diversifying industrial structures, and 
moving up the global value chain. While economic growth 
alone did not automatically lead to welfare improvement for all, 
economic transformation was a necessary, albeit insufficient, 
condition for large-scale and self-sustaining poverty reduction 
(Commission on Growth and Development 2008; Stewart, Ranis 
and Samman 2018).
Given its domestic development experiences and the capabilities 
thus created, China then aimed to foster economic structural 
transformation in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) countries 
to ensure that China’s rise would not be a threat but rather a 
window of opportunity for moving up the global value chain 
together (NDRC, MFA and MOFCOM 2015; SCIO 2021a; Xu 
and Carey 2015b; Gu and Kitano 2018). The BRI addresses the 
infrastructure and connectivity shortfalls underlying premature 
deindustrialisation (Rodrik 2016) or resource curse (van der Ploeg 
2011) in developing countries and opens up new perspectives 
for inclusive growth in developed countries that have joined the 
initiative.
One salient binding constraint faced by many developing 
countries is the lack of long-term finance for basic infrastructure 
associated with risk appetite, and operational modalities 
adjusted to local systems and delivery schedules (Gil, Stafford 
and Musonda 2020; OECD and ACET 2020). The assumption that 
financial markets would be able to channel capital where and 
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when it was needed with volumes and time frames that would 
impact on dynamic structural transformation turned out to be a 
false hope, and this problem has yet to be fully recognised. Aid 
agencies largely failed to play a role in providing the intellectual 
and financial capital to support structural transformation, hence 
the daunting infrastructure gap that severely constrained the 
potential of developing countries for economic transformation.
China had tackled its domestic infrastructure financing problem 
via an entrepreneurial development bank. Created in 1994, 
the China Development Bank (CDB), after initial setbacks, 
undertook credit reforms to build firewalls against undue political 
intervention. In response to a policy gap created by a tax reform 
in 1994 that centralised revenues, and a simultaneous law against 
borrowing by local governments, the CDB innovated the Wuhu 
model to fill the financing gap and incubate the market for 
urban infrastructure financing (Xu 2017). This Wuhu model used 
local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) to enable local 
governments to borrow from the CDB, which became a model 
that it would replicate across China.
The collateral for these loans was land, the value of which 
would be multiplied by the infrastructure investment enabled 
by the LGFV, thus establishing a new local government revenue 
base. In this way, the CDB became indispensable to urban 
development, and scaled up its balance sheet with assets 
reaching well over US$2tn (Sanderson and Forsythe 2013; Xu 2017). 
Anticipated increasing land values was the basis for much of 
this lending expansion. China’s large-scale urbanisation and its 
associated job creation, combined with the investments made 
in secondary and tertiary education, and trade-oriented SEZs, 
created an economic miracle just as Robert Lucas had predicted 
(Lucas 1993). In short, the general lesson from this experience 
is that entrepreneurial development banking combined with 
entrepreneurial decentralised government with performance 
accountability is a very powerful vector.
China is inspiring the renaissance of development banking 
worldwide (Xu, Ren and Wu 2019). A pilot database on 
development financing institutions (DFIs) estimated that the 
total assets of over 500 DFIs are as large as US$18tn and their 
annual contribution to the financing of global investment was 
US$2.2tn in 2019, accounting for about 10 per cent of the world’s 
investment (Xu, Marodon and Ru 2021). On the multilateral front, 
China has initiated the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
and New Development Bank that act as public entrepreneurs 
(Xu and Carey 2015a). National development banking has been 
rethought and rehabilitated, first at the Addis Ababa Financing 
for Development Conference in 2015, and then at national level 
including in some Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries. For instance, the UK Treasury 
has rewritten its Green Book on public investment criteria, 
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including a special section on transformation (HM Treasury 2020). 
China’s policy banks are being emulated by the US in the form of 
the new US International Development Finance Corporation and 
a revived US Ex-Im Bank to compete with China.
Partly due to China’s impacts, economic transformation is now 
taking equal place alongside human development in the field of 
international development. Indeed, they are seen as interactive 
parts of a holistic development process. Economic structural 
transformation is at the heart of the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), which succeeded the human development-based 
MDGs at the United Nations. SDG 8 is to ‘promote sustained, 
inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive 
employment and decent work for all’ (UN 2015). SDG 9 goes a step 
further, proposing to ‘build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive 
and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation’ (ibid.).
Manifestly, the Chinese experience and the BRI have influenced 
international thinking (Gu, Corbett and Leach 2019; Carty 
and Gu 2021). In many OECD countries, including in the UK 
and the US, infrastructure maintenance and renewal and the 
challenges of the energy transition are frontline issues, with 
previously unimagined scaled-up financing. The communiqué 
of the UK-hosted G7 meeting reflects this influence and ends 
with mandating a Task Force to produce proposals for a 
G7 programme to match the BRI (G7 Research Group 2021).
China has proactively shaped policy priority towards structural 
transformation in international organisations and fora (IDA 2017). 
In the World Bank Group’s International Development Association 
(IDA), on a proposal from China, it was agreed in 2016, to prioritise 
jobs and economic transformation in its operations at the 
eighteenth replenishment of the IDA. Recognition at the World 
Bank of the importance of economic transformation was largely 
driven by China’s proactive efforts. In the context of the triennial 
Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the extensive 
roadmaps outlined in the action plans are explicitly set in a 
comprehensive pan-African transformation framework, covering 
investments in social, production, and infrastructure sectors and 
linked to China’s ongoing transformation (MFA 2018).
In summary, China’s development experiences indicate that 
economic transformation is a key engine for large-scale poverty 
alleviation in a sustainable manner. Inspired by its own domestic 
experiences, China has proactively promoted economic 
transformation in the BRI countries and shaped the development 
agenda at the World Bank and more widely towards job creation 
and economic transformation.
2.2 The return of industrial policy
If it is important to achieve structural transformation, then what 
kind of roles, if any, can governments play in achieving this 
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objective? During the past four decades, China has successfully 
lifted itself from low-income country status and is likely to march 
into high-income country status during its 14th Five-Year Plan 
(2021–25). Industrial policy has been actively deployed by both 
local and central Chinese governments to improve productivity 
and climb up the global value chain. Industrial policies are 
those policies that help shape the sectoral composition of an 
economy. Yet not all industrial policies work well in China. Drawing 
on development experiences and lessons from China, NSE holds 
that the effective implementation of industrial policy entails the 
following three essential elements (Lin 2014; Lin and Xu 2018).
First, an effective industrial policy starts with targeting industries 
with latent comparative advantages. Latent comparative 
advantage is defined as sectors in which factor costs of 
production are low by international standards, but where 
higher transaction costs due to inappropriate soft and hard 
infrastructure prevent firms from gaining a competitive edge. 
In learning lessons from past failures, it is important to avoid 
setting too ambitious a goal of supporting industries that defy 
the country’s latent comparative advantages which are primarily 
determined by its factor endowments. Otherwise, subsidies and 
protection may win a competitive edge temporarily but will not 
be sustainable in the long run, and may even result in entrenched 
rent-seeking. This new effective policy contrasts with ‘old’ 
industrial policies, which failed because they supported industries 
that defied comparative advantages, so that the high costs of 
production undermined their competitiveness (Lin and Xu 2019).
Second, an effective industrial policy entails a dynamic analysis 
of sector-specific binding constraints. Instead of falling into the 
trap of ‘prescription before diagnosis’ or ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy 
recommendations, NSE emphasises that binding constraints 
(i.e. those most critical and important constraints) vary on a 
sectoral basis and change over time. That is why ‘horizontal’ 
industry policy (without targeting any specific sector) is not 
sufficient in releasing the bottlenecks on the path to structural 
transformation. In short, identifying sector-specific binding 
constraints in a dynamic way is crucial to the diagnosis of what 
prevents the country from moving up the value chain, which can 
lay the foundation for targeted government interventions.
Third, governments need to play a facilitating role in mitigating 
the binding constraints. Placing emphasis on governmental 
facilitation is by no means advocating regressing to a command 
economy. Rather, cautious and well-designed government 
intervention aims to reduce the transaction costs of sectors with 
latent comparative advantages by redressing market failures 
and incubating market institutions. This pragmatic approach can 
help to go beyond the unproductive confrontation between free 
market and state intervention and foster synergies between an 
effective market and a facilitating state.
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The success of China’s economic miracles with industrial policy 
stands in sharp contrast to the mainstream development thinking 
whereby industrial policy has been regarded as an ineffective 
toolkit. China has proactively used industrial policies and foreign 
investment to facilitate technology transfer from advanced 
economies. In fact, history reveals that countries have successfully 
deployed industrial policy to promote industrial upgrading and 
structural change both in the past and at present (Amsden 1992; 
Mazzucato 2014; Wade 1990). Robert Walpole, the de facto 
first British prime minister, is credited to have been the first 
person to launch a comprehensive infant industry programme 
in 1721. Walpole strongly influenced Alexander Hamilton, the 
first US Treasury secretary, who first developed the theory of 
infant industry protection. Even today, the US government is 
actively deploying industrial policy to commanding heights in 
the high-tech industries and fostering innovation (Di Tommaso 
and Schweitzer 2013). Therefore, when rich industrialised 
countries advise developing countries to forgo industrial policy, 
they are kicking away the ladder as they climb up to the top 
(Chang 2002).
Industrial policy is now back on the agenda of development 
policymaking. An emerging global consensus is that industrial 
policy is an important part of the toolkit by which governments 
can shape the economy for the better. Hence, the key question 
is not about whether we need industrial policy or not, but 
rather how to make industrial policy work better (Rodrik 2009). 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff recently published a 
Working Paper titled The Return of the Policy that Shall Not Be 
Named: Principles of Industrial Policy, which argues that more 
can learned from miracles than failures and suggests three key 
principles behind the success of industrial policy: (1) the support 
of domestic producers in sophisticated industries, beyond the 
initial comparative advantage; (2) export orientation; and (3) the 
pursuit of fierce competition with strict accountability (Cherif and 
Hasanov 2019).
The Inter-American Development Bank launched an influential 
report titled Rethinking Productive Development: Sound 
Policies and Institutions for Economic Transformation, which 
urges that Latin American country governments should not 
shun active industrial policies even though misguided industrial 
policy has often done more harm than good in the past (Crespi, 
Fernández-Arias and Stein 2014). The report argues that ‘flatly 
rejecting all policies that resemble industrial policies because of 
past failures in the region would amount to throwing the baby out 
with the bath water’ (ibid.: 5).
A current criticism is that subsidised Chinese firms with access 
to cheap finance have created unfair advantages in market 
shares. This issue is not new to China. The Boeing-Airbus conflict 
over subsidies has lasted nearly 20 years. In fact, a growing 
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trend of mutual interdependence between states and firms 
throughout the world shows that a critical determinant of the 
success of firms in international markets is that states need to 
formulate national and sectoral policy to resolve the dilemma 
inherent in their dealings with foreign firms (Stopforth, Strange 
and Henley 1991). Yet some subsidies are justified when social 
returns exceed private returns, a basic rule in economics. Thus, 
the case for an entrepreneurial ‘mission-driven’ state is becoming 
more recognised (Mazzucato 2014). For example, China’s 
support for the photovoltaic solar panel industry has produced 
a spectacular improvement in efficiency and reduction in price 
– a huge global return on a Chinese public investment. Similarly, 
support for Chinese investment in African information technology 
infrastructure has had an inestimable impact on Africa’s 
economic performance and prospects as well as people’s lives 
(Gagliardone 2019).
In summary, China’s economic miracles would not be possible 
without a facilitating government, though industrial policy 
sometimes may go awry in practice. This has helped to shift the 
debate from ‘why we need industrial policy’ to ‘how to make 
industrial policy work better’. NSE’s approach to industrial policy is 
complementary to the recent discussion on enabling conditions 
for effective industrial policy (Andreoni and Chang 2019; Chang 
and Andreoni 2020).
2.3 Special Economic Zones
SEZs became a viable development strategy for China to initiate 
the reform and opening-up policy in a pragmatic manner in 
the late 1970s when the overall business environment was poor, 
market institutions barely existed, and infrastructure deficits were 
mounting. China introduced SEZs as part of its experimentation 
towards economic liberalisation. Rather than following the 
mainstream prescription of improving the ‘doing business 
environment’ nationwide, the Chinese government decided 
to devote its limited resources to improving the soft and hard 
infrastructure within demarcated areas in order to attract foreign 
investment to make the export-oriented development strategy 
feasible (Zeng 2010, 2011).
SEZs are potential instruments for promoting economic structural 
transformation, and their success requires enabling conditions. 
Otherwise, despite the best of intentions, SEZs may be ill 
managed and result in counterproductive consequences. While 
China’s experience cannot be directly replicated elsewhere, it 
does provide insights into enabling success factors for other 
developing countries (Lin, Xu and Xia 2020).
First, strong commitment by high-level leadership is the key to 
unleashing the potential of SEZs. The Shekou Industrial Park and 
the Shenzhen SEZ would have been non-starters if the high-level 
leadership had not provided steadfast support for pioneers such 
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as China Merchants. As every policy initiated in SEZs ran counter 
to the prevailing policy nationwide, SEZ governance committees 
needed authority from the highest level to overcome resistance 
from individual ministries. Otherwise, special policies would not 
have been fully implemented and SEZs would have lost credibility 
in the eyes of investors.
Second, it is essential to target the right sectors in line with latent 
comparative advantages in the given region and adjust the 
sectoral focus dynamically. Empirical studies show that SEZs can 
help promote industrial upgrading if the targeted sectors align 
with the comparative advantages of the local economy (Li and 
Shen 2015; Chen and Xiong 2015). Yet some local governments 
blindly set sectoral targets using the industrial structure of 
well-developed regions as the benchmark. Consequently, those 
comparative advantage-defying industries have either resulted in 
overcapacity subsidised by governments (Bao, Tang and Liu 2017) 
or unsustainable imitation (Deng and Zhao 2018). This suggests 
that governments need to prioritise sectors with care when 
designing preferential SEZ policies.
Third, capable and devoted leadership and administration is key 
to leading investment promotion and building the confidence 
of potential investors. Developing countries often have limited 
resources; hence, it is not feasible to improve the soft and hard 
infrastructure of the whole country within a very short time frame. 
What is feasible is to enhance the business environment and 
hard infrastructure within demarcated SEZ areas. A capable 
and dedicated public administration can help to overcome the 
first-mover challenge, as foreign investors are often hesitant to 
enter a zone at the very beginning, even with improved hard 
infrastructure and business environment.
Crucial to this endeavour is taking an experimentation approach, 
learning from mistakes, and generating feedback loops. 
SEZs are by definition an experiment, so trials and errors are 
inevitable. What matters is that both central government and 
local governments can effectively build a feedback loop and 
adjust policies based on successes and failures in practice. The 
Chinese SEZs may be seen as a way-in-advance application 
of the Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA) approach 
now advanced as an optimal strategy for developing state 
capabilities – an influence, at least, from Chinese experience on 
development thinking (Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock 2017).
Inspired by China’s economic miracles, the authors find that 
using SEZs for advancing economic transformation has 
been increasingly adopted in other developing countries 
(Lin, Xu and Hager 2018; Knoerich, Mouan and Goodburn 2021). 
Moreover, the Chinese government has proactively taken efforts 
to establish overseas SEZs since 2006 to encourage Chinese 
firms to go global. The Chinese government had no blueprint 
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for these SEZs and relied on market principles combined with 
government guidance and incentives to ensure that zones could 
be sustainable (Brautigam and Xiaoyang 2012).
Although African SEZ performance is often hampered by weak 
SEZ governance, inefficient bureaucracies, poorly designed legal 
frameworks (Farole and Moberg 2017), and lack of local autonomy 
in their own administration (Tang 2019), SEZs have provided 
a promising new approach to sustainable industrialisation 
(Brautigam and Xiaoyang 2011). Such an approach stands in 
sharp contrast to the mainstream approach of applying a uniform 
benchmark to rank the business environment of all economies 
worldwide and urging governments to improve the ‘doing 
business’ environment against the one-size-fits-all blueprint. 
Empirical studies have shown that using the World Bank’s Doing 
Business Indicators as proxies for the business environment is 
problematic (Holden and Pekmezovic 2020).
In summary, inspired by China’s example, SEZs are being actively 
used by developing countries to attract foreign direct investment 
and foster export-led industrialisation. This approach demands 
local engagement and vision. The mainstream approach of 
improving and measuring the ‘doing business’ environment 
nationwide failed to capture China’s extraordinary success in 
export-oriented industrialisation. China scored well down the 
list on the Doing Business Indicators, revealing the limitations of 
these metrics.
3 Conclusion
From the NSE perspective, China can provide at least three 
potential lessons for development thinking and policies in the field 
of international development. First, in terms of agenda-setting 
(what development is), Chinese policies and experience argue 
that human development and poverty reduction, which have 
been an important part of China’s own development strategies, 
are not sufficient alone, and indicate very clearly that economic 
structural transformation is a prerequisite for sustainable and 
large-scale poverty reduction and human and social capabilities.
Second, with respect to the role of the state in economic 
development, Chinese policies and experience show that the 
market system is essential but needs a facilitating state, with 
an indispensable role for industrial policy in fostering economic 
transformation. This does not mean that China’s industrial policy 
is free from flaws. Rather, China’s economic miracle with industrial 
policy helps to shift the debate from ‘why we need an industrial 
policy’ to ‘how to create synergies between a facilitating 
government and an effective market to make industrial policy 
work better’ (Ang 2020).
Third, regarding the means of development (how best to achieve 
development), Chinese policy and experience argues for using 
64 | Xu and Carey Exploring China’s Impacts on Development Thinking and Policies
IDS Bulletin Vol. 52 No. 2 November 2021 ‘China and International Development: Knowledge, Governance, and Practice’
limited state capabilities strategically to improve both hard and 
soft infrastructure within demarcated SEZs. This will generate 
export-led industrialisation and facilitate a move up global value 
chains in the context of a poor business environment and weak 
institutions nationwide at the early stage of development.
Our analysis above was set in the context of three basic elements 
of the Chinese scene: massive urbanisation in economic structural 
transformation; entrepreneurial financing of local government; 
and the competitive but accountable decentralisation of the 
economic governance system, producing a Lucas ‘economic 
miracle’ (1993) via the high combinatorial value of these three 
vectors. We note that the Chinese transformation process is now 
widely acknowledged, though industrial policies are contested 
internationally even while producing emulation in developed 
countries. China’s development banking system is also producing 
emulation. Finally, we propose that relevant and adapted 
elements of the Chinese experience could be powerful vectors in 
an urbanising African continent of 2.5 billion people by 2050.
Notes
* This IDS Bulletin was produced as part of the UK Anchor 
Institution for the China International Development 
Research Network, funded by the Foreign, Commonwealth 
& Development Office (FCDO). The opinions expressed are 
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or 
policies of IDS or the UK government.
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4 Despite the eradication of extreme poverty, the poverty 
headcount ratio at US$5.50 a day (2011 PPP) (per cent of 
population) was still as high as 24 per cent in 2016 according 
to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. This implies 
that there is still a long way to go for China to achieve shared 
prosperity. 
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China’s NGO Partnerships in a New 
Era of Development Cooperation*
Anthea Mulakala,1 Robin Bush2 and Hongbo Ji3
Abstract China’s 2021 White Paper, China’s International 
Development Cooperation in the New Era, offers a new vision 
for a more people-centred approach to its development 
cooperation. While the White Paper extensively discusses 
partnerships, it only briefly mentions encouraging cooperation 
with non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This article argues 
that NGO engagement in international development activities 
would improve their effectiveness, a view shared by many Chinese 
scholars and practitioners. However, challenges exist that 
constrain optimal engagement, especially access to funding, and 
a weak enabling environment and policy framework. This article 
addresses these challenges, drawing from the literature on ‘going 
out’ among Chinese NGOs and social organisations, along with 
interviews with key players in the Chinese NGO ecosystem. The 
article recommends, among other things, that the government 
clarify and improve its policy framework for NGOs/social 
organisations in support of China’s international development 
collaboration, especially regarding funding flows, personnel 
regulations, and material and capital outflows.
Keywords NGOs, social organisations, China, White Paper, 
internationalisation, development cooperation, Belt and Road 
Initiative, partnerships, 'going out', South–South cooperation.
1 Introduction
China has emerged as one of the most influential, debated, and 
discussed development cooperation actors in the twenty-first 
century. Chinese international development cooperation4 has 
been extensively researched, scrutinised, mapped, and quantified 
(Huang 2019; Lynch, Andersen and Zhu 2020; Mulakala 2021). 
Less research and attention have gone to Chinese NGOs and 
social organisations5 and how they fit into the broader schema 
of Chinese development and South–South cooperation (SSC). 
This article posits that for China to achieve the people-centred 
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aspirations outlined in its January 2021 White Paper, China’s 
International Development Cooperation in the New Era 
(SCIO 2021), Chinese NGOs and social organisations should 
become part of the equation.
China’s two previous White Papers on development assistance 
(2011 and 2014) largely responded to international calls for 
transparency (SCIO 2011, 2014). Neither discussed the contribution 
of Chinese NGOs and social organisations, although both 
described activities, such as humanitarian aid and improving 
health care, that may have involved these actors. The current 
White Paper offers a different vision: it explicitly affirms China’s 
commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 
people-to-people connectivity, especially through the Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI). Partnerships will prove critical to this forward 
vision. This article takes up this positive outlook on the role of 
Chinese NGOs and provides a more detailed look at both the 
potential opportunities and constraints they face.
Section 2 lays out the methodology for our study. Section 3 
provides a limited review of the literature on the growing 
internationalisation of NGOs in China. Section 4 is a brief 
discussion of how NGOs feature in the White Paper. Section 5 
discusses the strategic role for NGOs in the BRI. Section 6 discusses 
the importance of diversifying development partnerships. 
Section 7 outlines some of the challenges to internationalisation 
faced by Chinese NGOs. Section 8 puts forward some 
recommendations for strengthening the international role of 
China’s NGOs. Section 9 offers some final conclusions.
2 Research methodology
This article draws on a combination of secondary and targeted 
primary research. It first relies on a desktop review of the literature 
to provide a brief overview of Chinese NGO internationalisation, 
i.e. ‘going out’ efforts. Second, it identifies areas of China’s 
current development cooperation agenda, as articulated in the 
White Paper, where NGOs can play a pivotal role. Third, it draws 
again on a desktop review and interviews with seven Chinese 
NGO leaders and experts,6 to discuss challenges in fulfilling that 
role. Our conversations, semi-structured interviews, and email 
exchanges with these NGO leaders aimed for nuance and detail 
that could fill in some of the gaps in the literature and were 
analysed qualitatively.
The NGOs represented here span the various categories 
mentioned in Section 2. The Center for International NGOs and 
Foundations/Beijing Normal University (CINF-BNU) has both a 
practitioner and policy perspective, while the China Foundation 
for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA) is one of the largest and first 
Chinese NGOs to internationalise. The Global Environment 
Institute (GEI) conducts both development and advocacy, and 
the Beijing Rongzhi Institute of Corporate Social Responsibility 
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(Rongzhi) brings in some private sector perspectives. The leaders 
of these organisations spoke with us because they share an 
interest in advancing Chinese policy and want to take part in the 
international conversation about China’s global engagement. 
Their views, as described below, have also influenced our 
recommendations.
3 The internationalisation of China’s NGOs
Chinese NGOs comprise a relatively small feature of Chinese 
development cooperation. However, this role has expanded as 
the Chinese government, companies, and NGOs recognise the 
strategic potential this partnership affords.
Difficulties arise in pinpointing definitive data on the scale 
of international Chinese NGO involvement and how it may 
have changed over time. According to the Chinese Ministry 
of Civil Affairs (MCA) statistics, by the end of 2014, out of the 
606,000 social organisations in China, 215 social groups, nine 
foundations, and four private non-enterprise units had engaged 
in international work (MCA 2015). After 2015, the MCA no longer 
provided this type of data. A search on the United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) Database 
reveals that 20 China-based NGOs have carried out activities 
outside of China, and 71 Chinese NGOs have ‘consultative status’ 
with the United Nations (UNDESA 2021). Li and Dong (2018: 2) note 
that as of 2017, the China Foundation Center (CFC) had recorded 
49 Chinese foundations as active overseas, and that the China 
NGO Network for International Exchanges (CNIE) listed 63 of their 
NGO members as having a focus on international affairs.
Li and Dong (2018) place the internationalisation of Chinese 
NGOs within the broader context of China’s 'going out' as China 
opened up to the world in waves beginning in the 1970s. The 
third wave of 'going out' from the 2000s onward involved the 
export of Chinese culture (through Confucius Institutes) and its 
experience of development, with NGOs beginning to take part in 
international development. Li and Dong (2018: 2) also posit several 
factors driving this internationalisation of NGOs – both political 
incentives, with the Chinese government encouraging its NGOs 
to support national geopolitical goals, and economic incentives, 
due to increasing competition for funding domestically as well 
as increasing opportunity overseas through mechanisms such as 
the BRI.
Our review of the literature and our experience as practitioners 
indicate that Chinese NGOs engage in three distinguishable 
categories of internationalisation activities. First, some 
NGOs ‘go out’ and provide a quick response to international 
humanitarian and natural disasters. China is a disaster-prone 
country. Chinese NGOs, most prominently search-and-rescue 
teams, developed strong professional capacity following 
the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake and started providing 
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disaster-response assistance to other countries. International 
humanitarian or disaster response has thus become a primary 
sector for international Chinese NGO action (Huang 2019; Li and 
Dong 2018). This has been particularly visible during the Covid-19 
pandemic, when Chinese NGOs and social organisations have 
played a critical role in China’s response, providing support to 
over 109 countries on six continents by March 2020 (Zhang 2020).
Second, some Chinese NGOs implement on-the-ground 
environmental, health, education, or other development projects 
overseas. Some of these organisations operate from a Chinese 
base; others set up project offices overseas, and some operate 
through collaborations with local organisations. Examples include 
CFPA, which has set up field offices in partner countries such 
as Nepal, Myanmar, and Ethiopia, where it operates water and 
sanitation, children’s education, and women’s livelihood support 
programmes (CFPA n.d.), and the Global Environment Institute 
(GEI), an environmental and human-development NGO based in 
Beijing; it partnered with the Ministry of Livestock Development 
in Sri Lanka to adapt a renewable energy model developed in 
China to the local context (China Development Brief 2021).
Third, some social organisations conduct research and advocacy 
on a range of social and environmental issues relevant to 
development. They may also represent industry, and often 
work in partnership with international organisations or Chinese 
companies. Such organisations include GEI, which has created 
environmental exchange platforms such as the East and 
Southeast Asia Community Conservation Network7 and Beijing 
Rongzhi Corporate Social Responsibility Research Institute 
(Rongzhi); it supports Chinese governmental bodies, industry 
associations, and enterprises in research, development, and 
application of social responsibility standards and guidelines. It 
also provides technical assistance to Chinese enterprises.8
4 China’s 2021 White Paper and the role for Chinese NGOs
The 2021 White Paper reaffirms China’s previous commitments 
to development cooperation partnership with NGOs. It refers 
to social organisations three times, indicating different levels 
of commitment. First, the paper underscores a high-level 
commitment, citing President Xi’s statement at the Second 
Belt and Road Forum (2019) that China would support social 
organisation participation in public wellbeing projects along 
the BRI (SCIO 2021: 11). Second, the paper announces a funding 
mechanism: China’s US$3bn South–South Cooperation 
Assistance Fund (SSCAF) will focus on micro and small projects 
across diverse sectors, as well as trade promotion and investment 
facilitation, in cooperation with Chinese social organisations 
(ibid.: 19). Third, the paper proposes an institutional architecture: 
under ‘future prospects for international cooperation’, China’s 
inter-ministerial coordination mechanism for foreign aid becomes 
responsible for aligning the efforts of various government levels 
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and social organisations, the better to enhance efficiency and 
cohesion (ibid.: 49).
While versions of these commitments may have preceded the 
2021 White Paper, their mention affirms the space for NGO and 
social organisation engagement, however vague the details. 
Using the parameters of the White Paper, Chinese NGOs and 
social organisations can add impact in two broad areas, as 
described below.
5 Ensuring sustainability along the Belt and Road
China’s investments along the Belt and Road have declined 
significantly since 2016 (Mingey and Kratz 2021). This reflects a 
slowdown in the Chinese economy, concerns about rising debt 
and debt management, and more restraint by partner countries 
amidst challenging economic times. Accordingly, the White 
Paper’s discernible shift in focus from hardware to ‘humanware’, 
that is, human development, creates an opportunity to improve 
the execution and sustainability of existing projects.
Through guidelines and regulations, the Chinese government 
encourages Chinese BRI-building companies to take care of 
the communities and environments impacted by their projects, 
and these companies increasingly recognise the importance 
of stakeholder engagement and social and environmental 
considerations in business sustainability (Gu, Li and Zhang, this 
IDS Bulletin); however, they often do not have the experience 
or knowledge to address these issues (Guo and Duan 2017). 
NGOs and social organisations can bridge this gap. Simeng, a 
professional service institute for corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) managers and its consulting arm SynTao, have offered 
leadership in this area, producing community engagement 
guidelines and manuals and providing training for Chinese 
companies investing overseas. However, such collaborations 
remain rare. NGOs may have a role in working with frontline BRI 
companies to engage outside their comfort zone of traditional 
BRI project implementation and interact with communities and 
local stakeholders.
The White Paper devotes an entire section to the SDG agenda 
and presents the BRI as a platform through which China 
can channel its SDG efforts. China’s experience of poverty 
alleviation, in which Chinese NGOs have played critical roles, 
offers perhaps its most valuable lessons for partner countries. 
Sound development cooperation policies and practices also 
dictate an essential role for NGOs in delivering aid, since they are 
widely believed to be more efficient than government agencies 
(McCoskey 2009). People-to-people connectivity and sustainable 
development are two of CFPA’s core principles. Since 2019, CFPA 
has offered its domestic poverty alleviation experience to BRI 
countries through the Panda Pack Project, in partnership with 
Alibaba philanthropy, delivering school supplies to 732,314 children 
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in ten countries (CFPA 2020). This project complements CFPA’s 
other SDG-related programmes in maternal and child health, 
higher education, and non-profit hospitals in 20 countries and 
regions (Dong and Li 2020: 240). Similarly, GEI complements 
its work with Chinese companies through projects on forest 
protection in Myanmar, low-carbon development in Sri Lanka, and 
community biogas development in Laos (ibid.: 245–6).
The SDGs, however, are not a simple add-on. While the official 
Chinese narratives about the ‘Green BRI’ and ‘Health Silk Road’ 
are compelling, delivering SDG results will require more than 
dotting the BRI with education and health projects, despite 
their benefits. It requires designing and implementing the core 
big-ticket BRI infrastructure projects differently and inclusively, 
with the SDGs and partner country national development goals 
considered at every stage. Experienced Chinese NGOs, such 
as those we discuss, working in tandem with local NGOs and 
communities can contribute to this realisation.
6 Diversifying development partnerships
The White Paper emphasises the centrality of partnerships, 
noting that China will work through different forms and 
modalities and with diverse partners. While government-to-
government partnerships have historically underpinned Chinese 
SSC, the stated desire to engage more directly with people 
(SCIO 2021: 24) may require collaboration with more nimble 
actors. Chinese NGOs, such as CFPA, that have on-the-ground 
presence in some of China’s partner countries, can deploy 
local language skills through locally engaged staff, which helps 
them to implement community projects and respond during 
emergencies and humanitarian disasters. They can also act as a 
link between Chinese companies and communities. For example, 
in Sudan, CFPA collaborated with the Chinese Embassy, China 
National Petroleum Corporation, and the Al-Birr and Al-Tawasul 
Organisation, a Sudanese civil society organisation, to revitalise 
the Abu Ushar Hospital and deliver vital health services to 
Sudan’s poor (Peng, Ji and Wang 2017: 36). Increasingly, Chinese 
NGOs, such as CFPA in Nepal and Myanmar, are participating in 
country-based international NGO (INGO) forums.9
Many Chinese NGOs and social organisations, such as the China 
Association for NGO Cooperation (CANGO) and GEI, collaborate 
and share lessons with international peers and partners through 
extensive international networks. This helps bring the voice and 
experience of Chinese civil society to international consultations 
such as the UN climate change conferences (Dong and Li 
2020: 236–7).
Collaboration between international and Chinese organisations 
has numerous advantages for all partners. Chinese NGOs benefit 
from exposure to INGO norms, standard operating procedures 
(SOPs), protocols, networks, and knowledge of local contexts; 
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INGOs benefit from Chinese NGO quantitative and qualitative 
information and from their privileged insights into China’s 
development cooperation and overseas investments. Both 
benefit from mutual learning and sharing. These partnerships can 
also serve as a form of Track Two Diplomacy10 in conditions where 
formal relations between China and other countries may have 
become strained.
7 Challenges faced by Chinese NGOs 'going out'
In the limited but growing literature on Chinese NGO international 
activities, three main challenges consistently recur: a weak policy 
and regulatory environment, lack of access to funding, and 
weak human-resource capacity for international work. The NGO 
representatives and scholars we interviewed evoked the persistent 
incongruence between the aspirations and official directives 
for an expanded international NGO role and the practical 
mechanisms (clear policy, access to funding, and capacity) 
needed to make it happen.
7.1 Absence of an enabling policy framework
The lack of a robust regulatory or policy framework to support 
NGO internationalisation (Shuai 2017; Huang 2019; Li and Dong 
2018) appears as a prominent challenge in the literature. Official 
directives have not so far translated into practical measures. 
Our interviewees clearly indicated that globalisation and the 
global development agenda (the SDGs) drive the increasing 
internationalisation of Chinese NGOs. As China goes out, so 
do Chinese NGOs, but without much government support. 
The irony of the BRI is that while investors and companies 
traverse continents in the fast lane, NGOs are still waiting 
for their passports. The ‘spontaneous’ expansion of Chinese 
NGOs overseas is taking place in advance of any government 
support – a reality that puts pressure on the government to both 
accommodate and manage this phenomenon. A representative 
of GEI, Ren Peng11 observed that China does not favour Chinese 
NGO participation in development cooperation, and most such 
activities suffer from the absence of a national strategy.
Furthermore, there remains no unified administration for NGO 
international activities.12 While the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) has qualification methods for enterprise participation 
in foreign aid projects, no such regulation exists for NGOs (Dong 
and Li 2020: 251–2). The China International Development 
Cooperation Agency (CIDCA), set up in 2018, does not have 
an NGO partnership mechanism like those that play important 
roles in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) 
country aid systems (e.g. Australia’s).
Amidst current global geopolitical tensions, Chinese NGOs have 
served as, and may increasingly become, a lever of China’s 
soft-power diplomacy. Li and Dong (2018: 2) assert that the 
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Chinese government had encouraged its NGOs to support 
China’s geopolitical goals. Director Yang Li of CINF-BNU13 
emphasised that the overseas practices of Chinese NGOs will 
help reconstruct China’s global image and promote international 
exchanges. According to CFPA Vice President Wang Xingzui,14 
some Chinese NGOs have positioned themselves to participate 
in global governance and ‘share Chinese ways with the Western 
world’. Yang provided the example of the Amity Foundation, 
which established a Geneva office in 2015 in part to provide 
a bridge for Chinese social organisation engagement along 
the BRI (Amity Foundation 2021).15 For CFPA, the extent of 
public display of its Chinese background depends on the local 
context. In Myanmar, CFPA faces scepticism about its in-country 
activities from some local stakeholders. To operate effectively, 
the NGO status needs to be emphasised and distance from the 
government is necessary.16 In Nepal, on the other hand, CFPA 
identification with the Chinese government reassures Nepali 
government counterparts and facilitates its work in-country.17
Given this reality, as Chinese NGOs expand internationally, they 
will require the flexibility and autonomy to position themselves 
according to local political context and bilateral relationships 
with China. Strategic positioning aside, our respondents all shared 
a view of a deeply intertwined relationship between Chinese 
NGOs overseas and the Chinese government – one in which the 
NGOs could play a significant role in furthering the government’s 
soft-power and foreign policy agenda, but also one in which the 
effectiveness of the NGOs themselves depends on supportive 
measures from the government.
Meanwhile, as Chinese NGOs seek more international 
engagement, they face the challenge of being perceived as 
a front for China’s state machinery, despite the absence of 
government funding support. This perception is enhanced by 
the government’s framing of the BRI as an all-inclusive platform 
for China’s globalisation. This challenge does not affect Chinese 
NGOs alone. Chinese private companies invested overseas are 
often lumped together with state-owned enterprises in critiques 
of the BRI, although many operate outside the oversight of the 
Chinese state. While many other international NGOs funded by 
their countries of origin are also seen as advancing their foreign 
policy agendas (Silver 2006; Ishkanian 2007), current geopolitical 
dynamics may subject Chinese NGOs to more scrutiny.
7.2 Funding constraints
Access to funding has proved a long-standing challenge for 
Chinese NGOs 'going out' (Li and Dong 2018; Huang 2019; Fan 
2019; Shuai 2017; Lu 2017). They rarely receive funding directly from 
government international development funds. While President 
Xi announced the establishment of the SSCAF in 2015, very little 
of its funding has gone to Chinese NGOs. Once established in 
2018, CIDCA took over SSCAF management from MOFCOM. 
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This transition contributed to the slow progress on NGO 
involvement in SSCAF.
In 2017, the China NGO Network for International Exchanges 
(CNIE) established the Silk Road NGO Cooperation Network 
to complement the BRI with coordinated Chinese NGO efforts 
to build people-to-people connectivity, implement beneficial 
projects, and build public support for the BRI. The network has 
attracted 352 members across 72 countries (CNIE 2020). CNIE 
has a mandate to coordinate Chinese NGO applications to the 
SSCAF by reviewing NGO project proposals and making funding 
recommendations to CIDCA. CNIE made its first call for proposals 
in July 2020 and so far, no Chinese NGOs have received funding 
awards through this process (ibid.). According to You Fei,18 the 
Executive Director of CINF-BNU, CNIE should play a larger 
role both in supporting Chinese NGOs’ work overseas and in 
facilitating dialogue with the Chinese government, including on 
topics such as access to government funding through the SSCAF.
As a result of the lack of government funding, most Chinese 
NGOs operating overseas have often relied on online and offline 
fundraising from the domestic population or Chinese companies. 
CFPA Vice President Wang19 says his organisation receives 
only 4.2 per cent of its funding for international work from the 
government. The remainder comes primarily from the public, 
donated through online portals such as Alibaba and Tencent 
(59.55 per cent), with smaller amounts coming from foundations 
(10.76 per cent), state-owned and private enterprises (9.7 per 
cent), and private individuals (9 per cent). He expects to see a 
gradual increase in government allocation of financial support to 
NGOs for international work. He noted a sign of progress in CFPA’s 
selection as one of the few pilot applicants for SSCAF funding.
7.3 Limited capacity
Weak capacity and limited international experience create 
further challenges for Chinese NGOs. Lu (2017) notes that 
Chinese foreign aid is often criticised for its lack of sensitivity to 
local contexts and local communities. This reflects the common 
practice of implementing infrastructure projects such as bridges, 
roads, and stadiums through Chinese companies and contractors, 
who lack awareness of why or how to engage communities in the 
process. While Chinese NGOs could in theory fill this void, their 
role remains limited by inadequate personnel capacity or lack 
of overseas experience. In our interviews, all respondents cited 
internal capacity as a constraint and challenge to effective 'going 
out'. Chinese NGOs struggle to recruit personnel experienced in 
both the political and social contexts of their partner countries, 
as well as the technical procedures of managing international 
projects overseas. Interviewees often note that their NGOs receive 
little to no training in international or multicultural engagement, 
diversity awareness, or in the cultures and socioeconomic 
contexts of the countries in which they work.
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Many of the capacity constraints relate to the challenge of 
aligning policy frameworks not initially designed to be in sync. 
For example, Nepal’s government requires INGOs to cooperate 
with local NGO partners in programme implementation, and to 
maintain an annual contribution of US$200,000. Due to Chinese 
policies on foreign exchange control, there are also difficulties 
in fund transfer.20 Many Chinese NGOs with recent 'going out' 
experience need more experienced personnel to navigate these 
administrative challenges.
Other capacity constraints relate to the challenges of managing 
multiple language and donor requirements. Language barriers 
make it challenging for Rongzhi to conduct surveys or other 
activities in targeted countries. CFPA Myanmar often need to 
produce project reports in Burmese, English, and Mandarin 
customised according to the interests and priorities of different 
donors. For example, their Hong Kong-based foundation donors 
prefer visual records detailing implementation and have less 
interest in fund utilisation, while their mainland China-based 
donors attach great importance to local relationships, often 
promoted through local profiles of projects and events and 
local media coverage.21 These challenges will be familiar to all 
NGOs working in the international space, but Chinese NGOs 
have a smaller pool of personnel experienced in international 
development to draw upon and are relatively new to the game.
In this context, our respondents stressed the usefulness of sharing 
experiences with other NGOs operating in the same environment. 
CFPA has established effective partnerships with western INGOs that 
have significantly assisted their new offices. For example, the CFPA 
Myanmar Country Director conducted an eight-month internship 
with Mercy Corps in Myanmar, focused on country office set-up and 
developing working relationships with local staff).22 Similarly, the CFPA 
Nepal Country Director attended a useful country-office training at 
Mercy Corps Nepal.23 Both country directors cited the helpfulness of 
The Asia Foundation’s operational manual, produced for Chinese 
NGOs preparing to go out (see Lu 2017).
8 Recommendations for key actors
We argue the need for greater action as China’s international 
development cooperation prioritises a more human-centred vision 
and as opportunities for people-to-people connectivity become 
more critical in an increasingly polarised world. We suggest some 
practical steps that can include all players in the ecosystem – the 
Chinese government, private sector, partner countries, foreign 
and Chinese NGOs – to improve delivery of the SDGs. Here we 
consolidate recommendations from the literature, our interview 
respondents, and our own practitioner-based experience.
8.1 Recommendations for the Chinese government
Given the lack of a robust policy framework and funding support, 
we recommend that the government clarify and develop 
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an improved policy framework for Chinese NGOs and social 
organisations, especially regarding funding flows, personnel 
regulations, and material and capital outflows. A public–private 
partnership (PPP) model and policy framework would enable 
NGOs to leverage SSCAF funds for collaboration with Chinese 
businesses, thereby increasing their impact in international 
partnerships. To strengthen understanding between NGOs and 
various government agencies, the government, or government-
mandated organisations, could establish a systematic and 
regular coordination framework, including semi-annual dialogues 
between the government and internationally active NGOs and 
social organisations.
Smaller task forces, co-led by an NGO and a government 
counterpart, could conduct in-depth engagement on topics 
such as setting up country offices, managing funding outflows, 
applying for funding from SSCAF, and other priority policy 
measures. To facilitate coordination and promote knowledge-
sharing and mutual learning, we recommend that CIDCA or 
CNIE, working in partnership with academic or thinktank partners, 
establish a comprehensive database of Chinese NGOs and social 
organisations that have ‘gone out’ in various ways. Finally, the 
government needs an evaluation mechanism to assess Chinese 
NGO contributions to international cooperation, including their 
global practices, social impact, achievements, and challenges. 
This could result in recommendations or actions for improved 
planning and optimised resource allocations.
8.2 Recommendations for Chinese NGOs regarding 'going out'
NGOs can and should access the wealth of best-practice 
knowledge in international development, both prior to and 
after establishing an international presence (whether on a 
project basis, or through a country office). Prior to 'going out', 
NGOs should develop sound and transparent accountability 
mechanisms for overseas projects, including details of project 
development, sources and use of funds, and project evaluation 
upon completion. They should also invest in developing in-house 
expertise in the language, culture, history, and customs of key 
countries of operation.
Once they have developed a concrete plan for overseas activity, 
NGOs should analyse the country or location as an ecosystem, 
identifying all potential resources, including the Chinese Embassy, 
Chinese enterprises active in the location, other INGOs, local 
NGOs active in their sector, and the Chinese diaspora community 
in-country. Where NGO associations or coordination forums in 
partner countries exist, Chinese NGOs should seek to join these, 
to learn and share knowledge about local regulations, cultural 
norms, and development practices. Emergency response NGOs 
should establish relationships with counterparts in key partner 
countries, setting up networks and collaboration systems prior to 
any disaster that might require rapid response. They may wish to 
80 | Mulakala et al. China’s NGO Partnerships in a New Era of Development Cooperation
IDS Bulletin Vol. 52 No. 2 November 2021 ‘China and International Development: Knowledge, Governance, and Practice’
set up internships with other INGOs before establishing country 
offices, to observe international best practices, protocols, and 
implementation standards.
8.3 Recommendations for Chinese enterprises and businesses
NGO and private sector partnerships offer beyond-aid answers to 
sustainability and scale, combining complementary resources and 
capabilities to address development challenges. The BRI offers an 
opportunity for closer cooperation between Chinese NGOs and 
enterprises. Chinese companies lack the skills and experience 
to engage with communities, yet investment sustainability 
depends significantly on strengthened community impact. The 
Asia Foundation’s programmes and research with companies and 
communities engaged in BRI projects reveals opportunity and 
willingness on both sides to improve project implementation and 
community impact (Guo and Duan 2017; The Asia Foundation, 
forthcoming). Partnerships with NGOs should help in such cases.
Perhaps with support from the SSCAF, a new Chinese model of 
what we might call ‘South–South collaboration’ will emerge – one 
where Chinese business, government, and NGO interests coalesce 
with those of partner countries (Mulakala 2021). We recommend 
the development of a PPP model for partnering with NGOs using 
SSCAF funds: Chinese businesses could then allocate matching 
funds for said partnerships in key countries. Companies should 
also develop SOPs for partnerships with Chinese NGOs to assist 
with community engagement, socio-environmental impact 
assessments, and poverty alleviation activities in the communities 
where industrial and infrastructure projects take place.
8.4 Recommendations for other INGOs, development partners, 
and donors
Foreign INGOs and Western donors often do not actively 
engage with Chinese organisations in coordination and 
knowledge-sharing. This results in a lost opportunity for improving 
development effectiveness, given the increasing importance 
of Chinese assistance. We recommend that INGOs and 
international development partners should, as a matter of course, 
reach out to Chinese social organisations when researching 
Chinese development projects in partner countries, to forge 
ties with Chinese companies and to gain insights into Chinese 
perspectives. Furthermore, they should invite Chinese NGOs 
and social organisations to join donor coordination meetings 
in-country, arrange to meet with them bilaterally, and encourage 
the establishment of internships or exchange programmes with 
other INGOs.
8.5 Recommendations for partner countries
As Chinese development cooperation assumes a larger 
proportion of their available international resources, many 
developing countries will need to integrate such resources into 
national development planning and policy frameworks. While 
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some have established systems and government agencies to 
receive and partner with OECD-DAC donors, they often have 
not yet done so for Chinese ones. Investment in understanding, 
integrating, and maximising this source of international 
development funding will prove critical. Partner countries should 
include and invite Chinese NGOs to national development 
roundtables and establish procedures for adapting or applying 
existing SOPs and protocols to Chinese development projects. In 
addition, partner-country NGOs and thinktanks should receive 
encouragement to collaborate with Chinese NGOs as local 
implementers of Chinese development projects.
9 Conclusions and further research
The scale and breadth of China’s international development 
cooperation have a critical place in the global effort towards 
sustainable development. While China’s 2021 White Paper creates 
space for enhanced NGO engagement, our review here reveals 
that these NGOs face persistent deficits in policy enablement, 
funding opportunities, and organisational capacity. Interviewees 
commented that it might take over a decade before we see a 
boom in the global expansion of Chinese NGOs. Our findings 
reveal points of opacity in China’s development cooperation 
strategy, as Chinese NGOs have an official and vital status, 
but with unclear articulation of their precise role or the means 
of enabling it. Our recommendations indicate a possible way 
forward for Chinese NGOs to receive the attention needed for 
them to play a strategic role in China’s international development 
cooperation.
This article presents primary qualitative perspectives of a few key 
Chinese NGOs on the current scope and environment for Chinese 
NGO participation in Chinese development cooperation. Due 
to time constraints and limitations resulting from the pandemic, 
we were unable to undertake a broad quantitative assessment 
of Chinese NGOs’ experience or conduct primary research with 
relevant Chinese government stakeholders. We hope our research 
may inform further discussion with government actors and with a 
broader range of Chinese NGOs, particularly as more enter the 
development cooperation arena. Further research can also track 
implementation of the White Paper to investigate whether and 
how NGO partnerships increase.
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Notes
*  This IDS Bulletin was produced as part of the UK Anchor 
Institution for the China International Development 
Research Network, funded by the Foreign, Commonwealth 
& Development Office (FCDO). The opinions expressed are 
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or 
policies of IDS or the UK government.
1 Anthea Mulakala, Senior Director for International Development 
Cooperation, The Asia Foundation, Malaysia.
2 Robin Bush, Country Representative, The Asia Foundation, 
Malaysia. 
3 Hongbo Ji, Country Representative, The Asia Foundation, China.
4 ‘International development cooperation’ refers to China’s 
bilateral and multilateral efforts, within the framework of 
South–South cooperation, to promote economic and social 
development through foreign aid, humanitarian assistance, 
and other means (SCIO 2021).
5 The 2016 Charity Law of the People’s Republic of China lists 
three categories for charitable organisations, including 
foundations, social groups, and social service organisations. 
We use NGOs and social organisations interchangeably in this 
article to refer to all three categories.
6 Lin Yuan, Myanmar Country Director, China Foundation 
for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA) – interviewed via phone call. 
Liu Neng, programme manager, Beijing Rongzhi Institute of 
Corporate Social Responsibility (Rongzhi) – interviewed by 
email. Ren Peng, programme manager, Global Environment 
Institute (GEI) – interviewed by email. Wang Xingzui, Vice 
President, CFPA – interviewed via phone call. Yang Li, Director, 
Center for International NGOs and Foundations/Beijing Normal 
University (CINF-BNU) – interviewed in person. You Fei, Executive 
Director, CINF-BNU – interviewed in person. Zou Zhiqiang, 
Nepal Country Director, CFPA – interviewed by phone call.
7 Ren Peng interview, 23 April 2021.
8 Liu Neng interview, 23 April 2021.
9 Lin Yuan and Zou Zhiqiang interviews, 9 April 2021.
10 Informal or backchannel diplomacy carried out by non-state 
actors.
11 Interview, 23 April 2021.
12 Yang Li interview, 8 April 2021.
13 Interview, 8 April 2021.
14 Interview, 8 April 2021.
15 Interview, 8 April 2021.
16 Lin Yuan interview, 9 April 2021.
17 Zou Zhiqiang interview, 9 April 2021.
18 Interview, 8 April 2021.
19 Interview, 8 April 2021.
20 Zou Zhiqiang interview, 9 April 2021.
21 Lin Yuan interview, 9 April 2021.
22 Interview, 9 April 2021.
23 Zou Zhiqiang interview, 9 April 2021.
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Ownership and Effectiveness of 
China’s Aid Projects in Africa*
Chuanhong Zhang,1 Xiaoyun Li2 and Dawit Alemu3
Abstract The notion of ‘ownership’ has occupied a central place 
in measuring the effectiveness of North–South cooperation. How 
is it represented in South–South cooperation (SSC) and how does 
it affect the effectiveness of SSC? There is no clear answer in the 
existing literature. In this article, we describe the representation 
of ‘ownership’ in SSC and explain how it has affected the 
process and impact of SSC projects using case studies of 
three uniformly designed Chinese agricultural aid projects in 
Mozambique, Tanzania, and Ethiopia. Based on long-term 
participatory observation and in-depth interviews, we find that 
‘ownership’ in SSC is represented differently from project design to 
implementation. Divergence and ambiguity exist among different 
stakeholders on the operation of ‘ownership’. ‘Co-ownership’ of 
two partners at the local level contributes to the effectiveness of 
SSC projects while ‘de-ownership’ and ‘forced ownership’ have a 
negative impact on the survival and sustainable development of 
SSC projects.
Keywords South–South cooperation, ownership, effectiveness, 
China–Africa agricultural cooperation.
1 Introduction
The notion of ‘ownership’ has occupied a central place in 
measuring the aid effectiveness of traditional donors. The 
consensus is that without recipient-country ownership, 
i.e. recipient countries (implicitly government) as the primary 
agents in choosing policies and designing programmes financed 
by foreign aid (Savedoff 2019), it is impossible to form effective 
partnerships between donor and recipient. Since the mid-1990s, 
North–South cooperation (NSC) has strongly advocated having 
recipients ‘in the driver’s seat’ (OECD-DAC 1996).
Many scholars question theoretically the concept of ownership 
in terms of its ambiguity. For example, Raffinot (2010) argues 
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that market forces, and international norms and rules leave very 
limited autonomous space in which governments may formulate 
policy, while donor-driven agendas might be more effective 
than national ones if donors are more poverty averse and would 
actually be able to impose poverty reduction on an unwilling 
government. Saliba-Couture (2011) also highlights the ambiguity 
of the term, noting how its meaning varies when juxtaposed 
with qualifiers; for instance, ‘government ownership’, ‘country 
ownership’, ‘national ownership’, ‘democratic ownership’, and 
‘local ownership’. He also emphasises the low levels of effective 
ownership potentially associated with recipient governments’ 
lack of administrative capacity, financial resources, expertise, and 
information. 
Willem Buiter (2007: 651) considers the term ‘country ownership’ 
as ‘at best unhelpful and at worst misleading and obfuscating’. 
Buiter advocates abandoning the concept of ownership 
altogether. Booth (2012) argues that, rather than explaining lack 
of ownership, ownership itself should be considered an objective, 
not a precondition for effective aid.
The global landscape of development cooperation has changed 
drastically in the last two decades as more and more Southern 
countries are engaging in aid programmes. By advocating 
the principles of equality, mutual respect, mutual benefit, and 
non-interference of partner countries’ internal affairs, South–South 
cooperation (SSC) is considered as a new and alternative 
paradigm of international development cooperation through 
creating ‘horizontal partnerships’, challenging the ‘vertical 
relationship’ of NSC. The horizontal approach featuring a 
demand-driven focus and ownership of partner countries can 
avoid the inherent inequality between donor and recipient in NSC.
It can also effectively decrease Southern countries’ dependence 
on external assistance through promoting their self-reliance. 
As Sha Zukang (2010), Under-Secretary-General for Economic 
and Social Affairs of the United Nations puts it, ‘SSC carries little 
macroeconomic or governance conditionalities, which enhances 
countries’ ownership’. However, questions such as ‘Who is 
supposed to “own”?’ and ‘What is to be owned?’ in SSC are still 
fundamentally ambiguous (Hasselskog and Schierenbeck 2017). 
Moreover, the relationship between ownership and effectiveness 
is becoming more obscure and the actors involved are becoming 
confused about whether it is a precondition or an indicator of 
effectiveness.
Being the leading SSC provider, as well as the second largest 
economy in the world, China’s insistence on conducting 
development cooperation in the framework of SSC has aroused 
worldwide interest and has also met both censure and praise 
(Buckley 2013; Gu and Kitano 2018). The changing economic status 
of China makes the study on China’s practice in international 
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development cooperation more interesting to international 
scholars and China’s domestic policymakers (Gu, Li and Zhang, 
this IDS Bulletin). How ownership, the key principle in relation to 
measuring the effectiveness of NSC, is represented in China’s SSC 
could be a good starting point to understand the challenges and 
struggles of China’s approach. Current discussions on the trends 
of the ‘Southernisation’ of NSC and the ‘Northernisation’ of SSC 
during and after the Covid-19 pandemic in different roundtables 
and fora has made the topic even more relevant.
Against this backdrop, this article analyses the representation 
of ownership (who is supposed to own and what is owned) at 
the project level in Chinese SSC to see how it is different from 
that described/practised by traditional donors, and how SSC 
ownership affects the processes and outcomes of China’s aid 
to Africa. It uses three case studies of Agricultural Technology 
Demonstration Centres (ATDCs) in three African countries with 
relatively similar political systems (Geddes, Wright and Frantz 
2014): Mozambique, Tanzania, and Ethiopia.4 A qualitative/
process-traced approach to evaluating project-level 
effectiveness of SSC was utilised. By answering the above-
mentioned questions, the research explains the process through 
which SSC is shaped by traditional development knowledge, 
while simultaneously reshaping new international development 
knowledge. The results of this research could inform Chinese 
and African policymakers of potentially better approaches to 
collaboration to raise the effectiveness of SSC.
2 Theoretical framework and methodology
Since the 1950s, agricultural assistance has been a priority 
area for China–Africa strategic partnerships and cooperation. 
As the flagship Chinese aid project to Africa, ATDCs have 
aroused the interest of many scholars since their initiation. The 
existing research on ATDCs falls into two categories: (1) social 
anthropological research focusing on the process and intention 
of ATDCs, with the aim of revealing the central features of the 
projects from the Chinese perspective (Li, Tang and Lu 2017; 
Xu et al. 2016); and (2) more nuanced investigations of the 
interaction between Chinese stakeholders and local counterparts, 
revealing the multiple realities and relationships during the 
process of project implementation (Zhang et al. 2019; Gu et al. 
2016; Scoones, Cabral and Tugendhat 2013). However, there is 
minimal explanation about the variance of the performance of 
ATDCs in different African countries from both partner countries’ 
perspectives. Very few studies focus on the cross-country 
analysis of how host-country systems influence the performance 
and impact of ATDCs in different contexts. There is a dearth of 
empirical, comparative research on the analysis of these uniformly 
designed (and, therefore, theoretically comparable) projects.
Rather than focusing on the outcome or impact of the projects, 
the research follows the whole process of the projects to see how 
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‘ownership’ was perceived and implemented at the project level. 
To achieve this, a ‘structured focused case comparison’ (George 
2019) was applied to analyse the variety of different causal 
patterns and the conditions under which each distinctive type 
of causal pattern occurs. In addition to the case comparisons, 
process tracing is used to conduct within-case analysis (Bennett 
2010). The comparison is straightforward as all three ATDCs have 
the same objectives, are uniformly designed, and have received 
identical support from the Chinese government.
Each case encompasses configurations of similar variables that 
involve interactions at different stages of project implementation. 
In order to explore the process of interaction between different 
stakeholders at different stages of the project, we operationalised 
the concepts of ownership and effectiveness through 
disaggregating them (see Figure 1). The representations of 
ownership at national, partner (implementing units), and individual 
(Chinese experts and local staff) levels were described to answer 
the question ‘How does ownership work in practice?’, from which 
we could also trace the variation of ownership during the process 
of the project: design, implementation, and evaluation. Three 
indicators were used to measure the effectiveness of the project 
according to the prescribed tasks of the projects: technology 
transfer, sustainability, and benefit distribution.
As mentioned in Section 1, there is a lack of clarity in the literature 
on ‘ownership’ of aid projects which inevitably influences the 
discussion in this article. In many ways, ownership is a much-used 
concept in the practice of development, but it has not been 
rigorously conceptualised academically. In this article, we follow 
the logic of Chinese project designers and the principles of SSC 
and explore how this logic was accepted and responded to by 
the actors at the local level through describing the representation 
of project-level ownership in SSC. Here, the meaning of ownership 
goes beyond host government ownership in NSC; it involves more 
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the ownership of the physical property, and the responsibility and 
benefit generated from the physical property.
The data were collected mainly from primary sources. The 
processes of project implementation were traced through 
participatory observation and in-depth open-structured interviews 
with key informants at different levels of the interactions, to illustrate 
the representation of ownership. The first author visited and spent 
some time in the centres in Mozambique and Tanzania between 
2013 and 2021. The data on the Ethiopian case were collected by 
the local co-author (2014–20). Thirty-nine key informants including 
government officials (9), project directors (7), technical experts (10), 
evaluation experts (4), and local beneficiaries (9) engaged with 
project implementation were interviewed, either in person or online. 
The secondary data were collected from the centres or the official 
websites. All the evidence was triangulated to ensure accuracy.
3 Representations of ‘ownership’ in China–Africa development 
cooperation
3.1 ‘Uniformity’ at the national level
The launch of the ATDCs follows uniform processes featuring 
mutual ownership and the demand-driven request of African 
countries. China expressed its intention to support African 
agriculture through ATDCs at the Forum on China–Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) Beijing Summit in 2006. After this 
announcement, African countries interested in ATDCs lodged 
a request through the Chinese Embassy in their country. The 
agreements prescribed the responsibilities of the two parties: the 
African country would provide the land, necessary infrastructure, 
and security of the centre, while the Chinese government would 
provide RMB40m for its construction. After the centres were 
completed, the ownership of the property was transferred to 
the partner country, but the centres were co-managed and 
operated by Chinese experts and local partners for three years 
to provide technology transfer and capacity building for local 
partners with funding support from the Chinese government. 
All the money from China went to Chinese companies and no 
budget support went to the host government. This was to ensure 
the principles of mutual benefit and equality of SSC, with both 
partners contributing to the project, either in money or labour.
Mozambique, Tanzania, and Ethiopia were all in the first batch 
of African countries requesting ATDCs. The request reflected the 
desire for ‘national ownership’ by the host countries. The three 
countries all prioritised agricultural development in their national 
plans during the period in which the project was initiated. 
Mozambique formulated the Strategic Plan for Agricultural 
Development (PEDSA,5 2010–19) and the National Investment Plan 
for the Agricultural Sector (PNISA,6 2013–17). The Agricultural Sector 
Development Programme (2006–14), Long-Term Perspective Plan 
(2011–25), and the First Five-Year Development Plan (2011–15) 
promulgated by the Tanzanian government all provided targets 
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to be achieved by the agricultural sector in its contribution to 
national development plans (Zhang, Benjamin and Wang 2021). 
Ethiopia also published a national five-year development plan 
(2010–15), the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), which 
emphasised the importance of rapid agricultural transformation 
through both large-scale commercial farming and smallholder 
production capacity enhancement.
Interviews with national-level government officials in all three 
countries confirmed the alignment of the projects with their 
national development strategies. The African ‘agency’ in leading 
the process at the national level was identified by the scholars 
(for example, Alemu and Scoones 2013). From the Chinese side, 
the three centres were uniformly designed with the same amount 
of funding input from China, a similar project duration period, and 
similar procedures in choosing the implementing units.
Distinct from traditional donors, China does not set target 
countries for providing aid. Its provision of foreign aid is totally 
based on the demand-driven request of the African countries 
and with no political conditionalities attached, but mutual 
responsibility is a precondition to ensure equality and mutual 
benefit. The ATDCs were co-designed by each partner country in 
the arrangement based on these principles, which is understood 
and accepted by national-level stakeholders. For complete 
projects such as ATDCs, one thing is very clear: the hardware in 
the centres belongs to the host country and China will continue 
to fund the centre until it becomes self-sustaining.
3.2 ‘Divergence’ at partner level
Divergence occurred after the project entered the technical 
cooperation stage. China together with each partner country 
designated implementing units for project implementation. 
Three state-owned agricultural companies won the bids from 
the open tendering in China and became the implementers of 
the three centres. The three companies were responsible for 
the construction and technology transfer until the centres had 
become self-sustaining. The host governments also designated 
local agencies, usually the Ministry of Agriculture or one of its 
affiliated institutions, to operate the centres with Chinese experts.7
According to the agreements, the local partners need to dispatch 
management staff, liaison personnel, and security guards to 
work in the centres. A technical assistance group consisting of 
technicians, a translator, and an accountant was dispatched 
from China as the project commenced the technical cooperation 
stage. Implementers from China understood that it was the 
African partner’s responsibility to organise training activities 
for them. The Chinese experts were only required to prepare 
the curriculum and teach in class or demonstrate in the field. 
This is a fair arrangement following the principles of SSC, as one 
policymaker of China’s foreign aid reported:
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To ensure the independence of the local partner, we do not 
provide direct budget support to the local partners. If they 
become the employees of the project, it will be difficult to 
keep their independence. Also, the contribution of the host 
government is very important to ensure equal partnership 
between the two countries.8
Again, this approach distinguishes SSC from NSC with the 
objective of ensuring ‘equal and inclusive ownership’ and ‘mutual 
accountability’.
However, it is hard for this arrangement to function after 
implementation starts. As no salary is paid to the local staff, the 
local partner can only designate its staff to work part-time for 
the centre. As the location of centres is usually far from the host 
partner’s urban headquarters (HQ), the full-time involvement 
of local staff is almost impossible. However, the local partner in 
Mozambique did a better job as the centre is just 23km from the 
HQ office of the Ministry of Science and Technology (MST). Local 
liaison staff visited the centre frequently and facilitated some 
training and demonstration work.
Without the guidance of the local management staff, the Chinese 
experts in the Tanzanian centre also managed to reach out to 
different places in Tanzania with the help of the Chinese Embassy. 
In Ethiopia, the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) did not manage to 
assign any experts/staff to the centre due to budget constraints 
and distance (the centre was more than 80km from the local 
partner’s HQ). The minimal involvement of the local partner in 
centre management made the transfer of ‘ownership’ to the local 
partner difficult.
Divergence also occurred where an ATDC had a different 
understanding of the concept of ‘ownership’. In the Ethiopian 
case, the Chinese experts were waiting for the host partner 
to mobilise the local people for training, but the local partner 
did not dispatch any Ethiopian staff to the centre. When the 
first group of Chinese evaluators visited the centre in 2013 (one 
year after the project had commenced the period of technical 
cooperation), very few training activities had been carried out 
despite the centre having comprehensive facilities (maize and 
vegetable cultivation, agricultural machine demonstration, 
livestock for cattle and chicken rearing, mushroom production, 
and biogas demonstration), and the strongest team (12 Chinese 
experts with either master’s or bachelor’s degrees and field 
experience) compared with the centres in Mozambique and 
Tanzania. As the director of the Ethiopia centre stated, ‘We are 
here to demonstrate the technology, not to go out to the field to 
teach farmers. It is not in the plan’.9 However, this burden-sharing 
arrangement could be an obstacle for the centre to function 
as the host partners do not have the capacity or budget to 
facilitate the operation.
92 | Zhang et al. Ownership and Effectiveness of China’s Aid Projects in Africa
IDS Bulletin Vol. 52 No. 2 November 2021 ‘China and International Development: Knowledge, Governance, and Practice’
In the Mozambican case, both partners were flexible in mobilising 
extra resources to cover participants’ training costs such as 
transportation and subsidies for being off work. To accomplish 
the task of technology transfer in the centre and to save costs, 
the local partner also took the initiative to incorporate the 
training programmes sponsored by other donors into the centre’s 
activities. The Chinese implementing company also cooperated 
with other Chinese companies in training local farmers. The 
implementing company in Tanzania has also been working with 
Chinese companies and undertaking the technology-transfer 
programmes supported by the Chinese Embassy. Later, the 
Chinese experts at the Ethiopian ATDC also started to go to 
the fields to teach local farmers to fulfil the tasks laid out in the 
national-level agreement. Therefore, the proper function of the 
centres depends to a large extent on the ‘agency’ or flexibility of 
the Chinese implementing companies.
3.3 ‘Ambiguity’ at the individual level
The ambiguity of the concept of ownership can lead to tensions 
between the Chinese experts and local staff aggrieved at and 
confused by an unclear division of responsibility. During the 
process of the centre being transferred to the host government, 
the issues relating to who should take charge of it were disputed 
at the individual level. When the then Mozambican president 
Armando Gebuza visited the centre, he urged the Chinese 
experts to grow more local vegetables and use local varieties 
of maize. But a door that had been broken by the students of 
a Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) training class still 
needed to be repaired by the Chinese. The Chinese experts also 
refused to provide electricity from their generator to the security 
guards when power went off in the centre. The resulting chain of 
events was that when some thieves broke in, the security guards 
did not detect them. The Chinese director was badly injured by 
the thieves in the ensuing conflict. Fortunately, he recovered, and 
no property was stolen. However, the ambiguity of ownership 
(the question of ‘Who is responsible for what?’) contributed to the 
partners on the ground feeling ill at ease with each other.
The issue concerning who could use the facilities in the centre 
and how also began to be disputed, particularly when the 
facilities are profitable. The chicken-rearing facilities at the ATDC 
in Tanzania were considered to be the most advanced in the 
country. The scale of chicken and egg production was large 
enough for the centre to make a decent profit which could keep 
the centre self-sustaining after aid from China was phased out. 
However, in the local partner’s eyes, as an aid project, the ATDC 
should not have been conducting any for-profit activities. As a 
result, the centre stopped its chicken-rearing project.
Later, the local partner, the Chollima Research Institute, agreed 
to cooperate with the Chinese experts to relaunch the business 
by providing a new legal status to the centre on the condition 
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that it bought chicks from the Institute. However, the price of one 
chick offered by the Institute was about Tsh 7,000 (about US$3) 
whereas an adult chicken could be sold at Tsh 15,000–20,000 
(about US$6.5–8.5). The price of the chicks was too inflated to be 
accepted by the centre as it was deemed to be losing business. 
The Chinese experts were also unsure as to whether it was in 
fact the head of the Institute rather than the Institute itself that 
wanted to sell the chicks to them. After this event, the centre 
offered the Institute the opportunity to use the chicken-rearing 
facilities itself but by the end of 2019, the Institute had not taken 
any action.10 In the Ethiopian case, the ATDC was also subject to 
rigid regulations from the host government, and was not allowed 
to participate in commercial activities.
These ‘ownership’ issues deeply affected the Chinese experts’ 
identity in the host countries. Should they be treated as aid 
agency employees with free diplomatic visas, or should they 
have to apply for business visas? The Chinese experts in 
Mozambique had diplomatic visas but the process to apply for 
or update visas took a long time. All of the centres relied on the 
host-country liaison person to facilitate the visa process for them. 
The Chinese experts in Tanzania had to apply for business visas 
and pay US$250 every three months after the memorandum of 
understanding (MoU) for diplomatic visas expired. The Chinese 
experts had argued with the local partner to extend their 
diplomatic visas but the local response was: ‘Since you are 
coming to aid us, you need to pay us more rather than get a 
free service’. Moreover, every time the head of the local partner 
organisation helped them to obtain a visa, they needed to pay 
him a transportation fee (Tsh 100,000, approximately US$50), 
a labour fee (Tsh 300,000, approximately US$150), and provide 
a ‘gift’ (such as 10kg rice per visa). As one expert said, ‘We are 
working very hard to help them, but it seems that they are not 
grateful to us. We don’t feel we are welcomed by them’.
4 ‘Ownership’ and ‘effectiveness’ of SSC
In recent years, efforts have been made to measure and evaluate 
the impact of SSC. Inquiries have frequently assumed that SSC is 
unique, requiring a totally different set of principles and indicators 
to be measured. In the previous sections, we described how 
ownership was represented and understood by the two partner 
countries in SSC and how it affected the process of project 
implementation. This section explores how ownership affects the 
effectiveness of SSC based on evidence from the three centres.
To explore the relationship between ‘ownership’ and 
‘effectiveness’, we distinguish between three main forms of 
ownership which have evolved from our case studies: 
1 Mutual ownership – this is relatively close to the ideal type 
of host–donor relationship that SSC aspires to develop. It 
involves the co-contribution of physical property development 
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and maintenance, and the introduction of human resources 
to maintain the project. It requires the mutual respect and 
responsibility of both partner countries. 
2 De-ownership – this occurs when the understanding of 
‘ownership’ of the two partner countries or stakeholders 
from different levels diverge. One party wants to weaken/
expropriate the other party’s ownership for its own benefit or to 
follow its own principles. 
3 Forced ownership – this shares some similarities with 
de-ownership, but it also involves the abandonment of 
responsibility by one or both parties to force ownership on the 
one that is not ready to shoulder the whole responsibility.
The impact of these three types of ownership on project 
effectiveness (technology transfer, sustainability, and 
profit distribution) will now be explained through the case 
studies. Technology transfer was a stipulated task by the Chinese 
government. With funding of RMB15m (approximately US$2.2m), 
each ATDC needs to train 500 people/times per year and 
demonstrate advanced Chinese agricultural technology at the 
centre during the three-year technical cooperation stage. After 
that, the centre enters the sustainable development stage, which 
means no further support from the Chinese government and 
the centres would need to be self-sustaining, either run by the 
Chinese implementing units or the host partners, or both.
4.1 ‘Co-ownership’ and effectiveness of SSC – the Mozambican 
case
The Mozambican ATDC is considered the most successful project 
in terms of effectiveness among the three. The co-ownership of 
the centre by both partner countries contributes to its success. 
A consensus has been built that the Chinese experts will stay 
as long as the centre needs them, and the ultimate goal is to 
make the centre self-sustaining before it is completely taken 
over by the host partner. According to one local government 
official, ‘the centre will always be “China–Mozambique” ’.11 Chinese 
policymakers also think that the centre is an important platform 
for China–Mozambique cooperation and exchange. This is in 
large part due to the flexibility and compromise made by both 
parties at the local level (Zhang et al. 2019).
The centre’s performance in terms of technology transfer was 
more than satisfactory. Since 2011, it has selected more than 
ten rice varieties, six maize varieties, more than 20 vegetable 
varieties, and two cotton varieties, and transferred more 
than 20 technologies to local farmers. The Chinese experts 
have trained over 3,000 local people/times as well as 
800 demonstration households. The yield of one of the rice 
varieties reached 9 tonnes/ha, three times the local yield in 
2011. Two rice varieties, one cowpea variety, and one cucumber 
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variety trialled in the centre have been grown nationwide in 
Mozambique. The yield of a local maize variety grown by Chinese 
experts has increased to four times (6,750kg/ha) the local yield. 
The local director of the centre, Otilia Tamele reported that 
‘Chinese technical experts have made a great contribution to 
our country’ (Fang 2019). The centre also selected 15 promising 
Mozambican youngsters for short-term training and degree-level 
education in China.
In terms of sustainability, the centre has explored a survival 
approach after funding from the Chinese government stopped. 
Distinct from the Tanzanian and Ethiopian cases, the Mozambican 
partner has encouraged the centre to conduct business 
activities, such as selling the vegetables and rice that it produces. 
The profits were used to maintain the centre facilities. Also, as 
an important platform for Chinese–Mozambican agricultural 
cooperation, the centre introduced and cooperated with other 
Chinese companies investing in Mozambican agriculture. Two 
more Chinese agricultural parks in Gaza and Sofala provinces 
were constructed with the involvement of the implementing 
company of the centre.
Since August 2016, the local partner has been transferred to the 
Mozambique Ministry of Agriculture and the Institute of Agricultural 
Research Mozambique (IIAM), which started to get heavily involved 
in the daily management of the centre. The division of labour 
between the two parties was clearly stated, based on the principle 
of wide-ranging consultation, joint contribution, and mutual 
benefit. The China side is responsible for daily operations, while 
the local partner has responsibility for mobilising and coordinating 
local resources. The Chinese experts were still paid by the Chinese 
implementing companies while the seven local staff working in the 
centre were paid from the revenue it generated. Since 2017, the 
centre has been working with the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 
the World Bank, and other international partners on training 
programmes in Mozambique.
The centre is still on the way to exploring how to thrive. So far, a 
large part of the operating costs is still burdened by the Chinese 
implementing company, which means that the centre cannot 
be fully turned over to the host partner. With the long-term 
involvement of China, the vision of the ATDC is to help strengthen 
the agricultural value chain through attracting more international 
investment and support to Mozambique. As the business 
aspect of the centre is thriving, the sense of ownership from the 
Mozambican side is getting stronger, which might discourage the 
Chinese party’s continuous investment in the centre. One Chinese 
manager, Mr Y., shared the following story in an interview with the 
author Zhang Chuanhong:
In October 2018, Mr Y., the deputy CEO of the implementing 
company of China–Mozambican ATDC (Lianfeng company), 
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was sent to the police station just because he planned to take 
several sprayers out of the centre. The Mozambican police 
came and arrested him before he left the centre. The sprayers 
were transported to Mozambique with other goods in the same 
batch from the host company of Lianfeng in China. As the 
centre’s geographic location is convenient, some goods for the 
Friendship Farm (Saisai City, Gaza Province) were also stored 
in the centre. But when the Mozambican partners saw Chinese 
partners taking the materials from the centre, they reported 
this to the police. It was hard for the Chinese company to 
explain the complicated situation to the police. Mr Y. stayed in 
the police office for a few hours before the police officer was 
persuaded that he was not a thief. But the sprayers were kept 
in the centre.12
4.2 ‘De-ownership’ and effectiveness of SSC – the Tanzanian case
The ATDC in Tanzania has been maintained solely by continuous 
support from China. The centre has been performing well in 
terms of technology transfer. As mentioned above, more than 
3,000 farmers had been trained by the Chinese experts by the 
end of 2019. Since its implementation, the centre has worked very 
hard on self-financing through trying to create more operational 
income with the introduction of joint venture partners and 
business activities.
By setting up the commercial company in Tanzania and 
fully making use of the centre’s advantages in technical 
demonstration and extension, the centre will carry out 
various kinds of business in the field of crop farming, 
poultry-rearing, and food processing, in order to achieve profit 
to compensate the expenditure gap from public service in the 
centre. Meanwhile, the governments should give the centre 
corresponding policy support in the related aspects. 
(China-Tanzania ATDC 2013)
Since 2013, the Chinese implementing company has tried to 
extend its industrial chain by selling its fresh vegetables, quality 
rice, chickens, and eggs, and maize for feedstuff to the markets. 
However, the commercial activities run by the centre were 
questioned by the host partner, which thought that as an aid 
project it was not qualified for business activities and that if 
the centre wanted to do business, it should be registered as a 
business entity paying tax to the local government. But the fact 
that the ownership of the centre belongs to the Government of 
Tanzania, not the Chinese company, blurs the legal status of the 
centre. Under this scenario, the centre has had to shut off all its 
business activities. At present, the centre only functions as a pure 
aid platform undertaking different agricultural aid projects on 
training and technology transfer. The operation of the centre has 
been barely maintained by the Chinese implementing company. 
The local partner is not willing to run the centre itself as it lacks 
capacity to do so.
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The host partner’s expropriation of Chinese ‘ownership’ for using 
the facilities of the centre to do commercial activities without 
claiming ‘ownership’ and responsibility for itself makes it impossible 
for the centre to achieve the goal of sustainable development. 
To a large extent, the centre has lost its characteristics as 
an SSC project through the de-ownership of both partners. 
The focus on technology transfer may exert the long-term 
effect of ‘blood creation’13 for Tanzania. However, through the 
de-ownership process the host partner lost the opportunity to 
prosper with the centre. After the Chinese experts leave, the 
centre will be hard to sustain.
4.3 ‘Forced ownership’ and effectiveness of SSC – the Ethiopian 
case
The Ethiopian case failed due to its expectation of mutual 
contribution from the host government. After ownership of the 
centre’s hardware was transferred to the host government, the 
Chinese implementing company naively waited for the local 
partner to take the lead. This passive attitude resulted in the 
poorest performance of the centre across the three case studies. 
The major objective of the Chinese implementing unit was to 
accomplish the task assigned by the Chinese government 
through ensuring the smooth transfer of ownership to the host 
government. However, the limited involvement of the local partner 
and communities along with the context of socio-political unrest 
made the transfer an impossible mission. After Chinese experts 
were forced to leave due to political instability in 2018, the centre 
was looted. It was not until July 2019 that the ATDC was officially 
handed over to the Ambo Research Centre, which has converted 
it into one of its research sub-centres. Since, except for the 
buildings, much of the original technology demonstration fields 
have been considerably damaged.
From this case, it is clear that the consistent commitment of the 
Chinese partner is vital to keep the centre surviving and thriving. 
‘Forced ownership’ of a project by the host country or totally 
giving ‘ownership’ to the Chinese partner does not work under the 
principle of SSC and might be detrimental to the effectiveness 
of SSC.
5 Conclusions
Host-country ownership has been regarded as a central 
precondition for the aid effectiveness of NSC for a long time, but 
its ambiguity and paradoxicality have aroused controversy in 
both academic and policy circles. Very few studies have focused 
on the issue of ownership in SSC and its impact on programme 
effectiveness. In this research, we have revealed that project-
level ownership is far more complicated than the simple idea of 
national ownership advocated by traditional donors. Ownership 
under the SSC framework has also proved difficult and requires 
the consistent commitment and flexibility of the cooperating 
providers during implementation. Representation of ownership 
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varies among different levels of stakeholders as well as at 
different stages of project implementation. The approach to 
operating ownership by the implementing partners matters more 
than the uniformed concept of ownership reached at national 
level for the success of China’s SSC projects.
The results show that co-ownership may be the best approach 
for the effectiveness of SSC while de-ownership and forced 
ownership make sustainability and the survival of the SSC projects 
unlikely. These latter two approaches indicate that ownership 
in SSC is different from NSC as both partner countries need to 
contribute and shoulder responsibilities. The case studies also 
reveal that donorship in SSC is unfeasible as it is impossible 
for the SSC providers to control the whole process. This could 
be one advantage of SSC over NSC as it can overcome the 
inherent inequality between donors and recipients in NSC. From a 
long-term perspective, the whole ownership of the host country 
could be incubated. However, we concede that the research 
cannot cover the long-term impact of the project as it is only 
focused on the process of the project that is still going on. More 
research on the long-term impacts of a larger number of centres 
is needed to reveal the bigger picture in the future.
Space and time constraints mean that we are not able to present 
political economic analyses of the case studies to reveal the 
hidden causes that lead to the variations in performance of the 
ATDCs in the three countries. However, our preliminary findings 
reveal that the project-level stakeholders play a more important 
role for the effectiveness of SSC than was expected when the 
national-level design was undertaken. As with so many studies 
of aid programme implementation, ‘the devil is in the detail’. 
The implementation of SSC is not as easy as most policymakers 
might expect as host countries take time to accept this type of 
new cooperation modality. Patience is needed for SSC providers 
to ‘cultivate’ an equal partnership with the host partners. These 
results may help inform Chinese and African policymakers 
of potentially better approaches to effective development 
cooperation under the framework of SSC.
Notes
* This IDS Bulletin was produced as part of the UK Anchor 
Institution for the China International Development 
Research Network, funded by the Foreign, Commonwealth 
& Development Office (FCDO). The opinions expressed are 
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policies of IDS or the UK government.
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Selective Learning: China, the CGIAR, 
and Global Agricultural Science 
in Flux*
Xiuli Xu,1 Lídia Cabral2 and Yingdan Cao3
Abstract This article analyses the interaction between China 
and the CGIAR (formerly the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research) since the 1970s, exploring the formation of 
China’s modern agricultural science capability and its approach 
towards learning. While China was previously regarded and 
treated as a recipient of international scientific expertise, it is 
now a more equal partner and contributor, with capacity to 
provide funds, support exchange programmes for scientists, 
and collaborate in building laboratories and joint research 
programmes. Some of these now extend beyond the CGIAR 
system and are creating new platforms for scientific collaboration 
and knowledge production in the South. By offering an illustration 
of China’s ‘selective learning’ approach, emphasising self-reliance 
and pragmatism in its engagement with the CGIAR, this article 
feeds into broader debates on how China contributes to global 
development knowledge and learning.
Keywords China, CGIAR, international agricultural research, 
selective learning, South–South. 
1 Introduction
There is a long history of interaction between China’s agricultural 
science and technology systems and global development 
knowledge platforms such as the CGIAR (formerly the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research). 
Yet, insufficient attention has been given to the history of these 
relations and how they have shaped China’s own capability and 
identity in the field of agricultural science. This article traces the 
history of China–CGIAR relations over a period of 50 years and 
explores how these have evolved over time. While China was 
previously regarded and treated as a recipient of international 
expertise, it is now a partner and contributor to the CGIAR, with 
capacity to provide funds, support exchange programmes for 
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scientists, and collaborate in building joint laboratories and 
research programmes involving other Southern partners. By 
documenting the changing relationship between China and 
the CGIAR, the article offers an illustration of China’s ‘selective 
learning’, with its emphasis on self-reliance and pragmatic 
development. This feature of China’s development cooperation is 
relevant to the international community, particularly its partners in 
the global South.
The article draws on a review of secondary literature and 
semi-structured interviews with key informants in China, conducted 
between 2019 and 2021. The team interviewed 28 agricultural 
scientists, policy researchers, and managers, among whom 
15 individuals were working at CGIAR centres and their partners in 
China. Secondary literature comprised academic papers, reports, 
and archival material retrieved from the CGIAR webpage. 
The article is organised into six sections. Section 2 provides a 
historical overview of the CGIAR system, after which Section 3 
considers China’s international engagements and outlines its 
‘selective learning’ approach. Section 4 describes the historical 
trajectory of China’s relations with the CGIAR system. Section 5 
explores three modalities of interaction: germplasm exchanges, 
training of talent, and institutionalised platforms for collaboration. 
Section 6 concludes by discussing how China’s selective learning 
is now part of development knowledge networks in the global 
South. 
2 A brief historical overview of the CGIAR system
The CGIAR system was established in 1971, building on 
the experiences with international germplasm exchange, 
collaborative research, and training programmes involving 
American scientists and philanthropic organisations, such as 
the Rockefeller and Ford foundations. Byerlee and Dubin (2009) 
highlight the significance of the Inter-American Food Crop 
Improvement Program and the creation of four international 
agricultural research centres (IARCs) in the 1960s: the International 
Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines, the International 
Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) in Mexico, and 
the international institutes for tropical agriculture in Colombia 
(CIAT) and Nigeria (IITA). 
The perceived success of these centres fuelled interest in 
scaling up. The World Bank played a leading role in establishing 
the CGIAR as a ‘loose group of initially 17 member countries, 
international organizations and foundations for funding 
agricultural research’ (Byerlee and Dubin 2009: 456).4 Additional 
centres were created over the years and CGIAR membership 
expanded geographically. China officially joined in 1984, although 
connections between Chinese scientists and IARCs started earlier. 
Today, the CGIAR comprises 15 IARCs.
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Since its establishment, the CGIAR has focused on supporting 
developing countries to adopt modern agriculture technology 
and roll out the Green Revolution (CGIAR 1971). The development 
of modern technology involved two core competences: 
international germplasm exchange and training. Germplasm 
enhancement was regarded as the ‘backbone of the Centers 
[sic.] success and impact’ and where the IARCs’ comparative 
advantages laid (Anderson 1998: 9). Added together, CGIAR 
centres hold the largest collection of crop germplasm in the world 
(Dalrymple 2008). Furthermore, investment in training helped to 
develop an esprit de corps (Anderson 1998; Byerlee and Dubin 
2009), a defining mark for a mission-oriented institution.
In the field of agricultural science and technology, the CGIAR 
established itself as the leading source for global public goods 
(Dalrymple 2008) through training and ‘open source collaboration’ 
in the form of germplasm exchange and knowledge sharing 
(Byerlee and Dubin 2009). The centralisation of ‘fundamental 
research’ and germplasm collections in IARCs was seen as key 
to ensuring efficiencies through economies of scale and scope in 
knowledge production (Byerlee and Lynam 2020).
Though global in scope, links to developing countries’ research 
systems provided the ground where technologies could be 
tested and ultimately applied. Yet, because of their stance as 
autonomous non-governmental entities, the CGIAR centres 
presumably avoided national ‘political and bureaucratic 
interference in science’ (ibid.: 2). 
Throughout the 1990s, the creation of additional centres 
broadened the scope and geographical presence of the CGIAR. 
New centres for water, fish, forestry, and agroforestry were 
established and natural resource management became more 
prominent. But while the system widened and became more 
complex, funding did not follow suit, reflecting a broader decline 
of agricultural official development assistance (Eicher 2004). 
Nominal funding to the CGIAR declined in real terms during the 
1990s, becoming also restricted or earmarked (World Bank 2003). 
The increase in restricted funding is thought to have transformed 
‘the CGIAR’s authorizing environment from being science-driven 
to being donor-driven, and a shift in the System from producing 
global and regional public goods toward providing national 
and local services’ (ibid.: 3). The reduced focus on enhancing 
crop productivity, seen as the system’s core competence and 
comparative advantage, was questioned (ibid.). 
Concerns over the CGIAR’s mission crisis, financial sustainability, 
and global versus national focus, provide the backdrop in which 
China’s engagement unfolds. 
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3 China’s international engagements and ‘selective learning’
Since the turn of the century, China’s internationalisation 
intensified as part of a ‘going out’ strategy, which encouraged 
Chinese enterprises to do business abroad (Alden 2007; Wang 
2016). Trade and foreign direct investment with other developing 
nations have seen unprecedented expansion (Tang 2020). This 
is illustrated by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a transport 
and communications infrastructure development programme of 
global scale, launched in 2013 to help developing nations grow 
while improving China’s access to resources and markets within a 
‘win–win’ framework. Although there have been concerns about 
the BRI’s impact on developing countries’ debt and environmental 
sustainability (Teo et al. 2019; Were 2018), China’s White Paper 
on international cooperation sees it as a ‘major platform for 
international development cooperation’ and the ‘significant 
public goods China offers to the whole world’ (SCIO 2021: 7).
Technology trade and scientific and technical cooperation 
have long been important elements of China’s South–South 
relations (Brautigam 1998). These include placements for Chinese 
experts in developing countries, through bilateral cooperation 
or via organisations such as UNDP or the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Furthermore, the 
2006 Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) launched 
Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centres (ATDCs) 
(Brautigam and Tang 2009), offering a hybrid of aid and business 
through public–private partnerships combining state provision of 
public goods with private management for financial sustainability 
(Tang et al. 2015; Xu et al. 2016).
So, what defines China’s development cooperation? Debates 
often frame the Chinese model as the ‘Beijing Consensus’, in 
opposition to the ‘Washington Consensus’ associated with 
neoliberal development policies spearheaded by the Bretton 
Woods institutions (Ramo 2004).5 This framing has been 
challenged as a foreign creation that inaccurately represents 
differences between models and for ‘overstating how far China 
diverges from standard economic theory’ (Kennedy 2010: 
475). The Beijing Consensus thesis has also been criticised for 
misleadingly suggesting the existence of a singular China model. 
Tang (2020) argues that China’s international engagements have 
shown that there is no generalisable model but that solutions are 
adjusted to contexts in a pragmatic manner. Tang defines this 
approach as ‘co-evolutionary pragmatism’, departing from the 
market–state binary to emphasise distinct pathways towards 
the goal of economic development. Taking development as 
a learning process (Lin and Wang 2008), developing countries 
need to set their own priorities. During the learning process, 
improvisation and innovation are needed to explore solutions 
adapted to local realities in a pragmatic manner, rather than 
following orthodox recipes. The development process is therefore 
not linear but a winding pathway. 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 52 No. 2 November 2021 ‘China and International Development: Knowledge, Governance, and Practice’ 103–120 | 107
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
Our notion of ‘selective learning’ captures the emphasis on 
development ownership and pragmatic development. These 
two ideas originate from China’s own trajectory and its own 
process of learning from the international community and are 
now embedded in China’s development policy and discourse. The 
emphasis on ownership links to the diplomacy of non-interference 
and Southern self-reliance that originated at the 1955 Bandung 
Conference on South–South solidarity (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and 
Tafira 2018). China is also sensitive to external interference due to 
its prior experience of dependence from Western powers in the 
nineteenth century. It thus avoids imposing on other countries 
what it does not want for itself.6 
While the extent to which these principles hold in practice has 
been debated (Aidoo and Hess 2015; Okolo 2015; Po and Sims 
2021; Verhoeven 2014), China’s White Paper on international 
cooperation emphasises ‘respecting each other as equals’ as a 
guiding principle (SCIO 2021: 7). Also, the principle of ‘providing the 
means for independent development’ conveys similar meaning 
and highlights self-reliance through learning via joint work and 
capacity-building activities such as the training of talent and 
technicians ‘to empower them to tap their own potential for 
diversified, independent and sustainable development’ (ibid.: 8). 
China’s pragmatic development means working with partners 
to advance economic development with no pre-established 
blueprint and ‘regardless of whether its [partner] political regime 
is authoritarian or democratic’ (Aidoo and Hess 2015: 110). In this, 
China is seen as differing from Western development approaches 
that often seek to reform socio-political systems in partner 
countries (Gu, Li and Zhang, this IDS Bulletin). Tang argues that 
‘China was able to develop by promoting market economy and 
international trade while maintaining a sociopolitical system 
different from the West’ and this experience informs its approach 
when engaging with other Southern nations. Hence, the pathway 
can be varied provided it leads to the ultimate goal: ‘It doesn’t 
matter whether the cat is black or white, as long as it catches 
mice’ (Tang 2020: 7, citing Deng Xiaoping).
The combination of development ownership/self-reliance and 
pragmatic development, or ‘selective learning’, is an approach 
that has defined China’s own domestic development process 
(and how it learned from other countries) and now informs its 
international engagements with other countries and institutions. 
Xu and Li talk about a ‘closing-gap experience sharing’ approach 
in China–Africa relations, which entails promoting ‘heuristic 
learning under equal relationship between peers and shaping a 
new image of African development’ (2020: 117).7
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4 Half a century of China’s engagement with the CGIAR in 
two stages 
In China, the CGIAR is regarded as an international reference 
for agricultural science and technology. Chinese officials and 
scientists often refer to it as the ‘World Academy of Agricultural 
Sciences’, the international equivalent of the Chinese Academy 
of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS), the prestigious science institution 
that formally hosted CGIAR centres in the country.
The interaction between China and the CGIAR started in the 
1970s, although this was only formalised in 1984 when China 
became a member. China currently holds Memoranda of 
Understanding (MoUs) with 13 CGIAR centres, and seven of these 
currently have registered offices in China.
Over this past half century, China’s interaction with the CGIAR has 
undergone two main stages. The first stage corresponds to the 
period between the 1970s and 1990s, when China was primarily 
a recipient of international agricultural science resources and 
expertise. The CGIAR provided significant contributions to China, 
particularly for non-staple crop research. These contributions 
intensified during China’s market-oriented reforms, from the early 
1980s. The second stage started in the new century, particularly 
after 2007–08, when the CGIAR initiated structural reforms and 
China increased its financial contributions. In this current stage, 
China has become more active and assertive by setting up a 
coordination office, establishing joint laboratories, and initiating 
joint programmes (Cabral, Pandey and Xu 2021). The following 
sections outline this trajectory.
4.1 Stage one: China as recipient of expertise and resources 
In the early 1970s, a Chinese delegation participated in a 
FAO-hosted conference in Manila where the President of the 
Philippines showcased seeds developed by IRRI. Germplasm 
exchanges between China and the CGIAR began to sprout. With 
the inspiration of hybrid practices and its benefits, the three-line 
indica hybrid rice was completed in 1973 by Yuan Longping and 
his team,8 and the hybrid rice production system was formally 
established. Productivity for hybrid rice was 10 per cent higher 
than for conventional rice, resulting in a qualitative leap for China’s 
rice industry. The introduction of wheat, potato, corn, and other 
crop varieties greatly increased the average output of food crops 
and set the foundations for the breeding of China’s main crops. 
Scientific cooperation started off from personal connections 
established during those early visits. A delegation from the 
CAAS visited CIMMYT for the first time in 1974 and an IRRI 
delegation travelled to China in 1976. In 1977, IRRI and the 
Chinese Ministry of Agriculture signed an MoU and the CAAS 
and IRRI jointly convened a biennial meeting for germplasm 
exchange. Institutional cooperation comprised crop improvement, 
biotechnology, integrated pest management, natural resource 
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management, rice field environmental monitoring, farming 
systems, information exchanges, and training. In 1982, IRRI and the 
CAAS launched a collaborative research and training programme. 
In 1983, a Chinese delegation participated in the CGIAR annual 
meeting and China became a member the following year. 
During this first period, collaborations between CGIAR centres 
and China comprised germplasm resource exchange and training 
Chinese scientists. Through these collaborations, the Chinese 
government encouraged the modernisation of domestic research 
systems and gradually transformed sporadic exchanges into 
institutionalised platforms for cooperation.
4.2 Stage two: China as partner and contributor
In the second stage, China’s engagement with the CGIAR 
changed from being a recipient to becoming a more active 
partner and contributor. This coincides with a significant increase in 
China’s financial contributions, particularly from 2007 (see Figure 1), 
in a context of sustained economic growth (Vincelette et al. 2010). 
China gradually developed closer and broader cooperation with 
the CGIAR, mainly through: (1) the establishment of a joint laboratory 
system with the CAAS; and (2) the launch of a joint agricultural 
science and technology programme with the National Natural 
Science Foundation of China (NSFC)9 (Han, Yan and Wang 2018). 
Source Authors’ own, based on information provided by a CGIAR respondent in an interview, Beijing, 2020. 
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Several CGIAR centres set up offices in China (CAAS 2017). Also, 
the NSFC and CIMMYT signed a cooperation agreement in 1999 
and, between 2001 and 2007, NSFC–CGIAR research projects 
increased from seven to 17 (Han et al. 2018). 
This stage is also marked by a problem-focused approach, 
reflecting China’s pragmatic and more targeted engagement 
with international research, which resulted in cooperation 
between CGIAR centres and local academies of agricultural 
sciences to address challenges in China. For example, in 2004, 
CIAT, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), and 
the CAAS jointly developed the ‘China Crop Nutrition Fortification 
Project’ to promote the cultivation of high-β-carotene sweet 
potatoes and high-zinc wheat in Sichuan, Chongqing City, and 
other regions: varieties such as ‘Zhongmai 175’ and high-speed 
rice ‘Zhongguangxiang No. 1’ sought to address nutritional 
deficiencies in poor areas. In 2008, following a devastating 
earthquake in Sichuan province, the International Potato 
Center (CIP), the CAAS, the Sichuan Academy of Agricultural 
Sciences, the Heilongjiang Academy of Agricultural Sciences, 
and other scientific institutions implemented the ‘Sichuan 
Potato Post-Disaster Aid Project’. This introduced and promoted 
new varieties, such as virus-free seed potatoes,10 and new 
technologies, such as mist culture,11 which enabled the Sichuan 
potato industry to recover.
With the backdrop of the CGIAR reform, the establishment of 
the China–CIP Center for Asia and the Pacific (CCCAP) in 2008 
illustrates a transition towards a more high-level, coordinated, 
and outward-looking mode of engagement by Chinese 
institutions. After the CGIAR reform was completed in 2011, 
the NSFC co-funded research with five CGIAR centres. In 2012, the 
NSFC and the CGIAR signed a framework agreement that now 
covers all 15 CGIAR centres and focuses on cooperation with the 
CGIAR’s core research areas in a coordinated fashion, in line with 
the One CGIAR initiative.12 
Over this second period, Chinese scientists became involved in 
CGIAR governance. Three Chinese senior scientists have served 
as members of the CGIAR Executive Council, and 15 have taken 
on the role of director of CGIAR centres.13
5 China–CGIAR cooperation and new South–South platforms
To further illustrate the evolving China–CGIAR interaction, we 
consider three modalities of cooperation: germplasm exchanges, 
training of talent, and institutionalised platforms for collaboration. 
We discuss the consolidation of selective learning, where Chinese 
scientists emerge as partners standing on equal footing with their 
international peers at CGIAR centres, and where these platforms 
increasingly serve as mechanisms for transfer of expertise from 
China to other countries in the global South.
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5.1 Germplasm exchange
Germplasm exchange marks the beginning of China–CGIAR 
relations and constitutes a pillar of China’s modern agricultural 
science system. Following the early visit of the Chinese delegation 
to the Philippines, IRRI provided rice genetic resources to China, 
several of which have been actively promoted in China.14 At 
present, 90 per cent of hybrid rice in China uses IRRI’s restoring 
genes (International Cooperation Bureau of CAAS 2008). Besides 
rice, China obtained germplasm resources from various CGIAR 
centres for crops, which laid the foundations for breeding China’s 
main crops, such as high-lysine corn, hybrid sorghum, peanuts, 
and high-quality wheat (ibid.). 
China has also provided germplasm resources to CGIAR centres 
(ibid.). Between 1981 and 2000, China donated 7,778 copies of 
Chinese rice landraces and 35 copies of wild rice to the IRRI 
bank. The China National Rice Research Institute (CNRRI) and 
12 provincial Academies of Agricultural Sciences have also 
participated in the International Network for Genetic Evaluation 
of Rice (INGER) and, over the past 20 years, Chinese scientists 
have been involved in evaluating more than 18,000 rice 
germplasms around the world. 
5.2 Training of talent
The CGIAR has contributed to the formation of Chinese scientists. 
Since the 1980s, many Chinese scientists were trained at CGIAR 
centres, and later became the backbone of agricultural scientific 
research, teaching, and management. Some scholars have not 
only made contributions to agricultural science and technology, 
but have also worked on the development of agricultural policy in 
China and abroad through international cooperation. 
Taking IRRI as an example, this CGIAR centre signed an MoU 
with the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture in 1977 and began 
collaborating with the CAAS from 1982 on research and training. 
Between 1984 and 2008, IRRI supported the participation of 
700 Chinese scientists in international conferences, seminars, and 
training (International Cooperation Bureau of CAAS 2008). It also 
provided postgraduate training to 105 Chinese students, and 
non-degree training to 225. In addition, IRRI scientists conducted 
more than 500 visits to China and engaged in collaborative 
research and teaching activities in China. Renowned Chinese 
rice scientists, such as Yuan Longping, Xie Huaan, and 
He Cheng Jian, spent time working at IRRI at different points in 
their careers.
China’s hybrid rice achievements encapsulate the efforts 
of generations of Chinese scientists and the significance of 
international collaborations with the CGIAR. In the mid-1970s, 
China was the first country to successfully cultivate hybrid rice 
under temperate conditions (Tang and Ding 2002). Between 1986 
and 1996, ‘Shanyou 63’ was the main rice variety planted in China, 
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which covered a total of 52.7m ha in 1996 (Xie and Zheng 1996). 
Although the yields success of ‘Shanyou 63’ is seen as the 
result of several factors (including the use of agrochemicals), 
studies highlight the role played by scientific research on crop 
improvement and germplasm exchanges with IRRI (Cheng and 
Liao 1998; Xie and Zheng 1996). 
These achievements contributed to a more confident 
engagement of Chinese scientists in international knowledge 
networks. As a result, Chinese institutions gradually adopted 
a more active stance in the construction of platforms for 
collaboration and reciprocal training. For example, the Asian 
Rice Biotechnology Network (ARBN) comprises IRRI, China, and 
four other countries. Also, Chinese scientists cooperated with 
IRRI to establish the International Rice Information System (IRIS), 
which provides germplasm parent and pedigree information. The 
extension of these knowledge networks builds on the gradual 
deepening of cooperation between China and the CGIAR and 
the growing contribution of Chinese scientists. Wang Ren, the 
first CGIAR Secretary-General of Chinese nationality, highlighted 
China’s role in scientific cooperation:
It is difficult for us to have the opportunity and conditions to 
express Chinese ideas and influence on major issues related 
to the development of international agriculture. The Chinese 
people should play a greater role on the world stage.  
(Duan 2008: 23–5) 
But only recently has the capacity development of Chinese 
scientists become institutionalised. The CGIAR earmarks part 
of the donations from the Chinese government for training and 
capacity building. The CAAS and the CGIAR have implemented 
an exchange programme that places Chinese scientists with 
CGIAR centres on a regular basis.15 This not only improves the 
CAAS’s capacity but also promotes collaborative projects. In 
recognition of the CGIAR’s contribution, the Chinese government 
issued ‘Friendship Awards’ to 11 CGIAR scientists and two centres 
between 1998 and 2001 (CIMMYT and IRRI).
The NSFC and the China Scholarship Council have also 
cooperated with the CGIAR on training. The China Scholarship 
Council signed an MoU with CIMMYT and IRRI for joint 
scholarships to sponsor Chinese scholars (about ten scientists 
annually). The CGIAR and the NSFC also hold an international 
cooperation agreement for joint research projects.
Training programmes have, therefore, become normalised, 
institutionalised, and widespread. There is also growing interest 
in creating opportunities for collaborative research between 
Chinese scientific institutions and IARCs.
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5.3 Institutionalised platforms for international collaboration
China has become a more active contributor and partner of 
CGIAR centres since the turn of the century, as illustrated by 
the establishment of joint laboratories with CAAS institutes and 
collaborative research involving the NSFC. These are now leading 
to further collaborations with China’s Southern partners (see 
Section 5.4).
Since 1999, the CGIAR and the CAAS have established a joint 
laboratory system to carry out collaborative research and 
technology extension. Ten joint laboratories were created with the 
eight research centres with offices in China (CAAS 2017). 
The new mode of engagement entails collaborative research, 
as illustrated by the NSFC–CGIAR framework agreement. 
This emerged from the High-Level Forum on China–CGIAR 
cooperation hosted by the Ministry of Agriculture in Beijing in 1997. 
In 1999, the NSFC and CIMMYT signed a cooperation agreement 
for the first time, resulting in collaborative projects.16 This led to 
further agreements involving IRRI and, later, the International 
Center for Biodiversity. After the CGIAR reform was completed 
in 2011, the NSFC jointly funded seven projects with five CGIAR 
centres. In 2012, the NSFC and the CGIAR reached a consensus on 
signing the NSFC–CGIAR framework agreement, which came into 
effect in 2013. Priority funding areas are jointly determined, and the 
review, approval, and management of projects is the responsibility 
of the Chinese side. Chinese scientists and technicians operate 
as project hosts and the CGIAR collaborates by jointly submitting 
project applications. The NSFC provides scientific research and 
personnel exchange funds for approved projects, whereas CGIAR 
centres provide financial support for the participation of CGIAR 
personnel and for training and learning (Han et al. 2018).
These spaces are part of an effort from China’s research 
organisations to have a more institutionalised and coordinated 
interaction with the CGIAR. The opening of CGIAR offices in 
Beijing brought to light high transaction costs and coordination 
gaps between different centres, as well as their limited practical 
contributions to contemporary China’s agricultural challenges. 
In the early days, CGIAR centres played a key role in 
introducing new technologies and training scientists, yet now 
their comparative advantages have been greatly reduced 
in China’s context. They increasingly focus on meetings, 
delivering presentations and writing papers. It looks fancy, 
yet the work effectiveness and outcomes are limited. It has 
become increasingly bureaucratic and over-burdened. 
(Interview with staff member at CGIAR centre, Beijing, 2020)
Joint laboratories and framework agreements reflect the efforts 
to make these interactions more strategic and effective for China, 
and learning more selective from international organisations.
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5.4 New South–South connections and knowledge platforms
International research collaborations have provided fertile ground 
for Chinese research systems to mature. Chinese experts are now 
engaging in South–South scientific cooperation, building new 
knowledge platforms based on their experiences with the CGIAR. 
One example of new platforms is the CCCAP, which is expected 
to push forward joint research and extension on potatoes in 
China and the Asia-Pacific region (Lu and Xiu 2014). Furthermore, 
the CGIAR–CAAS joint laboratories provide not only a space 
for the continuation of training Chinese talent, but are also 
becoming channels for China to offer training and develop other 
collaborations and knowledge networks with Southern partners. 
China is also establishing additional international joint research 
centres and overseas bases, drawing on other international 
industry–university research networks. In June 2019, the Chinese 
Ministry of Science and Technology approved the first batch of 
14 Belt and Road joint laboratories, including six in agricultural 
research.
China has extended the joint research model to China–Africa 
cooperation, assisting the construction of the Sino–Africa 
Joint Research Center (SAJOREC) and establishing a ‘10+10’ 
cooperation mechanism for China–Africa agricultural science.17 
Since its establishment in 2013, SAJOREC has proposed more than 
45 joint research projects across a range of themes, including 
biodiversity, pathogenic microorganism detection, remote 
sensing, and natural resource management (SAJOREC n.d.). It has 
also provided scholarships for African students to study in China 
and training for scientists and senior technicians from across 
Africa (ibid.). 
China has also set up a national research plan and special 
projects dedicated to supporting international scientific and 
technological cooperation. The aim is to enhance capacity 
to facilitate global innovation, meeting the global goals while 
promoting the participation of Chinese businesses in international 
cooperation.
6 Conclusion
This article has reviewed the interaction between China and 
the CGIAR over the past 50 years and identified two stages 
in this relationship. The first stage features China largely as a 
recipient of resources and expertise, particularly in the context 
of market-oriented reforms (in China) and greater international 
exposure. During this formative stage, the interaction comprised 
germplasm exchanges, cultivation of new crop varieties in China, 
and training and mentoring of Chinese scientists. The second 
stage has unfolded in a context of China’s economic ascendency 
and intensified contributions to global development (Alden 2007; 
Carmody 2013). During this stage, there has been a gradual 
assertion of Chinese scientists and scientific institutions within 
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the CGIAR (at a time of stagnant CGIAR funding), as well as in 
other international spaces through new Southern platforms for 
collaboration. China’s more active and strategic engagement 
with the CGIAR fits a trend towards increasingly earmarked CGIAR 
funding. This is also happening alongside intensifying South–
South cooperation activities (Mawdsley 2012; Scoones et al. 2016).
Over this period, we can trace the formation and practice of 
China’s ‘selective learning’ in agricultural science, followed by its 
extension to other countries through South–South cooperation. 
Selective learning is defined by emphases in ownership (or 
self-reliance) and pragmatic development that have long guided 
China’s own trajectory (Tang 2020). The approach emerged from 
interacting with international organisations, such as the CGIAR 
centres. In the first stage, China’s selective learning entailed 
an emphasis on the training of talent (who would later lead 
research projects and institutions) and focused on germplasm 
exchanges, on the basis of which China gradually developed 
its national agricultural research system. In the second stage, 
when China began to actively ‘go out’, the principle of selective 
learning meant being more entrepreneurial and proactive 
in research collaborations, aligning these with China’s own 
challenges, and building on accumulated competences and 
knowledge. China’s pursuit of development ownership is visible 
in the push for more problem-driven cooperation, in line with 
the country’s needs. Pragmatic development is reflected, in turn, 
in the joint laboratories with CGIAR centres and collaborative 
projects that are geared towards an exploration of multiple 
pathways to economic development, and which establish new 
knowledge spaces involving multiple players, including diplomats, 
bureaucrats, and businesses, for scientific and technological 
innovation. The White Paper on international cooperation 
states that science and technology are the ‘primary productive 
forces’ and a key element in supporting endogenous growth by 
developing countries (SCIO 2021: 40). These global science and 
technology initiatives are being extended to include Southern 
knowledge networks and spaces, diversifying the existing 
international development regime and knowledge pool. 
While links to prestigious and well-established knowledge 
networks such as the CGIAR centres continue to be highly prized 
spaces for the formation of Chinese talent and cutting-edge 
knowledge production, China is also enabling the construction 
of new platforms for collaborative scientific research and 
technological innovation together with other nations. While these 
build on the learnings of five decades of collaboration with the 
CGIAR, they bring on board Southern partners and connections, 
convened by Chinese scientists and research institutions in their 
own right.
It is too early to say whether these new initiatives will lead 
to a reconfiguration of global agricultural research systems 
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and knowledge networks. Further research should explore the 
extent to which China’s heightened international engagement 
and domestic capability is transforming established systems 
and opening up new pathways for global agricultural science, 
including creating channels in the South for the circulation of 
ideas, and the exchange of people and germplasm resources. 
Drawing implications for international cooperation relations, our 
analysis suggests that foreign assistance, if well selected and 
adapted to specific needs of recipient countries, can contribute 
to building their domestic capabilities and enable the choice 
of development trajectories that suit them. China as a South–
South cooperation provider emphasises partner ownership and 
self-sufficiency through capacity development that can enable 
endogenous development trajectories. How China’s ‘selective 
learning’ is interpreted by other Southern countries and whether 
it is taken up as a distinctive approach to development learning 
that they can apply on their own terms are questions that 
warrant further investigation.
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4 The first meeting of the CGIAR, held in May 1971, listed the 
following countries and organisations as members: Canada, 
Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United 
States, the African Development Bank, FAO, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction 
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and Development (the World Bank), the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), Ford Foundation, the 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC), the Kellogg 
Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation (CGIAR 1971).
5 Ramo’s notion of the Beijing Consensus centres on three 
presumably distinctive and central features of China’s 
economic model: (1) innovation-based development; 
(2) economic success measured not by growth alone but 
by equitable distribution of wealth and environmental 
sustainability; and (3) self-determination vis-à-vis the United 
States’ hegemony. 
6 As Confucius put it: ‘Do not impose on others what you yourself 
do not desire’.
7 Specifically, this approach comprises three elements: (1) drawing 
on experiences already practised; (2) mobilising actors that 
worked directly with those experiences to find solutions with 
local partners to tackle on-site development challenges; and 
(3) peer-to-peer experience sharing (Xu and Li 2020).
8 The successful completion of the ‘three-line’ hybrid rice was 
the result of years of research by a team of Chinese scientists 
led by Yuan Longping. The three-line matching system was 
announced as successful at the National Rice Scientific 
Research Conference in 1973. 
9 The NSFC is the organisation responsible for coordinating 
funding to support basic research and foster scientific talent, 
and ultimately promote progress in science and technology for 
China’s socioeconomic development. Since 2018, the NSFC sits 
under the Ministry of Science and Technology.
10 This refers to the virus-free or rarely virus-infected seed potato 
obtained after implementing a series of technical measures to 
remove the virus in the potato block. It has the advantages of 
early maturity, high yield, and good quality.
11 Mist culture is a new type of soil-less cultivation. It uses a spray 
device to atomise the nutrient solution into small droplets, 
which are directly applied to plant roots to provide water and 
nutrients.
12 One CGIAR is an internal initiative to promote greater 
integration across CGIAR centres in recognition of the 
interconnectedness of sustainable development challenges.
13 For example, Wang Ren was the Deputy Director General of 
IRRI in 2000–07 and Shenggen Fan was the Director General of 
IFPRI in 2009–19.
14 IR varieties from IRRI (such as IR24, IR26, IR30, IR50, IR64,  
IR9761-19-1) have become the most important restorer lines and 
parents of hybrid rice in China.
15 In 2019 alone, these included placements with CIMMYT, IFPRI, 
the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), World 
Agroforestry (ICRAF), and Biodiversity International (interview 
with staff member at a CGIAR centre, Beijing, 2020).
16 The NSFC Life Sciences Department subsidises about 
35 projects on rice physiology, nutrition, pathology, genetics, 
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Chinese Foundations and the 
Challenge of ‘Going International’*
Lindan Tan1 and Huib Huyse2
Abstract China’s international cooperation strategies are 
gradually changing due to evolving views about the limits of its 
internationalisation approach, which has traditionally mainly 
focused on building governmental and business relationships. 
Intensified interactions with low-income countries in the context 
of the Belt and Road Initiative are perceived to benefit from an 
increased role for its domestic non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). This article explores China’s initial steps in enabling the 
domestic NGO landscape to internationalise by looking at this 
development from an organisational capacity perspective. By 
assessing five key organisational characteristics of 36 Chinese 
foundations engaging in international cooperation, we find 
that the average organisational capacity for international 
cooperation is still limited but shows gradual improvement. While 
they all comply with government regulations in governance 
and several foundations have large budgets and capacity 
for domestic operations, our findings suggest that only a few 
currently mobilise substantial human and financial resources for 
their international activities.
Keywords non-governmental organisations (NGOs), foundation, 
international cooperation, Belt and Road Initiative, China.
1 Introduction
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched by Chinese President 
Xi Jinping in 2013 is by far the most prominent example of China’s 
growing international ambitions in the areas of trade, diplomacy, 
and international cooperation. Certain studies (e.g. Maliszewska 
and Mensbrugghe 2019) conclude that the outcomes would be 
largely beneficial; global income would increase by 0.7 per cent 
and the BRI areas are estimated to capture 82 per cent of the 
gain. Other studies (e.g. Deych 2019) are more critical and accuse 
China of ‘neo-colonialism’, claiming that China is guided only by 
its own interests, even violating human rights and disregarding 
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environmental regulations. The Chinese government feels 
misunderstood in what it perceives as misconceptions, although it 
acknowledges that these two areas might require more attention.
First, not all Chinese enterprises overseas attach sufficient 
importance to the fulfilment of social responsibility. This is 
reflected, for example, in the social responsibility development 
index of Chinese enterprises, which shows scores as low as 5.67 
on average (Zhong, Ye and Zhang 2017) for Chinese companies 
overseas, compared to 35.1 for enterprises working in China 
(Huang et al. 2017).
Second, there are signs that China realises that its own state-led 
development model cannot meet all the needs for effective 
engagement, and multilateral dialogue and cooperation with 
low-income countries.
Regarding both challenges, the Chinese government sees a 
potential role for Chinese non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), as stated in policy documents from 2015 onwards. NGOs 
can urge Chinese overseas enterprises to pay more attention to 
their environmental and social responsibilities on the one hand, 
while complementing China’s traditional unilateral diplomacy and 
showing a different side of China, on the other hand. In recent 
years, the Chinese government has developed a relatively active 
policy framework to facilitate the international collaboration of 
Chinese NGOs.
This article takes note of this development and asks the question 
as to what extent the Chinese NGO landscape is evolving in line 
with these policy intentions. More specifically, the article assesses 
the extent to which Chinese NGOs are prepared for a growing 
role in international cooperation. Estimates for the year 2014 show 
that only 529 out of a total of 606,048 NGOs were engaging in 
activities abroad (MCA 2015). While the absolute numbers remain 
low, even less is known about their capacity to engage at the 
international level.
In Section 2, we define the concept of NGOs in China and in 
Section 3, we frame the rise of Chinese NGOs with international 
activities within recent developments. This is followed by a short 
literature review of the organisational capacity assessment, and 
the designed assessment framework, in Section 4. Section 5 
assesses the readiness of Chinese foundations, a subgroup of 
NGOs, to enter the international arena, based on the screening 
of a random sample of 36 foundations across five dimensions: 
organisational internal governance capacity, organisational 
economic capacity, human resource capacity, organisational 
sustainability, and international cooperation experience. The 
organisational capacity assessment framework is constructed 
around 21 relevant indicators identified in the annual reports from 
these foundations. Section 6 concludes, giving tentative insights 
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into how China’s foundations are slowly turning their attention to 
low-income countries, although in a careful and modest way in 
terms of financial and human resources.
2 NGOs, social organisations, and foundations
China’s NGO landscape has evolved steadily over the last 
three decades (Figure 1), increasing from 4,446 NGOs in 1988 to 
866,335 in 2019. This associational growth has similarities with 
what has happened in other countries, although the comparison 
is complicated by the differences in how NGOs are defined. An 
in-depth comparison would go beyond the scope of this article. 
China’s policy framework distinguishes between three types of 
NGO: (1) social organisations; (2) people-run non-enterprise units; 
and (3) foundations.
In 2019, the biggest group (56 per cent) was that of people-run 
non-enterprise units, which are defined as institutions, societies, 
and other social forces established with non-state-owned assets 
by individual citizens for non-profit social services (SCIO 1998a). 
Social organisations are the second largest group of NGOs 
(43 per cent), and essentially cover non-profit organisations 
voluntarily created by Chinese citizens to achieve the collective 
desires of members, and conduct activities according to their 
charters (SCIO 1998b). The smallest group is that of foundations 
(7,585, or around 1 per cent), which are defined as non-profit legal 
entities that employ assets donated by actual persons, legal 
entities, or other organisations for the purpose of engaging in 
some public benefit enterprise (SCIO 2004).
Chinese foundations are the focus of our study. They have a 
long history of involvement in international cooperation and 
Source Authors’ own, based on data from MCA (2020).
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their role has been particularly emphasised since the BRI was 
launched. As early as 1951, the Chinese Red Cross Foundation 
(CRCF) was involved in international relief efforts in Korea. The 
China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation’s (CFPA) medical aid in 
Sudan since 2010 has been a typical example of a Chinese NGO 
going to Africa. Since 2014, the China Foundation for Peace and 
Development (CFPD) has been actively responding to the BRI 
by creating the Friends of the Silk Road brand and launching 
international cooperation activities in Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, 
and other countries, mainly in the form of education assistance. 
In 2017, CFPA was commissioned and funded by China’s Ministry 
of Commerce (MOFCOM) to carry out an international volunteer 
project, which marked the first time that NGOs were included in 
the framework of China’s foreign aid work.
Within NGOs’ annual reporting requirements, international 
activities are understood by the Chinese government as 
participating in international conferences, setting up offices 
overseas, participating in international organisations, providing 
assistance to international NGOs in China, and conducting 
international projects.
3 Chinese NGOs entering the world scene
In Western countries, the internationalisation of civil society 
organisations (CSOs) has come in several waves (Develtere, 
Huyse and Van Ongevalle 2021). Initial internationalisation 
efforts originated in the trade union movement and around 
humanitarian work (e.g. the International Red Cross). Subsequent 
waves originated during colonial times; the post-war period; at 
the end of the 1960s (the so-called third world movement); in the 
1980s and 1990s (new humanitarian NGOs); and post-2000 (social 
entrepreneurs and private initiatives). Over the last decades, a 
growing body of Chinese and international research has looked 
into the expansion of the Chinese NGO landscape, in education, 
environment, health, culture, disaster relief, and so forth (Wang 
2001; Tang and Zhan 2008; Xu, Zeng and Anderson 2005; Hsu and 
Jiang 2015; Kang 2017), also comparing this with trends in Western 
countries (Spires 2012; Hsu and Teets 2016).
Much less is known about the activities of Chinese NGOs 
abroad, with the exception of a limited number of studies. Some 
scholars have documented the work of Chinese NGOs in areas 
such as global governance (Buckley 2013), service delivery and 
technical support (Huang et al. 2014), advocacy (towards Chinese 
enterprises) (Deng and Wang 2015), and cultural exchanges 
(Hsu, Hildebrandt and Hasmath 2016). In addition, scholars 
have critically assessed the activities of Chinese NGOs in Africa, 
observing a general reluctance to engage deeply in international 
cooperation in the face of uncertainties in the Sino-African policy 
framework (Brenner 2012). Others have documented the limited 
impact of Chinese NGOs in countries such as Ethiopia and Malawi 
(Hsu et al. 2016).
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Moreover, the capacity and efficiency of Chinese NGOs 
to roll out activities in low-income countries is a largely 
under-researched topic. Huang et al. (2014) compared the 
internationalisation strategies of Chinese NGOs with those 
of foreign CSOs and Chinese enterprises. They found that 
Chinese NGOs had to operate within an inadequate policy 
framework, and lacked human resources and financial support, 
resulting in poor performance and impact. The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP 2017) in China assessed the 
challenges faced by 18 Chinese foreign-related CSOs in their 
international cooperation activities, based on three factors: type 
of organisation, geographical distribution, and business area. 
This survey-based research concluded that Chinese CSOs were 
only in the nascent stage of ‘going out’, resulting in low scores 
for performance. Qiu and Liu (2019) conducted field surveys of 
Chinese foundations such as CFPA and CRCF and found a serious 
lack of technical support, legal guarantees, professional staff, and 
funds during their international projects.
There are indications that the policy context is gradually 
becoming more conducive for Chinese NGOs. The BRI is acting as 
a catalyst in encouraging a larger role for NGOs in international 
cooperation. At least five recent policies and communications 
facilitate a ‘going out’ strategy for Chinese NGOs step by step. 
First, a 2015 policy was issued in the context of the BRI which 
suggests increased exchanges and cooperation between 
NGOs of countries along the Belt and Road (NDRC, MFA and 
MOFCOM 2015). Second, in 2016, a policy was issued that NGOs 
should be guided to play a supporting role in foreign economic, 
cultural, scientific and technological, educational, sports, and 
environmental protection exchanges, as well as acting as a 
platform for civil society in foreign exchange (General Office of 
the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the State 
Council 2016).
Third, in 2015, the General Office of the CPC Central Committee 
and the General Office of the State Council also encouraged 
NGOs to participate in international organisation projects and 
support foreign aid work in a more structured way (General Office 
of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the 
State Council 2015). Fourth, in 2016, MOFCOM stated that it would 
support NGOs through the South-South Cooperation Assistance 
Fund to implement assistance projects abroad (MOFCOM 2016).
Finally, since the opening ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum 
(BRF) for International Cooperation was held in Beijing in May 
2017 (Xinhuanet 2017), Chinese President Xi Jinping has launched 
the idea of developing a network for cooperation among the 
NGOs in countries along the Belt and Road, as well as initiating 
new people-to-people exchange platforms in a variety of formal 
settings. Chinese scholars have used these political statements 
and policy changes to point at the ‘unprecedented opportunities’ 
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for Chinese NGOs to enter the world stage, especially 




Research on organisational capacity assessment (OCA) has 
evolved considerably over the last decades. Since the 1970s 
and 1980s, the focus has shifted from organisational capacity 
as human resources combined with a limited set of ‘hard 
capacities’ (e.g. accounting and infrastructure), to frameworks 
that also include a set of ‘soft capacities’ (e.g. leadership, 
learning, and self-renewal), further inspired by complexity 
thinking (Huyse et al. 2012). In their review of the literature on 
organisational capacity in the development sector, Holvoet and 
Leslie (2013) conclude that only two frameworks are supported by 
a wide body of evidence.
First, Kaplan (1999) identified both elements related to hard 
capacities, such as material and financial resources and 
skills, as well as elements related to soft capacities, including 
organisational attitude and the organisation’s understanding of 
the world. Second, Land et al. (2008) developed and tested a 
conceptual framework with five core organisational capabilities, 
which again combines both hard and soft capacities.
While the two frameworks stress the importance of both ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ elements when assessing organisational capacity, the 
absence of data may complicate the assessment of the latter 
(Holvoet and Leslie 2013). Considering that this research relies on 
secondary data available in the public domain, it faces similar 
constraints. As our index to assess the capacity for international 
cooperation (CIC) is mainly based on indicators that relate 
to hard capacities, our assessment is likely to act as a proxy 
for organisational stability, and to some extent organisational 
performance, rather than adaptability (ibid.). To assess the latter, 
one would need to assess soft capacities in addition to hard 
capacities.
More specifically, based on a review of annual working reports of 
Chinese foundations, 21 indicators in five sub-dimensions were 
identified to establish an index for the CIC (see Table 1). The 
sub-dimensions – internal governance capacity, human resource 
capacity, and organisational sustainability – provide indications 
of organisational stability. Organisational performance relates to 
organisational economic capacity and international cooperation 
experience. The resulting theoretical framework and the CIC index 
provide indications of the capacity for international cooperation, 
which need to be validated and further explored in future 
research efforts.
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4.2 Variable and assessment framework
Using yaahp v10.0 and the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
proposed by Saaty (2008), a representative subjective weighting 
method was used to assign weights to the 21 indicators of the 
variable of CIC. The weighting is based on the subjective opinions 
of 12 Chinese experts who focus on NGO-related research on the 
relative importance of the indicators when compared two by two.
Table 1 Measurement indicators of the capacity for international cooperation (CIC)
Target level Criterion level Index level










A council is in place 0.05
A supervisory board is in place 0.05
An information disclosure system is in place 0.05
Administrative penalties have been imposed 0.05
C2: Human 
resource capacity
Number of full-time staff 0.067
Percentage of full-time staff with a bachelor’s 
degree or above
0.067




Length of organisational development history 0.067
Average staff salary 0.067






Donations from the international community 0.034
Number of international cooperation projects 0.05
Amount spent on international projects 0.05
Percentage of expenditure on international projects 0.044
A department responsible for international 






Eligible for tax exemption status 0.022
Donation income 0.05
Government subsidy income 0.025
Total income for the year 0.044
Total fixed assets 0.022
Net assets 0.036
Source Authors’ own.
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The ‘Min-Max standardisation’ was then used to perform the 
linear transformation of the original data, mapping the value 
between [0,1] to ensure the comparability of data. Subsequently, 
the following formula for calculating the weighted average of 
the CIC was constructed. We define that Qi falling within [0.8,1] 
indicates that the CIC is very high; within [0.6,0.8) indicates high; 
within [0.4,0.6) indicates medium; within [0.2,0.4) indicates low; and 
within [0,0.2) indicates very low.
Where, Qij is the CIC of foundation j in year i, k represents the 
constructed 21 indicators, Wij is the weight of each indicator, and 
Zij is the standardised value; Qi is the overall value of CIC in year i, 
h represents the sample size, and Iij is the weight of each sample. 
We used Stata15.0 for the analysis.
4.3 Research sample and data sources
We collected panel data from the 36 foundations, which were 
randomly selected. This corresponds with around one third of the 
total population of foundations (108) that claim to have some 
international involvement in their annual working reports during 
the period 2014–19. This subgroup of 108 foundations accounts 
for less than 1.5 per cent of all foundations (7,585). All data were 
sourced from annual working reports of foundations that are 
publicly available as required by Article 38 of the Regulations on 
Funds (SCIO 2004). We use the mean imputation method to deal 
with missing data.
5 Empirical analysis
Figure 2 visualises the main scores for the CIC, as well as the 
scores for the five sub-dimensions for the 36 foundations 
throughout 2014–19. Our index suggests that the foundations in 
our sample have increased their CIC from a score of 0.37 in 2014 
to 0.4297 in 2019 but still cannot truly meet China’s expectations 
of advocating NGOs to ‘go out’ in the context of the BRI.
5.1 Stability: strong self-governance, low legal risk but limited 
organisational sustainability and human resources
All the foundations in our sample comply with the governance 
regulations of the Chinese government, resulting in the maximum 
score for this dimension. This implies that all of them have a board 
of directors and a supervisory board. They also comply with the 
rules of Article 38 of the Regulations on Funds to disclose their 
finances and activities information for inspection and supervision 
by the public. In addition, none of them violated Chinese 
government regulations in the area of governance or have been 
subject to administrative penalties.
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The organisational sustainability dimension receives a low score in 
2014 (0.33), moving to medium in the period 2017–19. The indicators 
provide further clarifications. Many foundations offer low staff 
salaries, such as the Yu Panglin Charity Foundation (YPLCF) in 2016 
(¥13,650 (£1,533)), the COSCO Shipping Charity Foundation (CSCF) 
in 2014 (¥22,000 (£2,471)), and the China Birth Defect Intervention 
and Relief Foundation (CBDIRF) in 2014 (¥24,000 (£2,696)). In the 
competitive Chinese labour market, this might affect the ability 
to attract high-performing professionals. Some foundations are 
very old, such as the China Children and Teenagers’ Fund (CCTF) 
which was established 40 years ago. The second group of seven 
foundations is about 30 years old, others are much more recent. 
Only three foundations have five different sources of income, 
around one third have four sources, and half of the group has 
three sources of income.
The average human resource capacity of the 36 foundations 
was low (0.33) in 2014 and medium (0.35) by 2019. Firstly, with 
82 per cent of full-time staff in possession of a bachelor’s degree, 
the educational level of the foundation staff is relatively high. 
However, except for two foundations (CFPA and the China Youth 
Development Foundation (CYDF)), all of the other foundations 
had less than 100 full-time staff in 2018. One third of the 
foundations had less than ten full-time staff in 2014. A similar trend 
can be observed for the number of volunteers. Some foundations 
have large numbers, such as the Shenzhen One Foundation 
Charity Fund (SZOFCF) which had 153,172 volunteers in 2019, while 
the International Scientific Exchange Foundation of China (ISEFC), 
YPLCF, and the China Guang Hua Science and Technology 
Foundation (GHF) had none.
Figure 2 Time evolution of the capacity for international cooperation, 2014–19
Source Authors’ own.
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5.2 Organisational performance: weak international cooperation 
experience and economic capacity
Of the five dimensions, international cooperation experience 
has the lowest score: 0.08 in 2014 and 0.11 in 2019. It confirms 
that Chinese foundations tend to have minimal experience in 
international cooperation. In 2014, only 17 out of 35 foundations 
received international donations. In 2019, the number grew 
to 23, but the percentage is still very small and the average 
international donation is just ¥7.42m (£0.83m). Second, while 
few foundations might have participated in international 
conferences or assisted international NGOs in their activities 
in China, most have not had structural activities abroad, such 
as setting up offices overseas or establishing international 
departments. In 2019, three quarters of the foundations did 
not have any overseas office. Similarly, only a small minority 
have actually implemented international cooperation projects 
abroad. For most foundations, the average percentage of 
expenditure on international projects was just 17 per cent, 
showing that it is not at the core of their operations. The 
Chinese Language and Culture Education Foundation of 
China (CLEF) is a notable exception, with 52 international 
projects in 2016 and almost 100 per cent of its expenditure on 
international projects. The same pattern can be detected for 
the average amount spent on international projects, which was 
just ¥15.92m (£1.79m).
The economic capacity of Chinese foundations also scores 
rather low, ranging from 0.14 in 2014 to 0.20 in 2019. Access to 
funding appears to be a major obstacle to the development of 
Chinese NGOs, but this average score hides large differences 
between the foundations. The annual income of different 
foundations differs substantially, with the highest total income 
for the year being around ¥1.57bn (£0.18bn) and the lowest being 
around ¥0.37m (£41,556), and with the average value being only 
¥173.02m (£19.43m). A few large foundations receive government 
subsidy income, such as the China Women’s Development 
Foundation (CWDF), the China Friendship Foundation for Peace 
and Development (CFFPD), the China Development Research 
Foundation (CDRF), CCTF, and so forth, yet most foundations do 
not. In addition, the fixed assets and net assets of foundations are 
not only low but also vary greatly. For example, in 2014, the ZTE 
Foundation (ZTEF) and YPLCF had zero fixed assets, while CYDF 
had fixed assets of ¥141.53m (£15.90m) in the same year.
5.3 A detailed breakdown for the 36 foundations
Table 2 provides an overview of the individual scores for the 
36 foundations in our sample, ranked according to their total 
scores for the CIC index (column 2). One foundation (CFPA) stands 
out with a score of 0.55. Around half of the foundations score 
medium (higher than 0.4 on the CIC index), the other half score 
low (below 0.4).
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Table 2 Average CIC for the 36 foundations over the six years of 2014–19


















CFPA 0.55 1.00 0.38 0.68 0.49 0.18
CDRF 0.51 1.00 0.21 0.33 0.71 0.29
CWDF 0.50 1.00 0.34 0.39 0.61 0.16
GHF 0.50 1.00 0.34 0.38 0.64 0.11
CIMF4 0.49 1.00 0.17 0.17 0.64 0.45
CYDF 0.48 1.00 0.43 0.41 0.49 0.10
CCTF 0.48 1.00 0.28 0.32 0.65 0.14
SZOFCF 0.47 1.00 0.20 0.61 0.34 0.17
AF5 0.46 1.00 0.10 0.46 0.53 0.20
ZUEF6 0.43 1.00 0.44 0.36 0.24 0.11
OCCFC7 0.42 1.00 0.17 0.36 0.51 0.06
CEPF8 0.42 1.00 0.15 0.35 0.53 0.04
CFFPD 0.41 1.00 0.14 0.31 0.43 0.19
YCCSEF9 0.41 1.00 0.14 0.35 0.34 0.21
SHACF10 0.40 1.00 0.16 0.39 0.45 0.01
IMLNF11 0.40 1.00 0.29 0.19 0.30 0.22
CGCF12 0.40 1.00 0.14 0.30 0.45 0.12
CFYEE13 0.40 1.00 0.17 0.36 0.41 0.04
CCF14 0.39 1.00 0.04 0.30 0.53 0.07
CLEF 0.37 1.00 0.13 0.23 0.22 0.29
SOCF15 0.37 1.00 0.13 0.29 0.39 0.06
CSAF16 0.37 1.00 0.17 0.30 0.39 0.01
CFCHC17 0.37 1.00 0.12 0.28 0.46 0.00
CSCF 0.37 1.00 0.15 0.31 0.37 0.02
LSCF18 0.36 1.00 0.14 0.38 0.22 0.06
CTF19 0.35 1.00 0.06 0.29 0.33 0.05
CFCAC20 0.35 1.00 0.13 0.21 0.39 0.02
CFHRD21 0.35 1.00 0.02 0.29 0.36 0.06
CVSF22 0.35 1.00 0.14 0.33 0.24 0.01
ZTEF 0.34 1.00 0.12 0.31 0.27 0.01
CBDIRF 0.34 1.00 0.19 0.28 0.24 0.00
WIFA23 0.34 1.00 0.02 0.11 0.46 0.10
ISEFC 0.33 1.00 0.04 0.32 0.27 0.02
CSDF24 0.33 1.00 0.11 0.08 0.38 0.07
TXZEF25 0.30 1.00 0.09 0.15 0.19 0.07
YPLCF 0.27 1.00 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.03
Source Authors’ own.
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The following observations can be made for sub-dimensions with 
differing scores. For organisational economic capacity, a large 
majority scores very low (25). Only two foundations are medium, 
and seven are low. For human resource capacity, a large majority 
scores low (6) or very low (26), and only two score medium (0.46). 
The situation is more balanced for organisational sustainability, 
with five foundations scoring high; 12 medium; 17 low; and two 
very low. For international cooperation experience, only one 
foundation reached the medium level, five foundations score low 
and the remaining 30 foundations score very low.
The 36 foundations were then clustered according to their scores 
on the various dimensions of the CIC (Table 3). The international 
cooperation experience, the dimension that has the closest 
relationship with the actual performance of the foundations 
within the CIC index, is confronted with the other dimensions, 
which should be seen as ‘foundational’ dimensions.
First, only one single foundation has a high score both for 
international cooperation experience and human resource 
capacity (AF). Three foundations (CLEF, IMLNF, and CIMF) obtain 
a high score for international cooperation experience but a low 
score for human resource capacity. This group should consider 
attracting professionals and expanding the number of volunteers 
to increase their CIC scores. Second, two foundations (CDRF 
and IMLNF) have a high score both for international cooperation 
experience and organisational economic capacity, indicating 
that strong economic power can help foundations to engage in 
international cooperation.
Four foundations (AF, CLEF, YCCSEF, and CIMF) have a high score 
for international cooperation experience but a low score for 
organisational economic capacity. This group has a relatively 
strong experience in international cooperation and could be a 
Table 3 Cluster of the dimensions of the Foundation’s CIC
International cooperation experience
High Low
Human resource capacity High AF SHACF
Low CLEF, IMLNF, CIMF Remaining foundations
Organisational economic 
capacity
High CDRF, IMLNF CBDIRF
Low AF, CLEF, YCCSEF, CIMF Remaining foundations
Organisational sustainability High CIMF, CDRF CFCHC, CEPF
Low CLEF, AF Remaining foundations
Source Authors’ own.
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priority for the Chinese government to provide additional financial 
assistance to support them in scaling up their international 
cooperation activities.
Third, two foundations (CLEF and AF) have a high score for 
international cooperation experience but a low score for 
organisational sustainability. For these foundations, further 
broadening the diversity of their income, and attracting and 
retaining professional talent through remuneration could be 
important breakthroughs to further improve their CIC.
Finally, two foundations (SHACF and CBDIRF) scored low for 
international cooperation experience but high for human resource 
capacity and organisational economic capacity. For these 
foundations, international cooperation is not currently a priority, 
but they have the infrastructure and potential to engage in it.
6 Conclusion
The average organisational CIC of foundations in China from 2014 
to 2019 is still limited and cannot truly meet China’s expectations 
of advocating NGOs to ‘go out’ in the context of the BRI. At the 
same time, our CIC index suggests that many foundations are 
gradually improving their capacity.
Establishing the exact reasons for the lower scores would require 
follow-up research but there are indications that the following 
factors contribute to the current situation: the inadequate legal 
framework to govern the specific activities of NGOs overseas; 
insufficient financial support from the government; insufficient 
number of dedicated staff and volunteers; and insufficient 
experience in international cooperation.
However, China’s foundations are slowly turning their attention to 
low-income countries. All the foundations in our sample comply 
with government regulations in the area of governance and 
some have high scores for organisational sustainability. Relying on 
organisational governance and sustainability, a few foundations 
have accumulated a relative wealth of experience in engaging in 
international cooperation, such as AF, CDRF, IMLNF, and CIMF.
In addition, 10–15 per cent of the foundations have relatively 
large budgets and capacity for their domestic operations, but 
only a few currently mobilise substantial human and financial 
resources for their international activities. For them, international 
cooperation is not currently a priority, but they have the 
infrastructure and potential to engage in it.
In conclusion, we can say that in the context of the BRI, only 
a few Chinese foundations that have large budgets are 
encouraged by the positive policy framework to truly ‘go out’, 
although in a careful and modest way. Foundations that are not 
yet adequately staffed and funded could be a priority for the 
Chinese government to support their engagement in international 
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cooperation voluntarily and proactively. Most foundations that 
lack both experience and enthusiasm to engage in international 
cooperation due to policy risk concerns, lack of funding, and lack 
of talent, are not fully ready for ‘going out’.
There are further policy implications which can be identified. The 
legal framework for the international activities of Chinese NGOs 
still contains gaps, which should be clarified through legislation. 
The Chinese government should consider providing adequate 
financial support to NGOs for international cooperation. NGOs 
should also organise themselves at a collective level to create 
opportunities for the exchange of experience, professional 
development, and expanding fundraising channels. Due to the 
availability of data, there are two main limitations of this study: 
first, social organisations, the category of NGO with the most 
international cooperation activities, are not included in the 
research sample; and second, the study does not include the 
softer dimensions of capacity, such as legitimacy, organisational 
culture, and resilience.
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11 IMLNF = Inner Mongolia Lao Niu Foundation.
12 CGCF = China Green Carbon Foundation.
13 CFYEE = China Foundation for Youth Entrepreneurship and 
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15 SOCF = Shanghai Overseas Chinese Foundation.
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
IDS Bulletin Vol. 52 No. 2 November 2021 ‘China and International Development: Knowledge, Governance, and Practice’ 121–138 | 135
References
Brenner, D. (2012) ‘Are Chinese NGOs “Going Out”? The Role of 
Chinese NGOs and GONGOs in Sino-African Relations’, Journal 
of Public and International Affairs 22: 131–52
Buckley, L. (2013) ‘Chinese Agriculture Development Cooperation 
in Africa: Narratives and Politics’, IDS Bulletin 44.4: 42–52, 
DOI: 10.1111/1759-5436.12041 (accessed 3 September 2021)
Deng, G.-S. and Wang, Y. (2015) ‘The Necessity and Policy 
Recommendations of Chinese NGOs “Going Abroad” ’, Teaching 
and Research 49.9: 28–34 (accessed 3 September 2021)
Develtere, P.; Huyse, H. and Van Ongevalle, J. (2021) International 
Development Cooperation Today: A Radical Shift Towards a 
Global Paradigm, Ithaca NY: Leuven University Press
Deych, T.L. (2019) ‘China in Africa: A Case of Neo-Colonialism or a 
Win-Win Strategy?’, Контуры глобальных трансформаций: 
политика, экономика, право Special Issue 2019: 63–82
General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General 
Office of the State Council (2016) ‘Opinion on the Reform of 
the Social Organization Management System and Promotion 
of the Healthy and Well-Ordered Development of Social 
Organizations’, State Council, People’s Republic of China, 
21 August (in Chinese) (accessed 7 September 2021) 
General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General 
Office of the State Council (2015) ‘Guidance on Strengthening 
the Coordination and Management of China’s Social 
Organizations’ Participation in International NGO Activities’, 
State Council, People’s Republic of China (in Chinese)
Holvoet, N. and Leslie, G. (2013) Feeling for the Intangible: 
A Framework for Donor’s Monitoring and Evaluation of Capacity 
Development Interventions, IOB Working Paper 2013.05, Antwerp: 
Institute of Development Policy (IOB), University of Antwerp
Hsu, C.L. and Jiang, Y. (2015) ‘An Institutional Approach to Chinese 
NGOs: State Alliance versus State Avoidance Resource 
Strategies’, China Quarterly 221: 100–22
Hsu, C. and Teets, J. (2016) ‘Is China’s New Overseas NGO 
Management Law Sounding the Death Knell for Civil Society? 
Maybe Not’, Asia-Pacific Journal 14.4: 1–16
Hsu, J.Y.; Hildebrandt, T. and Hasmath, R. (2016) ‘ “Going Out” 
or Staying In? The Expansion of Chinese NGOs in Africa’, 
Development Policy Review 34.3: 423–39
16 CSAF = China Social Assistance Foundation.
17 CFCHC = China Foundation for Cultural Heritage Conservation.
18 LSCF = Lingshan Charitable Foundation.
19 CTF = China Organ Transplantation Development Foundation.
20 CFCAC = China Foundation of Culture and Art for Children.
21 CFHRD = China Foundation for Human Rights Development.
22 CVSF = China Volunteer Service Foundation.
23 WIFA = Wu Zuoren International Foundation of Fine Arts.
24 CSDF = China Symphony Development Foundation.
25 TXZEF = Tao Xingzhi Education Foundation.
136 | Tan and Huyse Chinese Foundations and the Challenge of ‘Going International’
IDS Bulletin Vol. 52 No. 2 November 2021 ‘China and International Development: Knowledge, Governance, and Practice’
Huang, X.; Cai, L.; He, H. and Xu, T. (2018) Blue Book of Social 
Organizations: Report on Social Organizations in China, 
Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (in Chinese)
Huang, H.; Shi, Z.; Zhang, M. and Yang, H. (2014) ‘Study on the 
Internationalization Strategy and Path of Chinese Social 
Organizations’, Journal of China Agricultural University Social 
Sciences 31.2: 29–39 (in Chinese)
Huang, Q.; Zhong, W.; Zhang, E. and Wang, J. (2017) Blue Book 
of Corporate Social Responsibility: Research Report on 
Corporate Social Responsibility of China, Beijing: Social 
Sciences Academic Press (in Chinese)
Huyse, H.; Molenaers, N.; Phlix, G.; Bossuyt, J. and Fonteneau, B. 
(2012) ‘Evaluating NGO-Capacity Development Interventions: 
Enhancing Frameworks, Fitting the (Belgian) Context’, 
Evaluation 18.1: 129–50
Kang, Y. (2017) ‘The Development of Grassroots Chinese NGOs 
Following the Wenchuan Earthquake of 2008: Three Case 
Studies, Four Modi Vivendi’, Voluntas 28.4: 1648–72
Kaplan, A. (1999) The Developing of Capacity, Cape Town: 
Community Development Resource Association, Centre for 
Developmental Practice
Land, T. et al. (2008) ‘Capacity Change and Performance: 
Insights and Implications for Development Cooperation’, 
Policy Management Brief 21, Maastricht: European Centre for 
Development Policy Management
Maliszewska, M. and Mensbrugghe, D. van der (2019) The Belt and 
Road Initiative: Economic, Poverty and Environmental Impacts, 
Policy Research Working Paper 8814, Washington DC: World Bank
MCA (Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China) 
(2020) China Civil Affair’s Statistical Yearbook 2020, Beijing: 
China Statistics Press
MCA (Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China) 
(2015) China Civil Affair’s Statistical Yearbook (Statistic of 
China Social Service) in 2015, Beijing: China Statistics Press
MOFCOM (2016) ‘Administrative Measures for the Declaration and 
Implementation of South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund 
Projects (for Trial Implementation) (Draft for Public Comments)’, 
Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, 
9 September
NDRC, MFA and MOFCOM (National Development and Reform 
Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of 
Commerce of the People’s Republic of China) (2015) ‘Vision 
and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 
21st-Century Maritime Silk Road’, Belt and Road Forum for 
International Cooperation (accessed 7 September 2021)
OECD (2008) Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators: 
Methodology and User Guide, Paris: OECD Publishing
Qiu, M. and Liu, P. (2019) ‘Issues and Suggestions on the 
Internationalization of Chinese NGOs under the Background 
of “The Belt and Road” ’, Journal of Xiangtan University 
(Philosophy and Social Sciences) 43.6: 143–49 (in Chinese)
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
IDS Bulletin Vol. 52 No. 2 November 2021 ‘China and International Development: Knowledge, Governance, and Practice’ 121–138 | 137
Saaty, T.L. (2008) ‘Decision Making with the Analytic Hierarchy 
Process’, International Journal of Services Sciences 1.1: 83–98
SCIO (2004) ‘Regulations on Funds’, State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China, 8 March (accessed 3 September 2021)
SCIO (1998a) ‘Provisional Regulations for the Registration 
Administration of People-Run Non-Enterprise’, State Council 
of the People’s Republic of China, 25 October (accessed 
3 September 2021)
SCIO (1998b) ‘Regulations on the Registration and Management 
of Social Organizations’, State Council of the People’s Republic 
of China, 23 September (accessed 3 September 2021)
Spires, A.J. (2012) ‘Lessons from Abroad: Foreign Influences on 
China’s Emerging Civil Society’, China Journal 68: 125–46
Tang, S-Y. and Zhan, X. (2008) ‘Civic Environmental NGOs, 
Civil Society, and Democratisation in China’, Journal of 
Development Studies 44.3: 425–48
UNDP (2017) Going Global: An Assessment System for Chinese 
CSOs, UNDP in China Project Team, United Nations 
Development Programme (in Chinese)
Wang, M. (2001) ‘The Development of NGOs in China’, Nonprofit 
Review 1.1: 53–63
Xinhuanet (2017) ‘Chinese President Xi Jinping Delivers a Keynote 
Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum 
(BRF) for International Cooperation in Beijing, Capital of China’, 
14 May (accessed 7 September 2021)
Xu, H.; Zeng, Y. and Anderson, A.F. (2005) ‘Chinese NGOs in Action 
against HIV/AIDS’, Cell Research 15.11: 914–18
Zhong, W.; Ye, L. and Zhang, E. (2017) Blue Book of Corporate 
Social Responsibility: Research Report on Corporate Social 
Responsibility of Chinese Overseas Enterprises (2016–2017), 
Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (in Chinese)
138 | Tan and Huyse Chinese Foundations and the Challenge of ‘Going International’
IDS Bulletin Vol. 52 No. 2 November 2021 ‘China and International Development: Knowledge, Governance, and Practice’
This page is intentionally left blank
© 2021 The Authors. IDS Bulletin © Institute of Development Studies | DOI: 10.19088/1968-2021.125
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International 
licence (CC BY), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original 
authors and source are credited and any modifications or adaptations are indicated.  
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode 
The IDS Bulletin is published by Institute of Development Studies, Library Road, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK
This article is part of IDS Bulletin Vol. 52 No. 2 November 2021 ‘China and International Development: Knowledge, 
Governance, and Practice’; the Introduction is also recommended reading.
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
Triangular Cooperation: Different 
Approaches, Same Modality*
Sebastian Prantz1 and Xiaomin Zhang2
Abstract Triangular cooperation aims to utilise the comparative 
advantages of a pivotal partner (usually an emerging country) 
and a facilitating partner (usually a traditional donor) to generate 
development impacts with and for the benefit of a beneficiary, 
through simultaneously strengthening their partnership and 
providing opportunities for mutual learning. Utilising the triangular 
cooperation modality, China has acted primarily as a pivotal 
partner, implementing projects with facilitating partners and 
beneficiaries. Roles and responsibilities between China and 
facilitating partners differ greatly. Three approaches can be 
distinguished: (a) facilitating partner provides financial resources 
and China provides expertise; (b) China provides financial 
resources and facilitating partner implements; (c) China and 
facilitating partner provide financial resources and jointly plan 
and implement together with the beneficiary. This article argues 
that approach (c), currently practised in triangular cooperation 
projects between China, Germany, and beneficiary countries, 
provides the partners with the most potential for effectively 
generating developmental impacts and partnership effects.
Keywords international aid architecture, triangular cooperation, 
South–South cooperation, China, Germany, Ethiopia.
1 The transition of the international development cooperation 
architecture and the rising of the triangular cooperation modality
For the past seven decades, Organisation for Economic 
Co‑operation and Development (OECD) countries, organised 
in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), have taken 
up a central role in the international development landscape. 
Through the provision of official development assistance 
(ODA), they provided the biggest share of finance for global 
development assistance (OECD 2021a). Among them, the top 
five donors including the United States (US), United Kingdom 
(UK), Japan, Germany, and France contributed the most (ibid.). 
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Through providing modalities and norms, OECD‑DAC countries 
have been playing a dominant role in international development 
cooperation. The turn of the century witnessed a transition of 
the international assistance structure in line with an increasingly 
multipolar world order. New providers of aid (emerging donors) 
increased their bilateral development assistance contributions 
as well as their contributions to, and influence in, multilateral 
development institutions (Kolsdorf and Müller 2020). Non‑DAC 
countries steadily increased their share in global development 
assistance. Net ODA disbursement (even from different reporting 
standards) from non‑DAC donors rose to 15.2 per cent in 2018 
(OECD 2021b).
Starting in the 2000s, four High‑Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness 
were convened to adapt development cooperation to the 
changing international landscape and improve aid effectiveness,3 
ushering in a transition from development aid to development 
cooperation. With both ODA and South–South cooperation (SSC), 
providers have been facing criticism within the aid effectiveness 
debate (Moyo 2009; Lengfelder 2016), and efforts made to 
systematically leverage synergies between them. In 2008, the 
Accra Agenda for Action acknowledged SSC as a significant 
complement to traditional North–South cooperation and 
encouraged the providers of SSC to support the Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness (OECD 2008).4 The High Level Event on 
South–South Cooperation and Capacity Development held in 
Colombia in 2010 concluded that SSC is ‘an important instrument 
of effective and inclusive partnerships’.5 The Fourth High‑Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness, held in Busan in 2011, concluded 
that SSC and traditional development cooperation were both 
needed until 2015 to achieve the Millennium Development Goals 
(OECD 2011).
With these developments, the conventional narrative of ‘Northern’ 
OECD‑DAC countries being the providers and ‘Southern’ 
countries being the recipients has been largely contested and 
increasingly replaced by new approaches that ensure countries 
work together for sustainable development on a more equal 
footing (Kolsdorf and Müller 2020). Triangular cooperation is one 
of the modalities which has increased in prominence as a vehicle 
for traditional donors and emerging donors to work together with 
beneficiary countries to support their sustainable development 
(Altenburg and Weikert 2006).
Triangular cooperation is not a new mode of working together. 
A reference to the concept was present in the 1978 Buenos 
Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical 
Cooperation among Developing Countries (United Nations 
1978). The application of the modality of triangular cooperation 
became more widespread in the 2010s. A survey on triangular 
cooperation conducted by the OECD in 2015 showed significant 
increases in triangular cooperation projects in all regions and a 
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multitude of actors involved (OECD 2015). Triangular cooperation 
is seen as a modality with the potential to bridge the approaches 
of traditional donors and emerging donors and provide the 
opportunity to take the strengths of both approaches while 
preventing existing weaknesses from lessening the effectiveness 
of the intervention (Huang and Tang 2013; Yuan 2020).
As the modality is gaining momentum, the debate on its 
effectiveness is still ongoing. While the perceived benefits 
include the use of comparative advantages such as similarities 
in development challenges between pivotal and beneficiary 
countries, cost‑effective expertise provision, the possibility of 
mutual learning and thus improving aid delivery systems, practical 
challenges to the effectiveness of the modality are found in the 
transaction costs incurred through the coordination challenge of 
bringing everyone to the table (Fordelone 2009). An evaluation 
of the triangular cooperation modality in German development 
cooperation in 2020 attributed to it the potential for improving 
aid effectiveness, strengthening international development 
partnerships, and creating opportunities for mutual learning.
The evaluation found that these impacts are all usually 
generated, but unevenly, depending on the concrete project 
concepts. It distinguished impacts along two dimensions:  
(1) the programmatic‑content dimension, which includes 
developmental impacts generated in beneficiary countries that 
improve outcomes for the target groups of the intervention, and 
(2) the political‑strategic dimension, which includes strengthening 
partnerships between actors involved in the cooperation as 
well as improving development cooperation structures. In the 
political‑strategic dimension, impacts are generated for all 
partners involved. The evaluation attests the main benefits being 
in the second dimension, while impacts in the first dimension are 
relatively low because of the low volumes of the cooperation 
projects (Kaplan, Busemann and Wirtgen 2020).
There is currently no internationally accepted definition for 
what constitutes triangular cooperation. Variant terms are used 
and even if the same terms are used, interpretations can vary. 
For example, OECD‑DAC uses ‘trilateral cooperation’ (OECD 
2013), and the United Nations Economic and Social Council and 
Germany both use ‘triangular cooperation’ (ECOSOC 2008; BMZ 
2013). China uses ‘tripartite cooperation’ (SCIO 2021).
This article uses the term ‘triangular cooperation’ as defined 
by the Global Partnership Initiative on Effective Triangular 
Cooperation (GPI) and the OECD. There, triangular cooperation 
is defined as an initiative in which at least three partners work 
together in a combination of three roles, which can revolve 
throughout the implementation of the initiative. The roles are 
that of a beneficiary partner, which seeks support to tackle 
a specific development challenge, a pivotal partner, which 
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has proven experience in the issue, and shares its resources, 
knowledge, and expertise, and a facilitating partner, which helps 
connect the beneficiary and the pivotal partners, supporting their 
collaboration financially and technically (OECD 2019). China has 
a unique experience with the triangular cooperation modality, 
stemming also from its own experience of being a recipient of 
ODA and at the same time providing SSC.
2 China’s foreign aid and triangular cooperation
The world has witnessed the rapid growth of China’s economy 
in the last four decades. China has become a prominent 
emerging power, changing the landscape of international 
relations (Figure 1). China’s development model and its approach 
towards SSC are topics heatedly discussed internationally. There 
is a broad range of opinions. Firstly, a favourable approach 
sees China being well placed, with its successful development 
experience to support, for example, African countries in their 
development (Guennoun 2019; Gu and Kitano 2018). It also sees 
Chinese development finance positively impacting economic 
growth in recipient countries (Dreher et al. 2021). The critical 
approach sees Chinese aid engagement as being primarily 
driven by the quest for material inputs (Kaplinsky, McCormick and 
Morris 2007) or producing only marginal impacts (Toktomushev 
2019). Other views argue that Chinese foreign aid and traditional 
development cooperation by OECD‑DAC countries have similar 
motives and goals (Dreher et al. 2015).
Starting from the 1950s, China began to offer aid to its 
neighbouring countries. In the 2000s, China expanded its foreign 
aid in volume (Figure 2), in terms of how it was channelled, and 
institutionalised its development cooperation system. In 2018, 
Chinese contributions to multilateral organisations totalled 
US$1.4bn (OECD 2020).
Source Authors’ own, based on data from National Statistics Bureau of the People’s Republic of China.6 
Figure 1 China’s GDP, 2001–20 
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The rise in contributions to multilateral organisations ran parallel 
with an increasing openness towards international cooperation 
and multilateralism. The United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) attested this in a 2017 discussion paper, 
which documented the rising financial support for UN agencies 
by China, China’s initiatives to establish new multilateral 
organisations, as well as greater support for triangular 
cooperation by the Chinese government (Han 2017).
China began its first pilot triangular cooperation programme 
with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO) in 2008. The scope of its engagement with the modality 
has steadily increased since then (Han 2017; Gu, Li and Zhang, this 
IDS Bulletin). Triangular cooperation was mentioned in the first 
White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid, published in 2011 (SCIO 2011). 
In the second White Paper, published in 2014, it was reported that 
the scope of Chinese triangular cooperation had widened from 
working with multilateral partners to also working with bilateral 
facilitating partners (SCIO 2014).
In the White Paper on China’s International Development 
Cooperation in the New Era, published in 2021, triangular 
cooperation was linked closely to the exchange with other 
actors in international development cooperation. In the 2021 
White Paper engaging with North–South cooperation actors, 
on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, 
triangular cooperation is presented as a modality that is to be 
steadily advanced, building on a complementarity of strengths 
Source Authors’ own, based on data from Kitano and Miyabayashi (2020).
Figure 2 Net disbursement of China’s foreign aid 
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and creating synergies. Guided by the principle of mutual respect 
and learning, triangular cooperation is said to benefit recipient 
countries. Projects are to be proposed, agreed and led by 
recipient countries (SCIO 2021).
When discussing comparative advantages used in a triangular 
setting, China sees the experience of its own fast development 
and established networks under its SSC framework as a distinct 
advantage. Recently itself a beneficiary country, the development 
needs of other developing countries are believed to be firmly 
understood and China’s development knowledge can be shared 
horizontally with other developing countries (Xu, Ma and Li 2019; 
Gu, Corbett and Leach 2019). China is engaging in triangular 
cooperation for several reasons. It enables China to share its own 
development experiences with other developing countries through 
more channels while at the same time providing development 
actors in China with the opportunity to learn from traditional donors 
(CSD 2021). China sends a signal through triangular cooperation to 
traditional donors that it is interested in cooperation (Zhang 2017). 
It is seen as having the potential of increasing the effectiveness 
of SSC while at the same time enhancing China’s global image 
(Han 2017). Triangular cooperation increases the volume and scope 
of China’s development cooperation, enabling it to draw from 
co‑financing and in‑kind support to leverage its resources (ibid.).
For the facilitating partner’s side, during a survey conducted 
by UNDP China with traditional donors, the reasons for wanting 
to engage with China in triangular cooperation were twofold: 
generating sustainable development impacts in beneficiary 
countries and broadening the partnership with China, including 
policy dialogues on development cooperation and international 
standards. Traditional donors wanted to better understand how 
China’s development cooperation system works, building on the 
lessons learned by China on lifting its population out of poverty, 
supporting China’s contribution to reaching the Sustainable 
Development Goals, and contributing together to the protection 
of global public goods. Triangular cooperation is seen as a tool to 
work together, advocating for OECD standards, and overcoming a 
lack of donor coordination and transparency (UNDP China 2020).
Beneficiary country perspectives differ depending on the specific 
cooperation context. Compared to bilateral or multilateral 
projects, triangular cooperation projects are usually smaller 
in scale. They are seen as providing a chance to harmonise 
donor initiatives and benefit from comparative advantages 
while pooling resources and identifying more effective ways of 
promoting development (IPRCC and OECD 2013).
China has partnered up with traditional donors and international 
organisations in numerous projects (see OECD 2013; MOFCOM 
2016; Tang 2019; Casado‑Asensio and Piefer 2018; UNDP China 
2020; CSD 2021).
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3 Approaches of China’s triangular cooperation with partner 
countries
In the absence of a clear unified definition of triangular 
cooperation, concrete projects tend to differ greatly in their 
set‑up regarding the three roles involved. This holds true for 
the triangular cooperation projects of China with partner 
countries. Traditional donors have deviating interpretations of 
triangular cooperation (UNDP China 2020), while China does not 
have a clear policy on it. With the establishment of the China 
International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA), the 
modality has gained momentum in the Chinese discourse, but 
projects are decided on a case‑by‑case basis (CSD 2021).
In the following three approaches, China and facilitating 
partners have developed triangular cooperation together 
with the beneficiary countries as discussed. The distinction is 
made by looking at the roles China and the facilitating partner 
take regarding financial contribution, expert provision, and 
implementation responsibility for the projects. The approaches 
are analysed for their potential of delivering impacts in two 
impact dimensions: the programmatic‑content dimension and 
the political‑strategic dimension (Kaplan et al. 2020). Because 
of the small number of triangular cooperation projects and the 
specificity of the project approaches, examples are given rather 
than the accumulated data analysed.
3.1 (a) Facilitating partner provides financial resources, pivotal 
partner provides expertise
In this approach, the facilitating partner provides the financial 
resources for the triangular cooperation project. In large part, the 
facilitating partner also takes over the responsibility for overall 
project management. Steering is done jointly with all parties 
involved in the project, but project management capacity is 
provided in most part by the traditional donor. As the pivotal 
partner, the Chinese contribution is to provide expertise and 
in‑kind support through Chinese participating institutions 
(UNDP China 2020). The comparative advantages of China are 
seen as being able to provide first‑hand Chinese development 
experience for other developing countries which are facing similar 
challenges to those that China faced (Gu and Carey 2019). The 
advantages of the traditional donor are seen in their project 
implementation structures in the beneficiary country and their 
financing lines into the beneficiary countries and China.
In China, the projects financially support the provision of Chinese 
expertise for all expertise which cannot be provided through 
Chinese in‑kind contributions. In the past, the approach was 
often utilised in triangular cooperation projects implemented 
between China, the UK, through the Department for International 
Development (DFID),7 and beneficiary countries. Examples of 
the approach are the following projects: Agriculture Technology 
Transfer (AgriTT) in Malawi and Uganda, the Global Health 
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Support Programme in Ethiopia, Myanmar, and Tanzania, and 
the Community Based Disaster Management Programme 
in Bangladesh and Nepal (Keeley 2017). A review of the 
three projects showed that they generated impact through 
the sharing of lessons and experience from China with the 
beneficiary countries, although it was found that this was not 
a straightforward process, with lessons often being not easily 
transferable. At the same time, Chinese partners were provided 
with exposure to UK management expertise, development 
frameworks, and other modes of operation. It was concluded 
that a triangular governance model improved the quality and 
effectiveness of the interventions, but that various challenges in 
implementation gave rise to the view that the modality was too 
management intensive (ibid.).
With regard to the political‑strategic dimension, the approach 
seems to have reaped benefits, as the evaluation emphasises 
that a platform was created for dialogue with China, and 
opportunities were created for the UK to learn more about China’s 
development cooperation system. Chinese actors also learn from 
different modes of operations used by the UK in development 
cooperation (ibid.). However, Chinese expertise was utilised 
only in the provision of expertise, not in planning processes, 
thus limiting the exposure to project cycle management. In 
the programmatic‑content dimension, the projects faced the 
issue of transferability of Chinese expertise, with language and 
cross‑cultural communication being an issue. Financing, also 
of Chinese inputs, was solely done by the UK. The approach 
thus does not seem to be able to leverage additional financial 
resources from the UK perspective.
3.2 (b) Pivotal partner provides financial resources, facilitating 
partner implements the projects
In this approach, China provides the financial resources necessary 
for project implementation. Traditional donor agencies within the 
UN system receive funding and implement the project on behalf 
of China for the benefit of the beneficiary country. Expertise and 
project management is organised by the UN agency, while Chinese 
contribution is focused on the provision of financial resources. The 
approach sees the comparative advantages in China’s ability to 
mobilise financial capital to benefit sustainable development in 
other developing countries. The expertise as well as the project 
management capacity of traditional donors is used and with 
China’s help, gaps in financing are bridged (UNDP China 2020).
The distinction between the triangular cooperation approach 
and multilateral development cooperation is that the financial 
resources provided by China are bundled into special funds, 
either managed by a UN organisation or managed by China 
but implemented by a UN organisation. Examples of these kinds 
of funds are the South–South Cooperation Assistance Fund, 
managed by CIDCA and the China International Center for 
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Economic and Technical Exchanges (CICETE), which had 
implemented projects with 14 international organisations by 
the end of 2019 (SCIO 2021) or the China‑IFAD South‑South 
and Trilateral Cooperation Facility, established in 2018, with a 
contribution of US$10m in supplementary funds from China to 
the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD 2021). 
Other dedicated funds by China exist within the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), International Labour 
Organization (ILO), United Nations Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs (UNDESA), and United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO).
Within the programmatic‑content dimension, the intervention’s 
effectiveness is the same as interventions financed through 
conventional multilateral channels, as established implementation 
channels of UN agencies are used. Beneficiaries thus benefit 
from additional resources that create development impacts, 
with all else being equal. The approach provides an opportunity 
on the political‑strategic dimension to further the integration of 
China into the multilateral landscape, although this is done in a 
donor‑implementing agency relationship between facilitating 
and pivotal partner.
Partnerships between the resource‑administrating bodies of 
the Chinese development cooperation system and the UN 
organisations are formed and learning can take place, especially 
on how fund management processes work. Mutual learning 
opportunities on development cooperation modalities, project 
set‑up, implementation, standards, and so forth for Chinese 
implementing actors are not part of the approach, as the 
Chinese contribution is focused on funding.
3.3 (c) Both pivotal and facilitating partner provide comparable 
financial resources, and they jointly plan and implement the 
projects with the beneficiary
In this approach, financial contributions, expertise provision, 
and project management are shared between China and the 
facilitating partner (traditional donor) on the request and for 
the benefit of the beneficiary (CSD 2021). Financial resources are 
provided in comparable volumes and along parallel financing lines 
either directly to the beneficiary country actors or to the respective 
development actors tasked with implementing the project from 
the Chinese and traditional donors’ side. As there is no mixing of 
funds, no distinction is made between provision of finance and 
in‑kind contributions of China and the traditional donor.
The projects are agreed upon between the three countries and 
each country tasks one or more of its implementing agencies 
with working together with the other two countries’ implementing 
agencies to jointly draft the project outline and implement the 
agreed‑upon interventions. The agencies are organised so as to 
bring their expertise and comparative advantage to the table. 
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A partnering up of the implementing agencies in the whole 
project cycle gives the opportunity to discuss and conceptualise 
projects in adherence to international standards. The 
approach is used by Germany when implementing its triangular 
cooperation projects with China, and special emphasis is put 
on comparability of contributions by China and Germany (ibid.). 
During implementation, agencies from all three countries provide 
expertise to reach the project goal and contribute to project 
management. At the time of writing, three triangular cooperation 
projects have been implemented in this fashion (see Section 4 
and Section 5).
On the programmatic‑content dimension, impacts of the 
interventions must be compared with the managerial task of 
coordination, which is extensive in this approach, as it needs all 
three parts of the triangle to come together during the whole 
project cycle. Mutual learning opportunities for implementing 
agencies, especially with regard to the standards, modalities, and 
concepts used by the other partners, as well as insights into their 
development cooperation systems are the most intense when 
compared to the other approaches. Regarding the political‑
strategic dimension, partnerships are strengthened on the 
political level, as well as on the implementation level.
4 Triangular cooperation between beneficiaries, China, and 
Germany
China and Germany have a long history of working successfully 
together on sustainable development, which goes back to the 
1980s. Until 2010, the focus was put on German development 
cooperation for the benefit of China. This approach then 
changed with China’s new position within the international 
development cooperation architecture (GIZ 2021). Germany 
started to engage in triangular cooperation in the late 2000s, 
seeing it as a bridge between South–South and North–South 
cooperation. The modality is utilised especially in Germany’s 
cooperation with emerging countries (Langendorf et al. 2012). 
Germany’s current political strategy on triangular cooperation 
defines it as a project which is jointly planned, financed, and 
implemented by a traditional donor, an emerging country, and a 
beneficiary country (BMZ 2013). For the German Federal Ministry 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), China is a 
global partner. In the 2021 BMZ position paper on global partners, 
cooperation with China is focused on providing global public 
goods, exchange based on good donor conduct, and triangular 
cooperation (BMZ 2021b).
In 2016, the BMZ and the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s 
Republic of China (MOFCOM) agreed to deepen their exchange 
on sustainable development, including identifying possibilities 
for triangular cooperation opportunities for the benefit of other 
developing countries (BMZ 2021a). The principles agreed upon 
were that the triangular cooperation projects would have to 
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be requested and led by the beneficiary countries. As a joint 
initiative, the BMZ and MOFCOM established the Sino‑German 
Center for Sustainable Development (CSD) in 2017. The mission 
of the CSD is to act as a catalyst and coordination mechanism 
between China, Germany, and partners in other developing 
countries to initiate, support, and evaluate triangular cooperation 
projects (CSD 2020a).
The CSD is politically steered by the BMZ and MOFCOM, while the 
triangular cooperation projects it houses are politically steered by 
the BMZ, MOFCOM, and the respective ministries in the beneficiary 
countries in Africa and Asia, with the mandate for development 
cooperation or the particular topic of the triangular cooperation 
project. At the implementation level within the CSD, the German 
side is represented by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH (German Agency for International 
Cooperation), while on the Chinese side, different partners 
contribute to the Centre’s activities. For the individual triangular 
cooperation projects, implementing partners are approved by the 
political partners (ministries in each country) of the projects, with 
each project including at least one implementation partner from 
each of the three countries in the triangle.
Through a jointly developed operation plan, roles are divided 
amongst the implementers, so each contributes to the project’s 
impact in accordance with their expertise and comparative 
advantage. Experiences from the initiation and implementation 
of triangular cooperation projects are then fed into the 
dialogue on development cooperation between Germany and 
China as well as international fora. Currently, three triangular 
cooperation projects are being implemented, with the partner 
countries of China and Germany being Ethiopia (Sustainable 
Textile Investment and Operation), Laos (Sino‑German technical 
vocational education and training (TVET) for rural jobs in Laos), 
and Namibia and Zambia (Fair and Effective Protected Area 
Management for Sustainable Development – Working Together 
for Global Standards).8 
With the founding of CIDCA in 2018, the landscape for 
cooperation partners within the triangular cooperation modality 
in China has widened. With the mandate to coordinate China’s 
international development cooperation, while most of the 
implementation work still lies with MOFCOM, CIDCA has become 
an exchange partner of the BMZ, also on the topic of triangular 
cooperation. Building on exchanges for mutual learning in 2019 
(CSD 2019) during the Sino‑German government consultations 
in 2021, CIDCA and the BMZ held a high‑level exchange which 
included discussing potential triangular cooperation projects 
(CIDCA 2021) and signing a memorandum of understanding (MoU) 
on strengthening the exchange on international development 
cooperation, also referring to triangular cooperation modalities 
(Die Bundesregierung 2021).
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5 A case study: sustainable textile production in Ethiopia
The triangular cooperation projects between China, Germany, 
and Ethiopia in the textile sector is an example of approach (c). 
As requested by Ethiopia, China and Germany have combined 
their efforts to support sustainable textile production in Ethiopia, 
with financial contributions, expertise provision, and project 
management tasks being shared between China and Germany in 
cooperation with their Ethiopian partners.
Ethiopia experienced a rapid growth in its textile and garment 
industry, with a number of domestic and international firms 
investing in the country. Chinese enterprises started moving 
their textile manufacturing operations overseas, with Ethiopia 
becoming an attractive destination. In 2019, China was the largest 
investor in Ethiopia, accounting for 60 per cent of newly approved 
foreign direct investment projects (UNCTAD 2020: 34). Germany’s 
development cooperation has focused on the textile and 
garment sector in Ethiopia and other African and Asian countries 
as a catalyst for job creation and sustainable development 
(BMZ 2019).
After the request by Ethiopia, the CSD brought together the 
partners of the three countries to work together with the 
aim of improving the environmental, social, and governance 
(ESG) standard of Ethiopia’s textile sector through capacity 
development and awareness raising for Chinese investors/factory 
managers and their Ethiopian business partners. MOFCOM named 
the China National Textile and Apparel Council (CNTAC) as the 
Chinese implementing partner. The BMZ named GIZ. The Ministry of 
Trade and Industry of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
named the Ethiopian Textile Industry Development Institute (ETIDI).
To ease the transition towards working together in the triangular 
modality, UNIDO was brought in through Chinese funding as 
an implementing partner (CSD 2020b). Building on cooperation 
formats that CNTAC and GIZ had successfully implemented 
together in Southeast Asia, a locally grounded approach in 
Ethiopia based on international standards was developed. 
Working from the baseline of how Chinese textile business 
investments in Ethiopia perform with regard to ESG standards, 
capacity development measures are being designed to improve 
the performance of Chinese‑invested and Ethiopian‑owned 
textile businesses. These development measures may include 
occupational skills training for local workers and the development 
of sustainability action plans for the factories.
An awareness of the Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact 
(United Nations Global Compact n.d.) will be raised through 
these measures, which will include digital technology to 
strengthen transparency and traceability, the support of market 
development, and the provision of policy review to help promote 
the textile sector. The insights gained from this project will then 
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inform the dialogue on further cooperation structures, as well as 
opening up the possibility of scaling up the approach into other 
African countries, as per their request (CSD 2020b).
Though the project implementation has been delayed due 
to the travel restrictions caused by the Covid‑19 pandemic, 
the first milestone, the baseline survey, was completed and 
compiled into a baseline report which will inform the design 
of capacity‑building measures, to be implemented in 2021. As 
such, the project is still ongoing, with the final evaluation of the 
development impacts for the target group and improvements in 
cooperation and partnership between all three partner countries 
(and UNIDO) still to follow upon completion of the project.
The preparation phase, the setting up of the political as well as 
the implementation infrastructure, has already proven to show 
mutual learning effects, regarding the respective development 
cooperation approaches of the parties involved. Especially during 
the preparation phase, the effects on the political‑strategic 
impact dimension of triangular cooperation can be seen. 
Through the joint exercise of project designing, political approval 
processes, and funding procedures, insights have been gained 
into Chinese and German approaches towards development 
cooperation and their standards, while at the same time the 
inclusion of UNIDO and the UN Global Compact principles have 
provided all participating actors with a chance to exchange 
on them. At the same time, partnerships between the three 
countries have been strengthened and networks built up (also 
into the UN system), which will be utilised during the course of 
implementation of the project activities, and potentially further 
cooperation projects in other sectors.
6 Conclusion
Within the changing landscape of international development 
cooperation and the emergence of non‑DAC donors and shifts 
in the traditional role of donor–recipient relationships, triangular 
cooperation, as a modality to utilise comparative strengths 
of traditional and emerging donors, has gained momentum. 
The absence of a clear and universally accepted definition of 
triangular cooperation has led to many different interpretations 
on how triangular cooperation projects are set up in practice. 
This is evident by the multitude of different approaches within the 
triangular cooperation modality implemented between China, 
traditional donors, and beneficiary countries. When analysed 
against the two impact dimensions inherent to triangular 
cooperation, the programmatic‑content dimension and the 
political‑strategic dimension, the approaches reveal different 
strengths and weaknesses. The approach used mostly by 
Germany in its triangular cooperation with China is distinguished 
by the joint financing, designing, and implementing of triangular 
cooperation interventions. In the political‑strategic dimension, the 
approach gives the most opportunity for the deep collaboration 
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of partners, not only on the project level, but also on the level of 
the development cooperation system.
This provides all actors with intensive opportunities for mutual 
learning, especially with regard to the modalities, concepts, and 
international standards the other actors adhere to. Compared 
to the UK or the UN system, both of which have been active 
with China in the triangular cooperation modality for over a 
decade (although the UK currently does not have any triangular 
cooperation projects with China), Germany is relatively new to 
triangular cooperation with China, starting the process in earnest 
in 2017.
Through the creation of the Sino‑German Center for Sustainable 
Development, the modality was institutionalised within the 
partnership between China and Germany on sustainable 
development. As such, the political‑strategic dimension of 
improving partnerships through triangular cooperation is 
already on display. Opportunities have been created to share 
international standards, discuss modalities, and learn more about 
others’ development cooperation systems. With the first triangular 
cooperation projects set to complete in 2022, their effectiveness 
in impact delivery in the programmatic‑content dimension will be 
able to be assessed.
Notes
*  This IDS Bulletin was produced as part of the UK Anchor 
Institution for the China International Development 
Research Network, funded by the Foreign, Commonwealth 
& Development Office (FCDO). The opinions expressed are 
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or 
policies of IDS or the UK government.
  The authors hereby thank the reviewers for their invaluable 
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Glossary
AAGC Asia–Africa Growth Corridor
ACET African Centre for Economic Transformation [Ghana]
AF Amity Foundation [China]
AgriTT Agriculture Technology Transfer
AHP Analytic Hierarchy Process
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank [China]
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations [Indonesia]
ATDC Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre
BENEFIT Bilateral Ethio-Netherlands Effort for Food, Income and 
Trade [Ethiopia]
BMGF Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation [USA]
BMZ Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und 
Entwicklung [Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development] [Germany]
BOT Build-Operate-Transfer
BRF Belt and Road Forum
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CANGO China Association for NGO Cooperation
CAU China Agricultural University
CBDIRF China Birth Defect Intervention and Relief Foundation
CCF China Confucius Foundation
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CCTF China Children and Teenagers’ Fund
CDB China Development Bank
CDRF China Development Research Foundation
CEPF China Environmental Protection Foundation
CFC China Foundation Center
CFCAC China Foundation of Culture and Art for Children
CFCHC China Foundation for Cultural Heritage Conservation
CFFPD China Friendship Foundation for Peace and Development
CFHRD China Foundation for Human Rights Development
CFPA China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation
CFPD China Foundation for Peace and Development
CFYEE China Foundation for Youth Entrepreneurship and 
Employment
CGCF China Green Carbon Foundation
CGD Center for Global Development
CGIAR formerly Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research [France]
CIC capacity for international cooperation
CIC China Investment Corporation
CICETE China International Center for Economic and Technical 
Exchanges
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CIDCA China International Development Cooperation Agency
CIDGA College of International Development and Global 
Agriculture (China Agricultural University)
CIDRN China International Development Research Network
CIMF China International Medical Foundation
CINF-BNU Center for International NGOs and Foundations/Beijing 
Normal University 
CLAC China-LAC Cooperation Fund
CLAI China-LAC Industrial Cooperation Investment Fund
CLEF Chinese Language and Culture Education Foundation of 
China
CNIE China NGO Network for International Exchanges
CNTAC China National Textile and Apparel Council
CPC Communist Party of China
CRCF Chinese Red Cross Foundation
CSAF China Social Assistance Foundation
CSCF COSCO Shipping Charity Foundation
CSD Center for Sustainable Development [China]
CSDF China Symphony Development Foundation
CSO civil society organisation
CSR corporate social responsibility
CTF China Organ Transplantation Development Foundation
CVSF China Volunteer Service Foundation
CWDF China Women’s Development Foundation
CYDF China Youth Development Foundation
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DEval German Institute for Development Evaluation
DFI development financing institution 
DFID Department for International Development [UK]
DIE Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik [Germany]
DSSI Debt Service Suspension Initiative
ECOSOC United Nations Economic and Social Council [USA]
EIAR Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research
ESG environmental, social, and governance
ETIDI Ethiopian Textile Industry Development Institute
FAC Future Agricultures Consortium [UK]
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
[Italy]
FCDO Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office [UK]
FOCAC Forum on China–Africa Cooperation [China]
GDP gross domestic product
GEI Global Environment Institute [USA]
GHF China Guang Hua Science and Technology Foundation
GIZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
[German Corporation for International Cooperation GmbH]
GmbH Gesellschaft mit Beschränkter Haftung [limited liability 
company]
GNI gross national income
GONGO government-organised non-governmental organisation
GPI Global Partnership Initiative on Effective Triangular 
Cooperation [France]
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GTP Growth and Transformation Plan [Ethiopia]
IDRC International Development Research Centre [Canada]
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development [Italy]
IIAM Instituto de Investigação Agrária de Moçambique [Institute 
of Agricultural Research Mozambique]
ILO International Labour Organization [Switzerland]
IMF International Monetary Fund [USA]
IMLNF Inner Mongolia Lao Niu Foundation
INGO international non-governmental organisation
IPRCC International Poverty Reduction Center in China
ISEFC International Scientific Exchange Foundation of China
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
LDC least developed country
LGFV local government financing vehicle
LSCF Lingshan Charitable Foundation [China]
MCA Ministry of Civil Affairs [China]
MDB multilateral development bank
MDG Millennium Development Goal
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs [China]
MoA Ministry of Agriculture [Ethiopia]
MOA Ministry of Agriculture [China]
MOE Ministry of Education [China]
MOF Ministry of Finance [China]
MOFCOM Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China
MOST Ministry of Science and Technology [China]
MoU memorandum of understanding
MST Ministry of Science and Technology [Mozambique]
NDB New Development Bank [China]
NDRC National Development and Reform Commission [China]
NeST Network of Southern Think Tanks [India]
NGO non-governmental organisation
NHFPC National Health and Family Planning Commission [China]
NSC North–South cooperation
NSE New Structural Economics
OCA organisational capacity assessment
OCCFC Overseas Chinese Charity Foundation of China
ODA official development assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development [France]
OECD-DAC Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development-Development Assistance Committee [France]
OPHI Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative [UK]
PDIA Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation
PEDSA Plano Estratégico para o Desenvolvimento do 
Sector Agrário [Strategic Plan for Agricultural Development] 
[Mozambique]
PNISA Plano de Investimento no Sector Agrário [National 
Investment Plan for the Agricultural Sector] [Mozambique]
PPP public–private partnership
PPP purchasing power parity
SCIO State Council Information Office [China]
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SDG Sustainable Development Goal
SEZ Special Economic Zone
SHACF Shanghai Adream Charitable Foundation [China]
SMEs small and medium-sized enterprises
SMU Singapore Management University
SOCF Shanghai Overseas Chinese Foundation [China]
SOE state-owned enterprise
SOP standard operating procedure
SSC South–South cooperation
SSCAF South–South Cooperation Assistance Fund
SZOFCF Shenzhen One Foundation Charity Fund [China]
TOSSD Total Official Support for Sustainable Development
TVET technical vocational education and training
TXZEF Tao Xingzhi Education Foundation [China]
UN United Nations
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
[Switzerland]
UNDESA United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs [USA]
UNDP United Nations Development Programme [USA]
UNDS UN Development System
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme [Kenya]
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization [USA]
WB World Bank [USA]
WIFA Wu Zuoren International Foundation of Fine Arts [China]
YCCSEF You Change China Social Entrepreneur Foundation
YPLCF Yu Panglin Charity Foundation [China]
ZTEF ZTE Foundation [China]
ZUEF Zhejiang University Education Foundation [China]
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